VZCZCXRO0046
RR RUEHGR
DE RUEHBE #0541/01 2491535
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 061535Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY BELMOPAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0775
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BELMOPAN 000541 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA/CEN FOR ROIS BEAL 
 
SAN JOSE FOR OFDA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL AEMR PGOV BH
SUBJECT: BELMOPAN: HURRICANE DEAN WRAP-UP 
 
 
¶1.  SUMMARY:   Hurricane Dean provided an opportunity to exercise 
our new hurricane plan, revised since we moved from Belize City to 
Belmopan.  Things generally went very well though there are some 
lessons learned that we will work into the upcoming Crisis 
Management Exercise.  Although the general state of hurricane 
awareness in Belize is high, action in response to that awareness 
was in this case often left to the last minute.  The tourist 
industry was generally very responsible in evacuating American 
citizens from vulnerable areas.  Our new embassy and housing 
compound in Belmopan represent a quantum leap in safety and security 
over our old digs in Belize City.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  As Hurricane Felix passes Belize and Embassy Belmopan stands 
down preparations for the second Category Five hurricane in three 
weeks, we offer the following wrap-up and some lessons learned from 
Hurricane Dean.  We had hoped for a bit more time to use the lessons 
from Dean to "tweak" our hurricane plan but we take what comes and 
will do a Dean-Felix revision to the plan as soon as we can. 
 
FATALISM, THEN PANIC 
-------------------- 
 
¶3.  Hurricane awareness in most areas of Belize is actually quite 
good.  Radio, one of the main sources of news, is very responsible 
about broadcasting warnings and official bulletins.  Most cable TV 
operators pirate the Weather Channel as part of the basic package. 
In urban areas the grapevine carries news quickly.  However, many 
people did nothing with the information they had until the last 
minute.  The hurricane's track did change but for many people making 
preparations is an expensive and time-consuming job that is normally 
ignored as long as possible.  Any number of people were heard saying 
that Belize would not be affected, the hurricane would turn further 
north, and so on. 
 
¶4.  Although it became apparent by Sunday morning that Dean was 
coming a lot closer to Belize than originally thought, the news did 
not seem to have much impact on people's weekend plans.  It was only 
on Monday, with the hurricane seemingly about 36 hours away, that 
people went into overdrive getting ready.  Although Embassy staff 
had reported for work as normal, the speed at which Dean was moving 
led us to dismiss non-emergency workers at noon so that they could 
make final (or in some cases initial) preparations.  Everyone was 
advised to go to their pre-arranged shelter point (which in some 
cases meant traveling to Belize City to pick up family and bring 
them back to Belmopan to stay with relatives or friends).  Stores 
and gas stations started closing early, leaving many people without 
fuel or food. 
 
¶5.   People seeking to leave Belize City found that the two-lane 
Western Highway between Belize City and Belmopan quickly became 
jammed with traffic.  Accidents and breakdowns combined to keep 
traffic flow to the west at around 20mph.  A major accident could 
have closed the only escape route indefinitely at a crucial point. 
 
 
AMCITS:  TOURISTS OUT, RESIDENTS IN 
----------------------------------- 
 
 ¶6.  We found that tourists were generally well taken care of and 
kept safe.  Cruise lines (the main source of tourists to Belize) are 
extremely sensitive to weather and avoid hurricane conditions. 
Resorts on the barrier reef islands (cayes) where many Americans 
vacation understand how vulnerable they are and were responsible 
about evacuating their guests, either to associated resorts inland 
or to the airport for those who wanted to leave.  When it appeared 
that there might be stranded passengers American Airlines put on an 
extra flight.  As far as we know every American who wanted to leave 
was able to do so. 
 
¶7.  AMCIT residents when contacted generally said they would stay in 
their houses and ride out the storm.  For those who live inland that 
would generally be a sound choice.  For those by the coast it might 
not be such a wise decision. 
 
¶8.  We were able to reach wardens, resorts and airlines with little 
problem before during and after Dean.  The reports from our wardens 
and other contacts, combined with local media coverage (see next 
para) gave us a good picture of what was happening in various parts 
of the country, including those where most Americans live or visit. 
 
 
"THANKS FOR CHOOSING LOVE" 
-------------------------- 
 
¶9.  Among the institutions to emerge from the hurricane with its 
reputation enhanced was independent radio station LOVE FM.  The only 
station with more or less nationwide coverage as well as a live 
 
BELMOPAN 00000541  002 OF 004 
 
 
internet broadcast site, LOVE stopped commercial programming well in 
advance of the hurricane and acted as a sort of national emergency 
broadcast system.  Founder Rene Villanueva manned the mike himself 
during a marathon call-in session and, in the best tradition of 
Belize talk radio, took calls from across the country and around the 
world allowing people to phone in live reports from their areas. 
Although primarily an English language station, LOVE brought in 
interpreters to make sure that all important announcements were 
repeated into Spanish.  LOVE also broadcast regular weather updates 
and made Belize's bilingual Deputy Chief Meteorologist Ramon Futos 
into something of a media star.  With CNN and most western TV 
focusing on tourist areas in Mexico, LOVE was the most reliable 
source of information for most people in Belize and around the world 
about how the storm was progressing and what was happening.  The 
station served as a bulletin board for different government agencies 
to send messages to each other and for anxious families to ask loved 
ones to phone home. 
 
¶10.  Another winner was the local telecom's monopoly, Belize 
Telemedia Limited (formerly Belize Telecommunications Limited).  One 
of those companies people love to hate, BTL was widely expected 
(including by us) to fail as soon as the wind got above 40 mph.  But 
BTL endured, by and large keeping land and cell phone lines up 
nationwide throughout the hurricane.  In Belmopan we had shut down 
our satellite aggregate circuit when we locked our dish into the 
position least vulnerable to wind.  Our fallback was the virtual 
private network which runs on a leased BTL line.  Our commercial 
lines worked fine throughout the hurricane, allowing us to call in 
reports to the Task Force.  Personal BTL internal landline and cell 
phone and internet connections suffered no outages, although outside 
calls to cell phones at times hit overloaded circuits and could not 
be completed.  Callers from the affected areas of Corozal and Orange 
Walk were generally able to get through internally during and after 
the storm.  Power outages in the north eventually degraded phone 
service for several days, but BTL held up during Dean. 
 
¶11.  The police and the Belize Defense Force generally got high 
marks from the public (normal for the BDF, uncommon for the police) 
for their hurricane response.  Police patrolled the streets until 
required to move to shelters and the BDF was out in force to support 
the police and help clean up (in many cases with British or U.S. 
helicopter transport) just after the hurricane.  There have been no 
reports of looting or civil disturbance in the aftermath of the 
hurricane, something that is attributable in part to a large and 
visible security force presence. 
 
THE NOT-SO-GREAT 
---------------- 
 
¶11.  It seems pretty clear that the National Emergency Management 
Organization (NEMO) is not ready for prime time.  Although NEMO has 
made a serious effort to encourage people to prepare for a 
hurricane, they have no way to compel people to prepare, and few 
permanent staff.  While there are some very effective NEMO managers 
in various areas, the organization as a whole seems to have an 
attitude of:  "we sent out a press release in May telling people to 
get ready for hurricanes so our job is done."  During Dean, NEMO 
officials occasionally went on LOVE FM, not to read safety bulletins 
or pass on information, but to argue with people who had called in 
to complain about limited information coming out of the 
organization's HQ in Belmopan.  Once the hurricane was over and the 
relief/reconstruction phase started, complaints about NEMO's 
ineffectiveness (some no doubt exaggerated or politically-motivated) 
poured in.  The agency replaced its manager in the affected northern 
district with the manager from Ambergris Caye, widely seen as an 
experienced and effective administrator.  In fairness, some of the 
things NEMO was blamed for (no electricity, for example) were out of 
its control.  On the other hand, the organization apparently had no 
stockpiles of things like portable generators or basic tools to help 
clear trees and start rebuilding.  As someone said of a different 
group in a different context: "We can count on them for nothing but 
excuses." 
 
¶12.  The Mayor of Belize City, Zenaida Moya, seemed at times to be 
in full panic mode, not too well briefed and pretty much out of her 
depth.  She phoned in to LOVE FM several times to complain that she 
could not reach NEMO and so could not make a decision to, for 
example, fuel busses to evacuate Belize City residents.  Her focus 
on blaming NEMO and the national government (which is controlled by 
a different political party) for Belize City's problems came off as 
shrill and excessively politicized. 
 
¶13.   The National Bus Company, supposedly the evacuation carrier of 
choice, did not manage to fuel up its busses in advance of Dean. 
Owner Tony Novelo -- a crony of the governing party already under 
scrutiny for a government guaranteed investment in another bus 
company that failed -- complained that NEMO should have forced more 
service stations to stay open late Monday so his busses could get 
 
BELMOPAN 00000541  003 OF 004 
 
 
diesel.  Again, what were they doing on Sunday? 
 
¶14.  Politicians and local activists of both parties took the 
opportunity to bash opponents in the press and blame them for 
failing to respond to the hurricane correctly.  There were 
complaints that town councils controlled by one party refused to 
give relief supplies to supporters of another party.  Although the 
complaints were probably exaggerated, there is undoubtedly an 
element of truth to some of them.  There were not a lot of political 
figures who emerged from Dean with their reputations enhanced. 
 
DAMAGE 
------ 
 
¶15.  Initial damage  assessments did not seem too bad.  There was no 
loss of life or serious injury.  The main economic damage appeared 
to be from downed crops, especially the papaya crop in the north 
which is largely exported to the U.S.  As the days went on the 
damage toll mounted, from around US$50 million to around US$100 
million.  Crop losses  remain the largest single component of the 
damage assessment. 
 
¶16.  OFDA provided cash and commodities for the relief effort. 
Although we received thanks and some good press for our donations, 
there was an undercurrent of "is there any more coming?" from the 
GOB officials with whom we have been working.  We expect to be asked 
formally for a larger contribution to reconstruction shortly. 
 
LESSONS LEARNED 
--------------- 
 
¶17.  The main lesson we learned was that an up-to-date hurricane 
plan is essential.  Moreover, we benefited from having done a "dry 
run" exercise to test some of the components.  Our plan was just 
revised and we took the occasion of Dean's approach to do what we 
thought would be a test run.  As Dean turned south and started 
tracking closer and closer the drill became real.  Fortunately we 
took Dean seriously from the start. 
 
¶18.  Internally we discovered that our ways of disseminating 
information to all staff need some improvement.  In addition, 
procedures to provide cash advances to local staff need to be better 
managed with Charleston.  In a disaster local banks cannot be relied 
on so the cash advance is crucial for many local staff.  Charge met 
with the FSN Association executive committee just after the 
hurricane to discuss concerns and ideas for possible solutions.  We 
will take advantage of the upcoming Crisis Management Exercise to 
test some ways to address deficiencies that we have identified. 
 
¶19.  Overall the housing compound is light years ahead of Belize 
City in terms of location and structural integrity.  We learned in 
practice what our earlier "dry run" drill had already told us: 
putting up the hurricane shutters for all 17 houses on the compound 
is a time-consuming and labor-intensive job.  Although the shutters 
are definitely strong, they are very heavy and do not always fit 
well.  Completely placing them takes two full days, time that we may 
not always have if there is a fast-moving storm.  It is then another 
two days to take them down.  We have used a mix of Embassy staff and 
contract labor to do the job and intend to use mainly day labor if 
possible in future. 
 
¶20. At the NEC we found a number of interesting issues.  One of the 
more striking is that our satellite dish, which has to be set to a 
safe position to withstand serious winds, can only be moved 
manually, a job that took three people an hour.  If there is wind, 
rain or lightening it could be a potentially dangerous job.  We will 
be requesting an upgrade to the motor-driven model. 
 
PARVUS NUMERO, MAGNUS MERITO 
---------------------------- 
 
¶21.   Embassy Belmopan's successful response to Hurricane Dean was 
the result of a lot of advance preparation by all agencies, as well 
as a lot of hard work by a small group of American and LES 
employees.  LES staff, particularly in GSO and Facilities 
Maintenance, did a great job of preparation despite the need to take 
care of their own families and property. 
 
¶22.  The mission hurricane plan was revised earlier in the summer 
thanks to the efforts of two exceptional interns under the direction 
of the RSO.  When the hurricane actually hit we were -- due to 
long-term staffing gaps and normal summer transfers -- down to a 
hard core of State Americans:  two consular officers (one second 
tour and one first tour) with no section head, no management 
officer, a first-tour GSO as the acting MO, a second-tour IMO, no 
IMS, an RSO but no RSO OMS and the Charge.  The front office was 
staffed by a locally engaged AMCIT.  (FYI:  She has worked for the 
USG in Belize for 22 years, and in accordance with department HR 
 
BELMOPAN 00000541  004 OF 004 
 
 
policy we have recently been forced to slash her salary and benefits 
dramatically as a result of the worldwide conversion to PSA Plus. 
END FYI.)  DEA, which has had two of its four American positions 
unfilled for a year, had one American in country during Dean. 
 
¶23.  Peace Corps, also newly moved to Belmopan, also saw Dean as an 
opportunity to test its recently revamped hurricane plan.  Peace 
Corps management had recently done a test run of its evacuation plan 
and, as a result, did an excellent job of contacting and 
consolidating volunteers.  All rode out the storm in safety. 
 
¶24.  The Military Liaison Office (MLO) stayed in its location 
outside of Belize City when the rest of the Embassy moved to 
Belmopan.  MLO staff had planned to shelter in Belize City but were 
asked by the Belize Defense Force commander on short notice to 
evacuate to Belmopan.  The small MLO staff of three Americans also 
brought with them 11 Special Forces trainers who were in Belize on 
long-term TDY.  They proved to be a welcome addition to the 
Embassy's internal defense team. 
 
DIETER