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DE RUEHJB #0656/01 2541507
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0574
INFO RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0044

UNCLAS BUJUMBURA 000656 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/C 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PINR PGOV BY PREL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT 
SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS JAMES SWAN 
 
 
SIPDIS 
 
¶1.  SUMMARY: Your visit to Burundi comes at yet another 
critical time in the country's modern political history. 
President Nkurunziza,s administration faces significant 
political challenges that could destabilize the government if 
unadressed.  Negotiations between the Government of Burundi 
(GOB) and the lone remaining rebel group, the PALIPEHUTU-FNL 
(FNL), broke down in July when FNL negotiators withdrew to 
the bush to &consult8 with their leader, Agathon Rwasa. 
Since then, a dissident FNL splinter group allegedly 
committed to a less confrontational posture came under attack 
in a Bujumbura suburb by pro-Rwasa FNL supporters, resulting 
in the deaths of at least twenty people.  The inter-FNL 
skirmish has raised new fears for renewed conflict, however 
both sides maintain they are committed to implementing the 
accords of the September 2006 cease-fire agreement 
peacefully. 
 
¶2. Successive episodes of corruption and a large civil 
service wage increase promised by the President have led to 
the temporary suspension of World Bank and other donor 
budgetary assistance totaling $93 million, pending a positive 
review by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of the 
current budget.  The IMF has established several 
prerequisites the GOB must fulfill to be eligible for a 
positive review.  In the meantime, civil servants, expecting 
a 34% salary increase promised by President Nkurunziza on May 
1, have gone unpaid, taxes have increased, and many 
government programs go unfunded. 
 
¶3.  A political stalemate in the National Assembly and the 
Senate has added to the tensions in Burundi as each side 
tries to out blame the other for the impasse.  In a 
frightening sign of the increasing hostilities, the homes of 
five parliamentarians suffered grenade attacks in a widely 
believed retaliation for signing a letter criticizing the 
government for its inaction.  No one was killed in the 
attacks and all political parties have since committed to 
resolve the stalemate through dialogue, and tensions have 
abated significantly, for the moment.  Throughout the 
disorder, the GOB remains committed to sending two battalions 
to take part in the AU Mission in Somalia.  The US has 
committed to train and outfit one of the two battalions.  END 
SUMMARY 
 
 
The Peace Process 
----------------- 
 
¶4.  In September 2006, President Nkurunziza,s government 
signed a cease-fire agreement with the FNL, the sole 
remaining rebel group, which had remained outside the peace 
process.  Nonetheless, the GOB faces significant challenges, 
which, if unresolved, could undermine its credibility and 
eventually lead to a return to violence.  The mandate for the 
UN Operations in Burundi (ONUB) expired on December 31, 2006; 
its remaining military forces (a South African infantry 
battalion) were literally &rehatted8 to fall under African 
Union sponsorship.  Several ONUB staff agencies were 
reconfigured in place to form the nucleus of the Integrated 
Bureau of the UN in Burundi (BINUB) to facilitate the FNL 
reintegration, among other security sector initiatives. 
 
¶5.  The government is now attempting to restart negotiations 
with FNL representatives to facilitate the demobilization and 
reintegration of former FNL combatants, and to integrate FNL 
political leaders into the current government.  In July, the 
Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JVMM) ceased to 
function, as FNL negotiators fled to the bush in dramatic 
fashion to &consult8 with their leader Agathon Rwasa.  The 
GOB and the FNL have since promised a return to dialogue and 
agreed to a meeting between President Nkurunziza and FNL 
leader Agathon Rwasa.  The Government of Tanzania (GOT), 
which hosts the FNL leaders, has given the two sides until 
December 31 to negotiate a settlement or lose GOT financial 
and logistical support for the process. Further complicating 
the negotiations, the FNL has written to the UN Secretary 
General, demanding South Africa be replaced as the 
facilitator for the FNL to continue to participate. 
 
¶6.  A group of so-called FNL dissidents allegedly weary of 
conflict and ready to implement cease fire accords with the 
GOB has formed, dividing the FNL.  The group is apparently 
growing in number but is strongly opposed by forces loyal to 
FNL leader Agathon Rwasa.  In a brazen show of force on 
September 3 and 4, pro-Rwasa troops attacked a contingent of 
dissident soldiers near the capital of Bujumbura, leaving at 
least 20 dead.  An FNL spokesman confirmed after the attacks 
that troops must remain devoted to the FNL cause or risk the 
same fate as their colleagues.  The Burundi Army has moved 
the dissident force away from Bujumbura for their security 
 
and has pledged to keep them protected.  A senior Burundi 
military official said privately today that if the pro-Rwasa 
forces attacked the dissident FNL forces under the Burundi 
Army's protection, the Burundi Army would engage the 
attackers. 
 
 
Political Situation 
------------------- 
 
¶7.  A political stalemate is ongoing in the Burundi National 
Assembly, with the President's fractured National Council for 
the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy 
(CNDD-FDD) party unable to unite to pass legislation. 
Opposition parties have become emboldened by the crisis in 
the ruling party and have stepped up efforts to impose their 
political will on the GOB.  Many of the parties are 
unfamiliar with the traditional role of an opposition party, 
and prefer to stymie the legislative process rather than 
compromise with opponents.  The CNDD)FDD is currently split 
between supporters of the President and supporters of 
ex-party President Hussein Radjabu. (Note: Radjabu was 
arrested in April for &threatening state security.8  He 
remains imprisoned, pending appeal.  End Note) 
 
¶8. In late August, the homes of five parliamentarians 
suffered grenade attacks in apparent reprisal for signing a 
letter of dissent against President Nkurunziza.  To date, no 
one has claimed responsibility for the attacks, but two body 
guards for one of the parliamentarians have been detained in 
connection with the incident.  The home of Pancrace Cimpaye, 
spokesmen for the opposition Front for Democracy in Burundi 
(FRODEBU), was raided a day after he accused CNDD-FDD party 
president Jeremie Ngendekumana of orchestrating the grenade 
attacks.  Cimpaye was not at home at the time and has since 
kept a low profile, remaining outside of police custody. 
 
¶9.  President Nkurunziza, under sustained pressure from the 
media, political parties, and the international community, 
reached out to opposition parties at the end of August to 
reestablish a dialogue and encourage them to work together 
for the people of Burundi.  The talks have yet to resolve the 
stalemate in the National Assembly, but are widely perceived 
as a positive step in the right direction. 
 
 
Budget Issues 
------------- 
 
¶10.  Notwithstanding the expectations raised by a highly 
successful donor conference in May, the Government of Burundi 
is currently facing a difficult financial situation.  Because 
of a high profile embezzlement scandal involving local 
petroleum importing company Interpetrol and a promised 34% 
salary increase for civil servants, the World Bank, the EU, 
and Norway have yet to disperse upwards of $100 million in 
budget support funds.  Dispersal of the funds is contingent 
upon IMF approval of the GOB budget.  The IMF has already 
conducted five budget reviews this year and is planning a 
sixth review after the IMF and World Bank annual meetings in 
Washington, D.C., October 19-21. 
 
¶11.  At the conclusion of its fifth budget review in August, 
the IMF delineated several prerequisites the GOB must meet 
before they will approve the budget.  The IMF stipulated that 
Burundi must backtrack on the President's promised 34% salary 
increase, as the money to finance it is unavailable.  Wages 
account for an astonishingly high 11%-12% of Burundi's 
budget, far more than in most developing countries where they 
account for only five to six percent.  In an effort to 
further reduce wages, the government must also make a good 
faith attempt to demobilize additional soldiers and police 
this year. 
 
¶12.  The IMF also instructed the GOB to recoup some of the 
$17 million dollars that disappeared as part of an alleged 
illegal payment to Interpetrol.  The missing funds were 
reportedly paid to the company to offset "exchange rate 
differentials" incurred by Interpetrol during the 
international embargo against Burundi during the civil war. 
The Minister of Finance has been replaced, the then Governor 
of the central bank arrested, and Interpetrol trucks seized 
at the border in an attempt to find the missing funds.  The 
GOB has also secured a freeze on $6 million in Interpetrol 
funds in a local bank; however, the GOB has yet to gain 
access to the money.  Finally, the IMF asked the GOB to 
increase taxes on several basic products, including gasoline, 
fizzy drinks, and sugar.  While the GOB has promised to 
implement the taxes, so far only the tax on sugar has been 
levied. 
 
 
 
AMISOM Deployment 
-------------------- 
 
¶13.  Burundi has pledged to support the African Union Mission 
to Somalia (AMISOM) with up to two battalions of roughly 850 
soldiers each.  The deployment has been delayed by the AU,s 
lack of organizational capacity, including its inability to 
find financiers for equipment and training for the volunteer 
troops.  The United States has stepped in to provide African 
Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) 
directed Expeditious Pre Deployment Training (EPDT) to the 
soldiers and will outfit one battalion with the full 
complement of equipment needed for the mission.  The AU is 
soliciting other donors to finance the second battalion.  The 
EPDT is currently underway and Burundian troops will deploy 
at the conclusion of the program and upon the arrival of all 
the necessary equipment. 
 
Conclusion 
---------- 
 
¶14. You visit here will help reinforce our message that the 
solution to the FNL problem is through peaceful negotiations, 
that this political impasse can only be solved through 
dialogue, and the GOB must take significant steps to arrest 
the continued corruption in this county.  Only by addressing 
these issues head-on will the GOB be able to govern 
efficiently and prosper economically.  Also, US support for 
the Burundi deployment to Somalia is strongly welcomed by the 
GOB in light of other donors inaction.  Your welcome visit 
here will underscore our continuing commitment to Burundi's 
AMISOM deployment and to the country's future as a key 
strategic partner. 
MOLLER