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Viewing cable 07JAKARTA2421, DAS MARCIEL'S MEETINGS WITH DEPLU DG HADI AND SBY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07JAKARTA2421 2007-09-04 09:28 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Jakarta
VZCZCXRO7282
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #2421/01 2470928
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 040928Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6048
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0087
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4263
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1095
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1328
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY 3415
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4159
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0725
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1705
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0664
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002421 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, NEA/I, PM, T, DRL/PHD, 
ISN/RA, IO/UNP, OBO, H, CA/OCS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2017 
TAGS: PREL MARR PHUM CACS ID
SUBJECT: DAS MARCIEL'S MEETINGS WITH DEPLU DG HADI AND SBY 
ADVISOR DJALAL 
 
JAKARTA 00002421  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak for reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: In separate August 28 meetings, EAP Deputy 
Assistant Secretary Scot Marciel discussed a range of 
bilateral issues with Andri Hadi, Director General for 
Information and Public Diplomacy at the Department of Foreign 
Affairs (DEPLU), and with Dino Djalal, advisor to President 
Yudhoyono.  Agreeing that the U.S.-Indonesia relationship was 
in good shape, they discussed the normalization of military 
ties; progress on human rights and accountability; possible 
UNSCR action on Iran's nuclear program; the situation in 
Papua; the USG travel warning on Indonesia and the status of 
the Embassy's land purchase.  END SUMMARY 
 
MILITARY TIES AND CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS 
---------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Noting that there were no longer legislative 
restrictions on U.S. military assistance to Indonesia, DG 
Hadi asked why the USG recently denied export licenses for 
Indonesian military (TNI) firearm purchases.  DAS Marciel 
explained that Secretary Rice had told Congress that the 
Administration would move steadily to reestablish normal 
military ties with Indonesia.  We would not rush ahead too 
fast but neither would we move backwards on our military 
relationship.  Congress was closely examining TNI's progress 
on human rights and accountability.  Moving forward too 
quickly might provoke backtracking on the progress we had 
already made.  As an example of this incremental movement, 
the USG had approved the sale of approximately 30 competition 
pistols for the TNI but decided that it was too soon for a 
larger sale of nearly 400 pistols. 
 
3. (C) Hadi, who until four months ago was DCM at the 
Indonesian Embassy in Washington, stressed that the GOI was 
committed to addressing USG and Congressional concerns and 
wanted to show Congress how far Indonesia had come.  He noted 
that some key Congress members and staffers had never visited 
Indonesia and suggested their understanding was based on 
obsolete information.  He reiterated that Indonesia welcomed 
Congressional visitors. 
 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
-------------- 
 
4. (C) DAS Marciel also stressed the importance of 
accountability for past human rights violations by TNI and 
other elements of the Indonesian security services.  He noted 
that recent developments in the Munir trial were a positive 
sign but cautioned that Indonesia needed to make further 
progress on this front.  The Indonesian Special Forces' 
(KOPASSUS) feting of Tommy Suharto at a recent shooting 
competition raised questions about Indonesia's commitment to 
accountability.  DAS Marciel also pointed to the recent 
appointment of Col. Burhanuddin Siagian, who had been accused 
of serious human rights violations in East Timor, to a 
sub-regional military command in Papua.  Incidents like these 
cast doubt on TNI's commitment to accountability.  Indonesia 
should pursue accountability not because the U.S. requested 
it do so but because it was important for Indonesia's 
democratic development.  DG Hadi agreed both incidents cast 
Indonesia in a bad light and admitted DEPLU had been caught 
off guard by the KOPASSUS event with Tommy Suharto.  He added 
that accountability was a sensitive issue within the GOI but 
that Indonesia was committed to it. 
 
IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM 
---------------------- 
 
5. (C) DAS Marciel asked for the GOI's views on Iran's 
nuclear program, noting that the UNSC would likely return to 
the issue in the near future.  DG Hadi replied that he could 
not say how the GOI might vote without seeing the text of a 
 
JAKARTA 00002421  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
proposed resolution.  Indonesia remained committed to 
supporting international nonproliferation norms but faced a 
complex domestic political environment.  Hadi noted 65% of 
the Indonesian public supported the government's yes vote on 
UNSCR 1747, according to a survey in the Indonesian media. 
 
6. (C) DG Hadi explained that Indonesian support for another 
resolution would depend on successful lobbying of the 
Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR), a key 
responsibility of his current position.  A small number 
hard-line Islamists in the DPR, such as Abdila Toaha, were 
implacably opposed to any resolution on ideological grounds. 
(Note: Other DEPLU contacts have mentioned Toaha as the DPR's 
most committed supporter of Iran. End Note.)  The majority of 
DPR members had no strong connection with Iran and, unlike 
the Islamists, might be persuaded to support the GOI's yes 
vote on the next resolution.  He added that many DPR members 
were eyeing the 2009 general election and would act based on 
domestic political calculations, not on the substance of any 
UNSCR.  DAS Marciel added that the USG understood Indonesia's 
domestic concerns and stressed that we would consult closely 
with Indonesia on any future UNSCR action. 
 
7. (C) Presidential advisor Djalal cautioned that it would be 
difficult for Indonesia to support another UNSCR on Iran as 
long as Iran appeared to be cooperating with the IAEA.  The 
GOI opposed harsh or punitive language in the resolution and 
wanted the UNSC process to be "part of the solution."  Djalal 
denied that domestic opposition to Indonesia's support of 
UNSCR 1747 had given SBY cold feet about supporting another 
resolution. 
 
IRAQ 
---- 
 
8. (C) Djalal said that, although a segment of the Indonesian 
population criticized U.S. policy in the Middle East, 
President Yudhoyono wanted to play a helpful role on Iraq. 
Noting SBY would meet Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki on the 
margins of the UNGA in New York, Djalal asked whether 
Washington had any specific message SBY should deliver. 
 
PAPUA 
----- 
 
9. (SBU) DAS Marciel thanked DG Hadi for his help with the 
successful July visit of Representative Eni Faleomavaega and 
said he might visit Indonesia again in December.  DG Hadi 
agreed the visit had been a success and Rep. Faleomavaega had 
left with a deeper understanding of the situation in 
Indonesia.  The key was to build confidence between Rep. 
Faleomavaega and the GOI.  Rep. Faleomavaega had to be 
confident that the GOI was working hard to improve the lives 
of the Papuan people, while he GOI needed to be confident 
that Rep. Faleomavaega did not have a hidden agenda of 
promoting Papuan independence.  While it was not possible for 
Rep. Faleomavaega to visit Papua during his July trip, DG 
Hadi said, he would be welcome there in December. 
 
TRAVEL WARNING 
-------------- 
 
10. (SBU) Noting that Indonesia had been free from a 
terrorist attack for over two years and had a number of 
recent counterterrorism successes, DG Hadi asked whether the 
USG would consider revising its travel warning.  DAS Marciel 
responded that we had already revised the travel warning this 
year and were continually reviewing the security situation in 
Indonesia.  He stressed that revision of travel warnings was 
not a political decision and was based solely on an 
evaluation of security conditions. 
 
EMBASSY LAND 
 
JAKARTA 00002421  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
------------ 
 
11. (SBU) DAS Marciel asked about the GOI's decision on 
selling the last of four plots of land which comprise the 
Embassy compound.  (Note:  The Embassy compound consists of 
four parcels of land.  The USG owns two outright and the GOI 
has already decided to sell the third to us.  We are awaiting 
their decision on the final parcel, the purchase of which is 
required to begin construction of a new Embassy.  End Note.) 
DG Hadi replied that the Finance Ministry was still 
soliciting the views of GOI entities that had equities in the 
issue.  He did not know when the GOI would make a decision 
but assured DAS Marciel that DEPLU was pursuing the matter 
through the GOI's interagency process. 
 
12. (U) DAS Marciel approved this message. 
HUME