VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBU #1793/01 2531231
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 101231Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9183
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6405
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 001793 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
ISN FOR D. MAHLEY AND PAM DURHAM 
OES/SAT FOR B. FORD 
WHA/BSC FOR BRUCE FRIEDMAN 
CIA/WINPAC FOR J. CASKER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2017 
TAGS: MTCR KSCA PARM PREL MNUC ETTC TSPL AR
 SUBJECT: ARGENTINE PLANS TO DEVELOP A SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLE 
  
 REF: A. KELLY/MAHLEY TELCON 8/30 
      ¶B. FM TAIANA OP ED LA NACION 08/23 
      ¶C. 00 BUENOS AIRES 1211 AND PREVIOUS 
  
 Classified By: AMBASSADOR EARL ANTHONY WAYNE, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D) 
  
 ¶1. (U) This is an action request for ISN/MTR.  Please see 
 paragraph 11. 
  
 ------- 
 Summary 
 ------- 
  
 ¶2. (C) Argentine space agency head Dr. Conrad Varotto said 
 that the development of a space launch vehicle is essential 
 to Argentina's space program, and that Argentina has been 
 transparently pursuing the development of such a capability 
 for years.  Varotto stressed Argentina's commitment to 
 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines, and 
 expressed a personal willingness to meet with U.S. officials 
 to explain Argentina's position, address U.S. concerns about 
 the direction of Argentina's space program, and work toward a 
 mutually acceptable solution.  End Summary. 
  
 ----------------- 
 A Tangled History 
 ----------------- 
  
 ¶3. (U) Emboff visited Argentine space agency (CONAE) head Dr. 
 Conrad Varotto September 5 to informally present the U.S. 
 position with regard to Argentina's development of a space 
 launch vehicle (Ref A).  That effort made some headway 
 recently with the May test of a liquid-fuel rocket motor and 
 an August public acknowledgement by Foreign Minister Taiana 
 of the importance to Argentina of developing its own capacity 
 to reach space (Ref B). 
  
 ¶4. (C) Varotto appeared agitated when Emboff raised 
 Argentina's series of assurances since 1992 that it had no 
 plans to pursue an indigenous space launch vehicle (SLV) 
 capability, and countered that Argentina has long -- and 
 transparently -- sought such a capability.  Varotto stated 
 that the first such steps occurred in 1994, when he said he 
 approached an embassy staffer (""the science adviser"") with a 
 draft chapter of Argentina's official space planning document 
 that clearly articulated Argentina's desire to develop a SLV 
 capability.  The embassy official checked with superiors in 
 Washington and later said that the USG had no problem with 
 the document, according to Varotto.  He asserted that that 
 ""assurance"" led to a GOA presidential decree in 1997 
 specifying that Argentina should have access to space, which 
 in turn led to abortive GOA partnerships with Lockheed and 
 with Brazil and Ukraine. 
  
 ¶5. (C) Varotto also pointed out that when Argentina's 
 then-Foreign Minister Di Tella accepted the dismantling of 
 the Condor missile program in the early 1990's and promised 
 to eschew SLV development, that commitment was only ""for the 
 foreseeable future.""  Varotto argued that anything beyond 5-7 
 years could not be considered ""foreseeable.""  When Emboff 
 reminded Varotto that the GOA reaffirmed that commitment in 
 2000, Varotto said that the GOA had argued then that it 
 needed to develop a SLV capability, and that it hasn't 
 changed its view. 
  
 --------------- 
 A National Need 
 --------------- 
  
 ¶6. (C) Varotto made clear his view of the importance of an 
 indigenous SLV capability, saying Argentina ""cannot maintain 
 a space program without it.""  Although he characterized 
 U.S.-Argentina (and specifically NASA-CONAE) space 
 cooperation as ""excellent,"" Varotto went through a litany of 
 reasons why Argentina will not be able to continue relying on 
 the U.S. or others to get its satellites into space. 
 Specifically, he cited the high launch costs of ""acceptable"" 
 providers, and the GOA's unwillingness to run afoul of the 
 International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) by dealing 
 with lower-cost providers of launch services such as China or 
 India.  Developing its own SLV capability is the least costly 
 alternative for Argentina, Varotto said. 
  
 ¶7. (C) Costs and trade controls on sensitive technologies are 
 not the only factors pushing Argentina to develop its own SLV 
 capability, Varotto said.  There is also a question of 
 control, with Argentina as a junior partner unable to 
 guarantee that it will be able to place the instruments it 
 needs into space.  Extant and earlier partnerships have shown 
 that to be an acute problem, according to Varotto.  Citing 
 those factors, Varotto said ""Argentina cannot maintain a 
 space program with such constraints."" 
  
 ---------------- 
 A Plea for Talks 
 ---------------- 
  
 ¶8. (C) Varotto stressed Argentina's non-proliferation 
 credentials, saying that Argentina is a MTCR partner because 
 it believes in the Regime's guidelines.  He took pains to 
 express a willingness to answer any of our questions about 
 the Argentine SLV program, saying ""I'll get on a plane 
 tonight to talk to anyone who will listen to me.""  Varotto 
 said that he has been ""a friend of the U.S."" all his life, 
 and is hoping to work with the U.S. toward a mutually 
 acceptable solution.  He said that if the U.S. is able to 
 formulate a plan that solves Argentina's launch problems, 
 Argentina would ""stop its SLV program immediately.""  Varotto 
 suggested an arrangement whereby the U.S. could somehow 
 monitor Argentina's progress and certify that Argentina ""was 
 doing nothing wrong,"" saying he would willingly comply with 
 such a system.  He added: ""If there is no solution to our 
 launch problems, we will have to shut down our space program."" 
  
 ---------------------- 
 Comment: A Way Forward 
 ---------------------- 
  
 ¶9. (C) Varotto expressed his desire that the U.S. and 
 Argentina continue an informal dialogue on this issue.  He 
 pointed out that this is not a particularly time-sensitive 
 issue, noting in response to a question from Emboff that 
 Argentina hopes -- in a best-case scenario -- to have a 
 viable launch vehicle in ""under a decade."" 
  
 ¶10. (C) Post agrees that publicly articulating our 
 unhappiness with Argentina's SLV development would not be a 
 good idea at the time.  We are at the peak of the Argentine 
 election cycle, and a public expression of U.S. concern 
 offers the unattractive possibility of giving pre-election 
 fodder to a nationalistic government that has shown a 
 willingness to bait the U.S. for its own political ends.  If 
 the issue of Argentina's development of a SLV were to become 
 politicized, the chances of Argentina agreeing to a 
 resolution aceptable to the U.S. would diminish 
 considerably.  The prospect of initiating quiet, expert-level 
 talks with Varotto is therefore appealing.  While the Foreign 
 Minister's recent editorial underlining the importance to 
 Argentina of development of a launch vehicle likely 
 circumscribes Varotto's options, it is the Embassy's view 
 that we should take Varotto up on his offer to discuss 
 Argentina's plans with our experts in Washington, and proceed 
 from there. 
  
 ¶11. (U) Action request for ISN/MTR:  Dr. Varotto will be in 
 Washington D.C. the week of September 10 for meetings related 
 to the Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS), 
 and has indicated that he will be available for meetings on 
 Friday, September 14.  Please advise whether ISN/MTR or any 
 other interested USG entity wishes to meet with Dr. Varotto 
 at that time. 
 WAYNE