VZCZCXRO7711
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDIR #0060/01 2471620
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 041620Z SEP 07
FM IRAN RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0180
INFO RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0164
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0130
RUEHAD/USDAO ABU DHABI TC
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI 0173
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDHP/DIA DHP-1 WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000060 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR GAYLE, BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD 
BAKU FOR HAUGEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  9/4/2017 
TAGS: IR PGOV MARR PTER
SUBJECT: NEW IRGC HEAD JAFARI DESCRIBED AS A BETTER SOLDIER AND 
MODERATE THAN SAFAVI 
 
REF: RPO DUBAI 0055 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000060  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian Burns, Director, Iran Regional Presence 
Office, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
 
1.(S//NF) Summary:  A contact who claims to have worked for 
three years as the deputy of new IRGC head Jafari described him 
as an excellent soldier, a war hero, and more moderate than his 
predecessor Safavi.  The contact did not think the timing of the 
change was linked to rumors that the US would designate the IRGC 
as a terrorist group.  He claimed that it was a normal rotation, 
actually overdue, requested by Safavi.  He also claimed that two 
groups had been working for Safavi's ouster: an internal group 
including Jafari who disagreed with Safavi over administrative 
matters, and an external group led by Deputy Interior Minister 
Zolqadr who disagreed with Safavi over political issues.  The 
contact clearly thought Jafari was better qualified for the job 
for Safavi, but at the same time noted that he thought the 
appointment signified that Iran was seriously preparing itself 
in case of military attack.  End Summary 
 
2.(U) Supreme Leader Khamenei named Brigadier General Mohammad 
Ali Jafari to replace Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi as head 
of the IRGC September 1 and promoted him to major general. 
Khamenei appointed Safavi as his advisor for military affairs. 
(Note:  In a subsequent press interview, Safavi noted it was the 
first time the Supreme Leader has appointed a military commander 
as an advisor. Endnote) 
 
3.(S//NF) An ongoing contact, purported a former IRGC general, 
said he served as Mohammad Ali Jafari's deputy for three years 
while Jafari headed the IRGC infantry.  The contact said he 
worked in the budget and planning office.  The former general 
clearly has a positive opinion of Jafari, describing him as a 
good soldier and a good man.  He said Jafari is tough, a 
professional soldier, a war hero, a better organizer and fighter 
than Safavi.  He also believed that Jafari is more moderate than 
Safavi and not political.  He claimed that Jafari is not in the 
group close to Ahmadinejad.  In his judgment, Jafari does not 
lie, and he thought Jafari would give the Supreme Leader 
realistic assessments of Iran's military capabilities.  The 
contact said that Jafari, an architectural engineer by training, 
has long been involved in the IRGC's traditional construction 
projects, but claimed that Jafari is opposed to IRGC's 
involvement in business, licit or otherwise. 
 
Reasons for change 
----------------------- 
 
4.(S//NF) The contact said that Jafari would not seek conflict 
but if ordered to fight, would do a better job than Safavi.  He 
believed the significance of the selection of Jafari to be that 
Iran was seriously preparing itself for the threat of war. 
(Note:  When asked how he thought Iran would respond in case of 
a military attack, the former IRGC general indicated he thought 
Iran would respond using both conventional and asymmetrical 
means.  Endnote)  The contact, similar to analysts quoted in 
various press reports, did not think the timing of the 
announcement had anything to do with press reports that the US 
was considering designating the IRGC a terrorist entity.  He 
said the replacement of Safavi was a normal rotation, that in 
fact Safavi had been in his position for longer than normal.  He 
claimed that Safavi was "tired" and had been requesting to step 
down for a year. 
 
5.(S//NF) The ex-general also claimed that two separate groups 
had been working for Safavi's ouster.  One was a group internal 
to the IRGC which reportedly differed with Safavi over how the 
IRGC was being administered (NFI).  This group included 11 
commanders, of which Jafari was the most significant one, and 
was supported by former IRGC head Mohsen Rezaie, now secretary 
of the Expediency Council.  The second, external group was 
reportedly led by Deputy Interior Minister for security affairs 
Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr, formerly deputy IRGC commander, 
considered ultra-right wing.  This group reportedly had 
political differences with Safavi and thought he was too 
moderate. 
 
6.(S//NF) One apparent cause of friction between Safavi and 
Zolqadr was Zolqadr's alleged continued dominance over the Qods 
Force, as well as the IRGC counter-intelligence unit.  Zolqadr, 
before moving to the Interior Ministry, reportedly put his own 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000060  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
people in both organizations and retains significant influence 
over both organizations.  The ex-general claimed Zolqadr tried 
to recruit him when he was in the IRGC, promising him 
promotions, but Safavi warned him not to join with Zolqadr.  The 
contact, when asked about the Ramazan force, claimed that the 
Ramazan Force, led by Zolqadr, operated inside Iraq during the 
Iran-Iraq war but indicated that this group was no longer in 
existence.  He also claimed that Zolqadr and his group are 
backing hardline cleric Grand Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi to 
be the next Supreme Leader but for now do not have sufficient 
power to try to effect a change. 
 
7.(S//NF) According to the contact, Jafari and Zolqadr are not 
close and belong to different groups, but they are not enemies, 
like Safavi and Zolqadr.  One area in which Jafari and Zolqadr 
do not agree is reportedly Zolqadr's support for IRGC business 
activities. 
 
Jafari Biographic data 
------------------------- 
 
8.(S//NF) According to the contact, Jafari began university a 
year before the revolution.  After the revolution he volunteered 
to fight against the Iraqis and later joined the IRGC.  While 
still in his 20s, he headed the Western unit at one point during 
the war (reportedly there were three units - Northwestern, 
Western, and Southern).  The contact did not think Jafari had 
traveled outside of Iran.  According to press reports, Jafari 
was one of the 24 IRGC commanders who sent a letter to then 
President Khatami in 1999, threatening action if Khatami did not 
control the student demonstrations.  According to a September 3, 
2007 article in conservative Keyhan newspaper, Jafari was 
"active" in the US Embassy hostage-taking. 
 
Other comments 
----------------- 
 
9.(S//NF) The former general said he supports talks between the 
US and Iran, saying he believed Iran would take positive steps 
if it got a security guarantee from the US.  He made clear he 
had no information to confirm this but thought that the recent 
six month ceasefire announced by Moqtada al-Sadr in Iraq was 
likely the result of Iranian pressure and could be viewed as a 
positive outcome from the US-Iran Baghdad talks. 
 
10.(S//NF) The ex-general said the IRGC and the regular army 
were set up to be complementary, with different taskings, to 
avoid competition.  He said they copied the US system, modeling 
the IRGC on the US Marine Corp.  He claimed that years ago in a 
private meeting, Khomeini had told them to copy the US military 
and focus on long-term planning "like the Americans." 
 
11.(S//NF) Comment: While we have no way of confirming the 
contact's claim to have been an IRGC general and to have worked 
under Jafari, he was introduced by a long-time contact and 
appears from his comments to have a deep knowledge of the IRGC. 
He appeared uncomfortable only once, when IRPO Director asked 
about the Ramazan Force, as if he had not been prepared to talk 
about it.  He reportedly left the IRGC over eight years ago but 
claims continued contact with regime insiders.  He exhibits a 
clear dislike of the extreme right in Iran, calling President 
Ahmadinejad "crazy."  End comment 
BURNS