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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 004008 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2017 
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV PK
SUBJECT: REASSURING PAKISTAN ON THE F-16 SALE 
 
REF: A. ISLAMABAD 3658 
     ¶B. ISLAMABAD 3526 
     ¶C. ISLAMABAD 3168 
 
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  In meetings with the Deputy Secretary last 
week, President Musharraf, Prime Minister Aziz and Foreign 
Secretary Khan told us the U.S. had violated the F-16 
 
SIPDIS 
agreement with Pakistan.  A series of misunderstandings and 
delays, including important ones on our part, has prompted 
Pakistan to cease payment, at least until these issues can be 
resolved.  We know many in Washington are dismayed by what 
they consider a juvenile reaction on Pakistan's part.  But it 
is hard to exaggerate the effect the failure of the F-16 sale 
would have on U.S. relations with Pakistan and on our allies 
in the Pakistani military.  While many of the issues are 
technical, they have now crossed into the political realm. 
Musharraf himself appears to be increasingly concerned about 
political fallout from unresolved issues with the sale.  The 
upcoming visit of Air Chief Tanvir will offer a chance to 
address these topics.  In our view, the outstanding F-16 
related issues would more usefully be addressed as a package 
and not as discrete (and often confusing) technical and legal 
issues.  We recommend the U.S. Government offer Pakistan 
assurances that the United States is committed to this sale, 
while reassuring the Air Chief that a number of the 
restrictions are not unique to Pakistan.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) During meetings last week with the Deputy Secretary 
(septels), President Musharraf, Prime Minister Aziz and 
Foreign Secretary Khan all raised concern about problems 
relating to the F-16 sale.  Musharraf said that the Air Force 
believed the U.S. had "violated" the agreement intentionally 
and he urged that we resolve this problem before it 
undermined bilateral relations.  Musharraf was particularly 
agitated about the F-16 sale during his September 16 meeting 
with CODEL Boehner, as he emphasized that the "man in the 
street" (i.e. voter) was aware of the previously failed F-16 
sale, and now it looked as if "history was repeating itself." 
 
 
¶3. (C) The Prime Minister characterized the U.S. as "moving 
the goalposts" and confirmed what Defense Production 
Additional Secretary MG Tariq Salim Malik wrote in a 
September 1 letter to DSCA Director Admiral Wieringa, namely 
that Pakistan would cease making payments on this case until 
problems are resolved.  Air Chief Marshal Tanvir Mehmood 
Ahmed reiterated  his concerns to Office of Defense 
Representative MG Helmly on September 14.  We understand the 
next payment was due September 15.  (We also understand that, 
as a practical matter, there is a grace period of several 
weeks.) 
 
Need for Reassurance 
-------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) The decision to pursue this $3 billion deal was 
difficult for Pakistan.  Air Chief Marshal Tanvir overcame 
the Finance Minister's concerns about the cost of the planes 
and the diversion of spending from social programs.  Tanvir's 
military colleagues warned him the U.S. would repeat the 
Pressler Amendment sanctions experience of the l990s when the 
Pakistanis paid for F-16s that were never delivered.  Now, 
the Air Chief, who is pro-American, is embarrassed and 
weakened by the perception among his colleagues that the sale 
-- for whatever reason -- will not be successful.  Much of 
his aggressive demeanor relates to his weakened standing. 
Moreover, President Musharraf views this sale as a symbol of 
a long-term U.S. commitment to Pakistan and a singular 
benefit of his alliance with us. 
 
¶5. (C) From our standpoint, the sale was a strategic decision 
to rebuild relations with a nation critical to the war on 
terror, despite Congressional and technology transfer 
concerns.  The notification that the MLU upgrade could not be 
performed in Pakistan was made just as the press reported the 
findings of the NIE and the passage of 9/11 Commission 
recommendations with its Pakistan-related provisions.  Our 
notification to the Pakistanis of this decision a year after 
it was resolved in Washington has further clouded the 
picture.  Much of the Pakistani mistrust is based on 
incomplete understanding of our security assistance process, 
and an assumption they are being singled out for specific 
 
ISLAMABAD 00004008  002 OF 003 
 
 
conditions on the F-16 sale.  We can effectively address 
these concerns and should do so quickly. 
 
Problems & Recommendations 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) In September 2006, Pakistan signed an LOA to  purchase 
18 new F-16 fighter aircraft; it also agreed to  purchase 34 
MLU kits, with the option of buying an additional 26 to 
support the used Excess Defense Articles (EDA) USAF planes 
being  provided to them.  Four EDA F-16s have been delivered; 
delivery of the new planes is scheduled to begin in January 
¶2010. 
 
Mid-Life Upgrades 
----------------- 
 
¶7. (C) In August 2007 (ref C), Ambassador advised the Air 
Chief Marshal of a letter signed by the Secretary in July 
2006 assuring the HIRC (now HFAC) and SFRC Chairmen that the 
MLUs would  not be performed in Pakistan.  At the time the 
LOA was signed on September 30, 2006, neither post nor 
Pakistan was aware of the Secretary's letter.  The LOA does 
not state that the MLUs can be performed in Pakistan, but 
Pakistan inferred that the clause relating to U.S. training 
of Pakistani technicians meant that the MLUs would occur in 
Pakistan. 
 
¶8. (C) The Deputy Secretary in his meetings made it clear 
that the Secretary's decision was final.  But we need to 
provide the background of our decision and smooth the way for 
helping Pakistan perform the MLUs in a third country. 
Pakistan cannot carry out the upgrades elsewhere without our 
help. 
 
¶9. (C) Recommendation:  (1) As a follow-up to their meeting, 
a message from the Deputy Secretary to President Musharraf 
reassuring him of our commitment to this sale and pledging to 
work together to resolve outstanding concerns.  This should 
be delivered  before the September visit to Washington of Air 
Chief Marshal Tanvir.  (2)  We thank DSCA Director Admiral 
Wieringa for his offer to meet with Tanvir and recommend he 
explain our decision and offer specific DCSA assistance in 
helping the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) evaluate its options and 
implement its decision on where to perform the MLUs. 
 
Basing 
------ 
 
¶10. (C) Reftels explain in detail the problems of the 
proposed security plan for basing the new F-16s in Pakistan. 
Simply put, the requirement to base separately the F-16s and 
foreign-origin SAR and support aircraft is impractical and 
will undermine the safety and effectiveness of air 
operations. 
 
¶11. (C) Recommendation:  Use Air Chief Marshal Tanvir's visit 
to brief key Congressional interlocutors and build support 
for Congressional approval of alternative basing proposals 
that both protect U.S. technology and allow the PAF 
reasonable air operations. 
 
Encrypted Software 
------------------ 
 
¶12. (S) Additional Secretary MG Malik in his letter to DSCA 
cites as additional evidence of our lack of transparency the 
fact that the LOA did not contain provisions explaining the 
need for encrypted devices.  He fears the U.S. will be able 
to limit the capability of the F-16s by withholding access to 
the cryptokeys. 
 
¶13. (S) Recommendation:  We need to explain to the Pakistanis 
that the provision was in the LOA and many countries are 
subject to the same restrictions.  The Pakistanis do not 
fully understand our requirements for sharing encrypted 
devices and need to be reassured that the aircraft will still 
fly without the cryptokeys.  A briefing for Air Marshal 
Tanvir and/or his staff could resolve this misunderstanding. 
 
Link-16 
------- 
 
¶14. (S) When Pakistan signed the LOA, they were aware that 
 
ISLAMABAD 00004008  003 OF 003 
 
 
the Link-16 command and control technology had not yet been 
approved for release to Pakistan but assumed it would occur 
in a timely fashion.  The delay in approval concerns them. 
 
¶15. (S) Recommendation:  The Joint Chiefs of Staff has 
approved the release; the decision now rests with the 
National Security Agency.  We understand that the Defense 
Intelligence Agency has some concerns about potential 
technology transfer, and CENTCOM is working to address those 
concerns.  This issue needs to be resolved quickly. 
 
Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶16. (S) Pakistan was previously cleared for separate elements 
of DRFM; now they need approval for the whole package.  USAF 
supports immediate release, but the Defense Technology 
Security Administration appears to have concerns.  SAF/IA is 
meeting this week with DTSA to review the issue. 
 
¶17. (C) Recommendation:  This decision process needs to be 
accelerated. 
 
¶18. (C) The National Disclosure Policy Committee will return 
to Pakistan in December to perform a security survey to 
confirm adequate Pakistani protection of U.S. classified 
information.  Tanvir is eager to participate in this survey 
and is working to meet the security restrictions as stated in 
the LOA.  We should make it clear to Tanvir that we can speed 
up the approval process of Link-16 and DRFM with enhanced 
cooperation on this survey. 
 
¶19. (C) We suggest Washington agencies address these issues 
as a package with Tanvir.  Of particular concern to the 
Pakistanis is the completion of the mid-life upgrades in a 
third country.  This can be resolved by U.S. engagement that 
reduces Pakistan's costs and involves Pakistani technicians 
in the third-country effort. 
 
PATTERSON