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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001512 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/HARDING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: GEAGEA:  WHAT IS HARIRI COOKING UP? 
 
REF: BEIRUT 1511 
 
BEIRUT 00001512  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b) 
and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea believes accepting 
Free Patriotic Movement leader General Michel Aoun's offers 
of detente is the best way to coopt Aoun's presidential 
ambitions.  He dismissed concerns that March 14's support 
could boomerang by increasing prospects for Aoun's candidacy, 
arguing that most people see through his devilish ways. 
Geagea was more concerned, however, with what he perceives as 
recent changes in Saad Hariri's position.  The Future 
Movement leader appeared to be straying from March 14's 
unified support for either Nassib Lahoud or Boutros Harb, 
instead advocating a consensus candidate -- probably MP 
Robert Ghanem -- a change of heart Geagea felt must be due to 
some sort of new Saudi regional plan.  Geagea expressed deep 
concern about what he saw as Ghanem's weakness and 
inappropriateness for the presidency.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, met 
with Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea and his advisor, 
Elie Khoury, at Geagea's home in Marab on September 29. 
Geagea was in a good mood, although it became quickly 
apparent that there was something on his mind. 
 
AOUN'S CHARM OFFENSIVE 
---------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Geagea explained Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader 
General Michel Aoun's recent about-face (reftel) as an effort 
to win new allies after his first strategy, wearing his 
opponents down by force and threats of chaos, failed.  Moral 
in Aoun's circle is down, he said.  Recognizing the writing 
on the wall, i.e., that Amal, Hizballah, and perhaps even 
Syria are looking for a consensus candidate for the 
presidency, Aoun realizes that to salvage any chance he has 
of becoming that candidate, he has to mend fences with March 
¶14.  He is therefore opening up "tous azimuts" -- or in all 
directions.  Aoun will only accept a candidate other than 
himself if he realizes he has no hope and March 8 is 
unwilling to go the route of chaos (i.e., a vacuum or two 
government scenario). 
 
¶4. (C) The Ambassador noted that one positive side to Aoun's 
overtures is that it would help March 14 challenge Parliament 
Speaker Nabih Berri's self-proclaimed role as sole kingmaker 
and conductor of all of the ongoing dialogues between 
parties, knocking him off balance.  Though if Aoun's 
popularity increases in the process, this could be a problem. 
 
¶5. (C) Geagea dismissed the Ambassador's last concern, noting 
that building bridges had never been Aoun's forte; on the 
contrary, his constantly shifting alliances only revealed 
that he is willing to negotiate with the devil to achieve his 
personal ambitions.  Geagea agreed, however, that over half 
of Lebanese Forces Christians would (despite decades of 
antipathy) like to see a reconciliation with the FPM as a way 
to build Christian strength and solidarity. 
 
¶6. (C) The Ambassador asked whether Aoun's cancellation of 
planned meetings with Progressive Socialist Party leader 
(PSP) Walid Jumblatt (scheduled for October 1) and Saad 
Hariri advisor Ghattas Khoury on September 28 (Aoun sent his 
own advisor and son-in-law, Gebran Bassil, to the meeting 
instead) suggested, as Hariri and Jumblatt believe, that Aoun 
had gone too far and Hizballah was reining him in.  Geagea 
disagreed with this theory, noting that one of his envoys was 
meeting with Aoun at that very moment. 
 
¶7. (C) Geagea, pondering for a moment with his chin resting 
in his hand, stated, "this is bizarre."  Why did Aoun see UN 
Envoy for Lebanon Geir Pederson three times this week?  he 
asked aloud.  The Ambassador responded that, according to 
Pederson, Aoun was "in love" with March 14.  It's the only 
way we can change him, Geagea countered, otherwise he will 
"float again."  As he had always told Saad Hariri, getting 
Aoun's agreement on a consensus candidate would be a good 
thing for March 14. 
 
BEIRUT 00001512  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶8. (C) Geagea admitted, however, that despite the flirtation 
with Aoun, he remained firmly behind March 14 candidates 
Nassib Lahoud and Boutros Harb.  The majority position was 
the election must take place without outside interference to 
elect one of these two candidates or nothing, Geagea said, 
adding that he had told this to two of Berri's 
representatives, MPs Ali Bazzi and Michel Moussa, the day 
before. 
 
HARIRI'S ARMAGEDDON 
------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Suddenly switching gears, Geagea then asked, "Where 
are the Saudis in this game?"  The Ambassador, stressing 
successful USG efforts to bring the new French government in 
line with U.S. policies, agreed that to look into the Saudi 
positions next.  "Something is going on," Geagea said, adding 
that he had sensed from his September 27 meeting with the 
Future Movement leader that Saad was cooking up a compromise 
with Berri.  Before Saad met with Berri, he, too, was 
insisting on a March 14 candidate, even if that meant 
electing one by absolute majority.  Now he's saying the 
contrary, warning how, though he would abide by it, an 
absolute majority vote will split the country, including the 
army, and he would not agree to be prime minister.  It's an 
"Armageddon," Geagea proclaimed. 
 
¶10. (C) The Ambassador noted that Hariri had made similar 
remarks in their September 28 meeting (septel), saying March 
14 had to appear to be ready to go all the way; in the end, 
however, the cost would be too high, and it would have to 
think about alternatives.  Berri's "alternatives," Saad had 
said, were Michel Khoury, Charles Rizk, and Robert Ghanem. 
We must find out what is going on and stop it, Geagea 
responded. 
 
¶11. (C) Asked whether Hariri realized that the worst scenario 
for March 14 would be a split within its ranks, Geagea said 
yes.   March 14 leaders had agreed to continue at this stage 
to insist on the right to an absolute majority vote to elect 
either Nassib Lahoud or Boutros Harb, and would confirm this 
in their meeting on September 30.  Hariri's Future Movement 
will go along, with the acknowledgment that the price will be 
high.  But now Hariri is saying he won't be prime minister if 
it comes to this.  There's something behind this, Geagea 
repeated, we must find out what is going on. 
 
¶12. (C) Answering his own question, Geagea dismissed the 
hypothesis that Hariri wanted to become prime minister so 
badly he was willing to negotiate on the presidency.  Rather, 
he believed outside forces were responsible for his sudden 
eagerness to compromise.  Geagea first suspected France 
(since, as Geagea believes, Robert Ghanem is a personal 
friend of President Sarkozy's) but now he believed Saudi 
Arabia was pulling the strings, possible as part of a 
Saudi-Iranian deal, whereby the Iranians would take care of 
Syria and Saudi Arabia would deal with France and the U.S., 
to avoid a mess in Lebanon. 
 
WORRIES ABOUT ROBERT GHANEM 
--------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (C)  Moving to a one-on-one conversation with the 
Ambassador while pacing in his driveway, Geagea said that the 
real problem is that both Hariri (who genuinely wants Nassib 
Lahoud) and Syria (who hopes for LAF Commander Michel Sleiman 
as president) have zeroed in on Robert Ghanem as their 
fall-back choice.  Both Hariri and Syria want a weak 
president, easily manipulated, and they will end up sharing 
Ghanem between them, Geagea said.  Ghanem has no significant 
Christian support, meaning that independent Christians will 
once again feel cheated out of an office that is their right. 
 This sense of alienation will drive them back into the arms 
of Michel Aoun, and the resurgent Aoun will humiliate and 
marginalize March 14 Christians, who will have gained nothing 
from their alliance with Hariri.  Geagea admitted that his 
outreach to Aoun was in part designed to create a unified 
Christian veto against Ghanem. 
 
¶14.  (C)  Geagea said that, in the next March 14 leadership 
meeting, he would try to persuade Hariri that supporting 
Ghanem was a big mistake for the Sunnis, too.  The Sunnis are 
 
BEIRUT 00001512  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
concerned about a heavily armed, growing Shia population in 
Lebanon.  The Sunnis should thus be forging a partnership 
with the Christians, to stand together against Hizballah and 
its arms.  But if Ghanem becomes president and a large number 
of Christians defect to Aoun, then Hariri and the Sunnis will 
be practically alone, standing against a united 
Shia-Christian front.  Hariri needs a partner, not a servant, 
Geagea said, musing again about whether the Saudis are 
pushing Hariri into such a compromise. 
 
SOLICITING A WASHINGTON INVITATION 
------------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (C)  Geagea also noted with concern the high-profile 
visits of Lebanese Muslims -- Hariri and Jumblatt -- to 
Washington and the lack of any credible Christian visitors. 
In order to show Lebanon's Christians that the March 14 
movement benefits them, too, Geagea argued that he needed to 
be received in Washington.  He would wait until after 
presidential elections, given the heavy Lebanese traffic to 
Washington now.  But it is time for him to go, he said. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶16. (C)  The traditionally right-wing Geagea and the 
traditionally left-wing Jumblatt -- both of whom are now 
hard-line anti-Syrians -- share a concern about the 
traditionally centrist Saad Hariri:  that Hariri will 
ultimately sell them out, in a compromise that is good for 
Hariri but not, in their view, good for Lebanon.  That Geagea 
would reach out to his arch-rival Aoun, against whom he 
battled during the civil war, demonstrates the level of 
concern he has that Hariri seeks a servant rather than 
strong, independent Christian as president. 
 
¶17.  (C)  As reported septel, Hariri did not come across in 
his last meeting with us as someone about to throw his 
support to Ghanem, whose name was mentioned as only one of 
three possible fall-back consensus candidates.  But Hariri 
was worried that the cost of going all the way with March 14 
presidential candidates would have grave consequences for 
Lebanon, perhaps a subtle hint to us that Geagea is right to 
suspect Ghanem is Hariri's private choice.  For Hariri's 
upcoming meetings in Washington, we suggest that we emphasize 
to him the need to keep in close touch with his March 14 
allies, as a split in the March 14 alliance would be an 
immediate victory for Syria's Lebanese allies. 
FELTMAN