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DE RUEHRL #1823/01 2711552
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O 281552Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9390
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0194

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 001823 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV GM KV UNMIK
SUBJECT: GERMANS DOWNPLAY SUGGESTIONS OF SPLIT ON KOSOVO 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Jeffrey Rathke for reasons 1.4 (b) a 
nd (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  German opinion on Kosovo is moving in the 
right direction.  Recognizing the unlikeliness of a positive 
outcome to the Troika process, officials at the Chancellery 
and Foreign Office have underscored to us that they are 
working toward the broadest possible support within the EU 
for Kosovo independence in the absence of a new UNSC 
Resolution.  Senior Chancellery officials have begun to 
prepare legislative opinion, engaging key Bundestag members 
on the unlikeliness of a UNSCR and the need for Germany to be 
a leader within Europe on the issue.  Contrary to suspicions 
voiced in other EU capitals, we have heard unanimously that a 
split within Chancellor Merkel's Grand Coalition along party 
lines is not emerging.  There is the possibility that some 
German politicians across the spectrum might be susceptible 
to last-minute gambits by Russia or Serbia to drag out the 
Troika process; however the Chancellery indicates it would 
oppose any proposals that could extend more than one month 
beyond the December 10 Troika report to the UN Secretary 
General.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) Recent reporting from Vienna and USEU suggests that a 
perception may be forming in some EU capitals that Germany 
could go wobbly on Kosovo because of differing views within 
the parties that make up Chancellor Merkel's Grand Coalition 
(CDU/CSU - SPD).  We have explored this possibility with the 
Chancellery, Foreign Office, and senior staff in the CDU/CSU 
and SPD Bundestag caucuses (and also used the opportunity to 
encourage Germany to demonstrate to its EU partners its 
steadfastness).  The response has been consistent across the 
board:  denial that there is any substantive difference 
between the CDU/CSU and SPD on Kosovo.  Comment:  We consider 
this significant, since officials here often are quick to 
cite coalition difficulties to justify German reluctance to 
take bold foreign policy steps.  We have heard this 
explanation often in response to our efforts to generate 
greater German contributions in Afghanistan, for example. 
End comment. 
 
Chancellery Optimistic on EU's Ability to Act 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Chancellery senior-director-equivalent Norman Walter 
told us the German government fully expects the Troika 
process to fail.  Walter said Germany wants it to be clear at 
the end of the process that the responsibility for failure is 
on the Serb and Russian side.  He said that National Security 
Adviser Christoph Heusgen and others on the Chancellery staff 
have begun engaging members of the Bundestag (especially the 
Foreign Relations Committee) to prepare them for the 
likelihood that a UNSCR will not be achievable and that 
Germany, the EU, and NATO will have to find a way forward 
without one.  According to Walter, the Foreign Relations 
Committee did not object to this message, which he said gives 
him some optimism about the Bundestag's ability to support a 
flexible German/EU response to a unilateral declaration of 
independence. 
 
¶4.  (C) Walter said that, if the Troika process fails, Berlin 
would expect a prompt unilateral Kosvar declaration of 
independence following the December 10 report to the UNSYG. 
The Chancellery would expect U.S. recognition soon 
thereafter, followed by an EU response that might take days 
(hopefully not weeks, he said) to coordinate. The Chancellery 
is optimistic that a sufficient degree of unity can be 
achieved among the 27 to allow the EU to act decisively. 
Walter said Germany had heard from the Romanians recently 
that Bucharest would not block EU action (although Romania 
probably would not recognize Kosovo).  Berlin expected the 
Slovaks to behave similarly, and Walter thought Spain would 
come around to that position.  Greece and Cyprus would be the 
toughest nuts to crack, in his opinion. 
 
¶5.  (C) Walter said that, in the absence of a UNSCR, he 
expected the Bundestag to be less concerned with the politics 
of a unilateral declaration of independence than with the 
legal aspects of a continued German presence in Kosovo (NATO 
and EU).  The absence of a UNSCR would encourage the Left 
Party to challenge the legality of German participation in 
KFOR before the Constitutional Court .  Contacts on the SPD 
staff were more relaxed, however, telling us that they did 
not expect a UNSCR, that they anticipated a challenge in 
court, but that this did not shake the SPD's view of the 
issue. 
 
No CDU - SPD Split, but Some Reluctance in All Camps 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
 
BERLIN 00001823  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶6.  (C) There are still doubts among a minority of 
legislators from both coalition partners, In particular, 
prominent SPD members Hans-Ulrich Klose and Gerd Weisskirchen 
reportedly are worried about the potential for violence after 
a unilateral declaration of independence.  Such voices could 
spark a deeper debate about German and European policy in 
Kosovo, but at present SPD staff expect the caucus to 
coalesce in support of Foreign Minister Steinmeier (who is 
soon to ascend to the Deputy Chairmanship of the SPD). 
 
¶7.  (C) Some German politicians may be vulnerable to an 
11th-hour attempt by Serbia or Russia to drag out the Troika 
process by putting tantalizing but vague ideas on the table 
close to the December 10 deadline.  Hans-Joachim Falenski, 
senior foreign policy staffer in the CDU/CSU caucus, told us 
he thought deputy caucus leader Andreas Schockenhoff and 
others would feel obliged to allow more time to negotiate if 
a proposal were made that seemed remotely reasonable.  We 
posed this scenario to Walter in the Chancellery, and he said 
Germany might be willing to entertain an additional thirty 
days of discussions if a plausible last-minute proposal were 
put on the table.  But Germany would insist on a rapid 
conclusion and not allow discussion to drag out endlessly. 
 
¶8.  (C) Comment:  Leaders in the German political 
establishment have not yet staked out a public position on 
how they would respond to the failure of the Troika talks or 
a unilateral declaration of independence, but it appears they 
are moving toward a position that will recognize independence 
and will work hard toward the greatest possible degree of EU 
solidarity. 
 
TIMKEN JR