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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001514 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/HARDING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MARONITE BISHOPS CALL FOR SOVEREIGN, 
FREE, INDEPENDENT LEBANON 
 
REF: BEIRUT 1475 
 
BEIRUT 00001514  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b) 
and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) In what many view as their clearest and most political 
statement ever, Lebanon's Maronite bishops issued their 
eighth annual "call" on September 19, a beacon of light on a 
day of tragic juxtaposition; just hours later a massive car 
bomb killed March 14 MP Antoine Ghanem, bringing to six the 
number of parliamentarians killed in the past few years.  Key 
elements in the statement are highlighted below: 
 
--  the statement highlighted the fundamental choice facing 
Lebanon:  "either our country will be sovereign, free, and 
independent, or it will be subordinate.  And we have seen 
where subordination has taken us;" 
 
--  it said the solution will not come without the 
cooperation between the president, parliament, and government; 
 
--  noting the "decisive, momentous" nature of the 
presidential election, it called for a president with 
political experience who is able to "unify the Lebanese" and 
work towards expanding the state's authority over all of its 
citizens; 
 
-- it expressed the bishops' hope that Berri's initiative (to 
find a consensus presidential candidate) succeeds; 
 
-- it made no reference to the two-thirds quorum, instead, 
noting the duty of MPs to vote, declaring that "boycotting 
the presidential election session is boycotting the nation." 
If elections don't take place, "the future of the country 
will be grim;" 
 
-- it noted that many MPs have left the country in fear of 
political assassinations; 
 
-- it condemned the acquisition of arms and money by 
confessional groups to use in "exerting hegemony" over others; 
 
-- it also condemned the lack of state control in these 
activities, leading to the rise of "mini states that would 
rise on the remains of one individual state." 
 
-- it praised the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) solidarity in 
Nahr al-Barid. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶2. (C) This statement was significant in several respects. 
Without being explicit, it strongly condemns Hizballah's 
arms.  Many see it as condemning implicitly Lebanon's Shia in 
their efforts to dominate other sects, a traditionally taboo 
subject. 
 
¶3. (C) In term's of the presidential election, the statement 
had something to offer for both sides, though overall it 
appears to be a victory for March 14:  March 8 can cite the 
language calling for a president who can "unify" the country 
as support for its efforts to seek a consensus candidate (the 
statement even praises Berri's initiative by name).  March 
14, meanwhile, can find comfort in the emphasis on a 
"sovereign, free, and independent" country as ammunition 
against the pro-Syrian opposition. 
 
¶4. (C) The qualifications cited for the president rule out 
some candidates, like bankers Riad Salameh and Joseph Taraby. 
 Further, a president who can "unite the Lebanese" is a far 
better formula that the Patriarch's contention that the 
president needs to be from neither March 14 nor March 8, but 
instead equidistance from all sides.  The praise for the LAF 
may also be seen as a vote of confidence for LAF Commander 
Michel Sleiman's candidacy for the presidency. 
 
¶5. (C) The language on boycotting parliament, though strong 
and appearing to lend strong support to March 14, was not 
ignored by the opposition in the September 25 electoral 
session of parliament (reftel).  While all 68 March 14 MPs, 
despite significant security concerns, heeded the call, only 
 
BEIRUT 00001514  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
six from the opposition were present, four from Berri's Amal 
bloc and two from the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) bloc. 
Berri, as Speaker, needed to live up to his promise to 
"convene" parliament (though whether or not parliament was 
technically convened is a matter of dispute, given that no 
vote was held), could hardly afford not to send any 
representatives, though he was careful not to send enough to 
help March 14 make the two-thirds quorum (86 out of 128).  (A 
two-thirds majority is needed for a candidate to win in the 
first round; if two-thirds of the MPs are not present, by 
default it is impossible to get a two-thirds majority).  It 
is doubtful whether the opposition will head the bishops' 
call on October 23, the next scheduled voting session, unless 
a consensus candidate has been agreed.  Nevertheless, the 
bishops' statement provides considerable moral power to the 
anti-boycott calls of March 14, and we hope that the 
Patriarch and Maronite clergy can repeat this message 
frequently. 
 
¶6. (C) We should bear in mind as well that the bishops' 
statement, despite its timing, is about much more than the 
presidency; it is essentially a spiritual and moral "state of 
the union" message.  The fact that this year's call was 
clearly more political than usual reflects the Maronite 
church's alarm at Lebanon's ongoing political crisis. 
 
¶7. (C) While the presidency, traditionally held by a Maronite 
under Lebanon's complex confessional political system, is of 
immediate concern to Lebanese Christians, who see themselves 
increasingly marginalized, the bishops' statement also 
recognizes that all of Lebanon's problems will not be solved 
by the election of President Lahoud's successor.  Hizballah's 
arms, Lebanon's relationship Syria, and the country's future 
as a sovereign, free and independent state are the underlying 
issues that must be addressed.  And, as the bishops so wisely 
point out, the solution will not come without the cooperation 
between its president, the parliament, and government. 
 
¶8. (C) Public attention to the widely anticipated statement 
was quickly diverted to the Ghanem assassination just hours 
later after its release.  While the attack underscored the 
importance of the bishops' message, sadly, it also seemed to 
disparage it.  We continue to reference the principles 
embodied therein when asked publicly which candidate the USG 
prefers (being careful not to play the name game). 
Unfortunately, it appears the Maronite church's moral suasion 
is not enough to deter pro-Syrian forces from using 
parlimaentary boycotts in an effort to torpedo Lebanon's 
struggling democracy. 
FELTMAN