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RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0110
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000527 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS CVIS KOC YI RU LO
SUBJECT: FM KUBIS ON KOSOVO, MISSILE DEFENSE, CFE, AND 
AFGHANISTAN 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  During a cordial one-hour meeting on 
September 18, Ambassador Vallee and Foreign Minister Kubis 
discussed Kosovo, CFE, Missile Defense, and Afghanistan.   FM 
Kubis noted that he had begun to advocate in EU circles the 
idea of decoupling the results of the Troika process on 
Kosovo from the issue of an EU ESDP mission.  On missile 
defense, Kubis stressed that the GOS position has not 
changed, and that the Prime Minister,s recent critical 
comments reflected only his personal views and that of his 
party.  Citing impressions from his recent visit to The 
Hague, Kubis expressed serious concern about the ability of 
Allies to sustain long-term commitments in Afghanistan in the 
face of domestic political pressures.  Kubis expressed 
enthusiasm regarding the U.S. "parallel action" plan on CFE 
and a willingness to play a leading role, within the Alliance 
and with Russia, to promote the process.  End Summary. 
 
KOSOVO 
 
¶2. (C) Ambassador underscored the U.S. commitment to the 
Troika process, but urged Slovakia to begin prudent and 
discreet planning with its EU partners on how to deal with 
possible outcomes post December 10.   Kubis said that there 
is consensus within the EU on a number of points, including 
the need to support the Troika and EU Representative 
Ischinger.  At the same time, the EU will make clear to the 
parties that they will be judged on their performance, not 
their "EU vocations."  Kubis stressed that the EU would not 
stake out a common position, e.g., on UDI, that could 
prejudice the outcome, and urged that the U.S. follow a 
similar line.  Kubis emphasized that Slovakia is one of 
several EU countries that would not recognize UDI.  Slovakia 
views the status quo as untenable, and it does not support an 
open-ended process of negotiations.  Thus, noted Kubis, 
emphasis must be on the current talks; there is no other 
option.  After the Troika makes its report to the UNSYG in 
December, the issue should return to the UNSC for 
deliberation.  Ambassador Vallee asked what the ramifications 
of UDI would be for an ESDP Mission.   Kubis replied that he 
has begun to push the idea of decoupling, prior to the 
December 10 deadline, the issue of an EU mission from the 
results of the Troika process.  In this way, Kubis explained, 
the EU could begin to plan for action and "create the 
reality," on the ground, rather than merely respond to it. 
In response to further questioning, Kubis indicated that as 
long as the proper legal foundation exists, there was no 
reason to question Slovak participation in KFOR.   That said, 
if major EU partners withdrew because of concerns about the 
legal underpinnings, Kubis could not predict what Slovakia 
might do. 
 
MISSILE DEFENSE 
 
¶3. (C) The Ambassador characterized the September 14 
declaration of Central European Social Democratic leaders 
against missile defense as unhelpful and inaccurate.  The 
statement ignored the ongoing consultations between the U.S. 
and its NATO Allies and with Russia, as well, and was 
particularly at odds with Kubis, prior assertions that 
missile defense was a bilateral affair.  If the Slovak 
position on missile defense has changed, due to the Prime 
Minister,s domestic or regional political calculations (to 
boost Czech Social Democrat Paroubek,s election prospects), 
the U.S. needs to know.  Kubis did not hide his distaste for 
the statement, but he offered a rather stilted and anemic 
response.  According to the Slovak Constitution, he said, it 
is the MFA that speaks for the government on such issues.  It 
is to Kubis we should listen on this question.  Fico's 
statements reflect his personal views, and those of his 
party.  Kubis stated unequivocally that there has been no 
change to the GOS position on MD.  This issue has not been 
before the Coalition Council, which he believes would not 
support the language of the Social Democrats (Note: 
Ambassador queried parliamentary leader Milan Urbani on the 
HZDS position on MD and Urbani unequivocally said HZDS 
Chairman Meciar would support the U.S. on the MD issue.) 
 
CFE 
 
¶4. (C) Kubis enthusiastically supports the U.S. approach on 
CFE, and offered to take an active role within the V4, V10 
 
and the E.U. in promoting the "parallel actions" concept 
within the Alliance and with Russia.  Kubis thinks the plan 
has promise, and is heartened that the Alliance has taken 
back the initiative.  Kubis said he would like to discuss the 
Ukrainian proposal with A/S Fried during upcoming 
consultations, noting that it would be good, if possible, to 
have Ukrainian support on this issue. 
 
Afghanistan 
 
¶5. (C) FM Kubis confirmed that the GOS is considering a 
package of requests from the Dutch for enhanced participation 
in ISAF, including in a PRT.  (Note: the Dutch Ambassador 
briefed Ambassador on the package, which proposes a total of 
over 100 Slovak soldiers in Afghanistan, PRT participation, a 
medical unit, an on-base OMLT, and engineering in Orguzan 
province integrated with the Dutch Units there.)  Slovakia 
would not be able to satisfy the entire request due to 
inadequate resources.  However, Kubis believes that the 
question of additional Slovak contributions, while relatively 
small-scale, has taken on a new urgency.  Based on broad 
consultations in The Hague last week, Kubis is quite 
concerned that the Dutch may have a difficult time sustaining 
a long-term commitment in the face of parliamentary and 
public concerns.  Other Allies may face similar domestic 
pressure, and the danger is that ISAF could begin to unravel. 
 Therefore, Kubis has requested an urgent meeting with Prime 
Minister Fico on September 19 to convey the "urgency" of the 
situation.   Kubis noted that the GOS would need to take a 
decision on additional deployments before the end of the year 
in order to deploy in a timely way, and was nervous that 
hooking up with the Dutch could leave the Slovaks high and 
dry if the Dutch were to draw down.  (Comment:  Kubis' 
concerns about the ability of Allies to stay the course could 
cut two ways.  He will make the case to PM Fico, he said, 
that the deployment of additional Slovaks has larger 
consequences for the ability of NATO nations to sustain the 
mission, and for the future of NATO itself.  But, his 
pessimism could play into Fico,s well-known reluctance to 
deploy Slovak troops abroad.  If stalwarts like the Dutch may 
not be there for the long haul, why should the Slovaks? 
Furthermore, as we understand it, the Dutch need firm 
commitments from other Allies to augment operations in the 
South.  If the GOS decides to wait for the outcome of the 
Dutch parliamentary debate to make its decision (which would 
not be out of character), GON efforts to build domestic 
support will be further complicated.  End comment.) 
 
VALLEE