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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001345 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/HARDING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON:  GEMAYEL:  OPPOSITION ARMING, MARCH 14 TO 
ELECT A PRESIDENT "AT ANY PRICE" 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d 
). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C)  On August 31, former President Amine Gemayel told the 
Ambassador that Hizballah and Michel Aoun are arming their 
followers, constituting a growing military and security 
threat.  He believes the opposition is intimidating March 14, 
and Hizballah-Aoun forces will act before the country can 
hold a presidential election.  There is no longer any 
separation between Hizballah and its Iranian backers, Gemayel 
argued.  To elect a consensus president would give Iran and 
Syria control over Lebanon, so March 14 is prepared to elect 
its presidential candidate by a simple majority "at any 
price."  The group has chosen alternate meeting sites in case 
Berri will not convene parliament, but is still working to 
secure the simple majority of MPs it needs to hold an 
election.  Finally, Gemayel asked that the United States 
support March 14 by recognizing the president it selects and 
convincing LAF Commander Michel Sleiman to abandon any 
thought of heading an interim government, by noting that we 
will not recognize its legitimacy.  End summary. 
 
AOUN, HIZBALLAH ARMING 
FOR A CONFRONTATION 
---------------------- 
 
¶2. (C)  During an August 31 meeting, former President Amine 
Gemayel and his son Sami told the Ambassador and Econoff that 
they had ample rumors but no hard evidence that Free 
Patriotic Movement leader (FPM) Michel Aoun is arming his 
followers, constituting a growing military and security 
threat rather than just political cover for Hizballah. 
Gemayel believes Aoun has distributed approximately 400 
machine guns in the villages around Baabda and Byblos, 
probably paid for by Hizballah.  A militia is not easy to 
maintain, Gemayel explained, and Aoun does not have the 
requisite funding or organization to do so; he couldn't even 
control Christian areas during the Metn election.  This 
points to Hizballah backing of Aoun's current efforts. 
Hizballah is also arming its own followers to help Aoun.  The 
group cannot interfere directly in Christian mountain 
strongholds but is preparing to intervene along the coast, 
arming, training, and sending additional fighters to three 
Shia villages near Byblos. 
 
¶3. (C)  The opposition is taking action to intimidate March 
14, Gemayel argued, intentionally leaking news of Hizballah 
arming the FPM and Shia fighters.  The August 19 shooting by 
FPM members of a Kata'eb sympathizer in Kahaleh is another 
example of intimidation.  Demonstrators are returning to the 
downtown tent city, and Hizballah is improving the 
infrastructure of its strongholds in the southern suburbs, 
the Biqa', and the south.  (Note:  Gemayel showed us a map of 
alleged Hizballah reinforcements in the southern village of 
Jezzine.  End note.)  Finally, Gemayel alleged that someone 
is pressuring Saad Hariri to accept General Michel Sleiman as 
an interim president. 
 
¶4. (C)  Gemayel predicted that Hizballah will act before 
March 14 uses their simple majority to elect a president. 
The group will not force a formal coup, but will allow small 
street confrontations to slowly escalate.  That way, it will 
look confusing to the international community; no one will be 
able to accuse Hizballah and Aoun as being the only ones to 
use arms, even though their greater strength will allow them 
to prevail.   Gemayel repeatedly worried that Hizballah will 
invade downtown Beirut, the Central Bank, the Serail, the 
Ministry of Justice or the Ministry of Finance.  He also 
worried that Hizballah could seal off Shia areas of the 
country and focus fighting in Christian areas, even 
disguising its Shia fighters as Aounists, by having the Shia 
wear orange shirts. 
 
NO LONGER ANY SEPARATION 
BETWEEN HIZBALLAH AND IRGC 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C)  There is no longer any separation between Hizballah 
and the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), 
Gemayel argued, with Hizballah fighters trained in IRGC 
academies.  Hizballah does not have "red lines;" it has not 
fomented a Sunni-Shia clash so far simply because the time is 
not yet right.  The presidential election is just an excuse, 
 
BEIRUT 00001345  002 OF 003 
 
 
Gemayel told us, a coincidence of the constitutional 
calendar, for the current escalation.  Hizballah and its 
Syrian-Iranian backers' real goals include provoking conflict 
between Christian groups, creating a vacuum that allows Syria 
and Iran to reassert control, and confronting the West in 
Lebanon.  Syria and Iran want to be able to claim to have 
defeated the West in Lebanon.  Gemayel worries that after 
Syria and Iran demonstrate a victory over Western influence 
in the region, they will reshape Lebanon's institutions. 
 
¶6. (C)  Hizballah and its backers are successfully using 
Lebanese citizens' fear of a presidential vacuum to reassert 
control.  Maronite Patriarch Sfeir is so afraid of a power 
vacuum that he is proposing unacceptable "nobody" candidates, 
Gemayel lamented, while Lebanese Armed Forces Commander 
Sleiman believes that a vacuum is his path to an interim 
presidency. 
 
¶7. (C)  What Sleiman and others don't understand is that the 
constitution entrusts power to the existing prime minister 
and his cabinet, rather than to the president, if a new 
president is not elected.  In an interim presidency the 
parliament is an electoral rather than a legislative body; it 
can pass no law until it elects a president.  The 
constitution requires that the cabinet not resign until after 
the formation of a new government, precisely to avoid any 
vacuum, Gemayel told us.  Perhaps Sleiman would be less 
likely to head an interim government if they realized it 
would be unconstitutional and unrecognized, he argued. 
 
MARCH 14 WILL ELECT THEIR 
PRESIDENT "AT ANY PRICE" 
------------------------ 
 
¶8. (C)  March 14 must elect its presidential candidate "at 
any price," Gemayel argued, and will not hesitate to elect 
its candidate with a simple majority.  Because of the implied 
veto of Hizballah, a consensus president would allow Syria 
and Iran to reassert control over and reshape Lebanese 
institutions; a compromise cabinet, new electoral law, and a 
compromise parliament would quickly follow.  That course 
would consolidate Hizballah's "state within a state" and 
endanger all that various UN Security Council resolutions 
have achieved, including establishment of the Special 
Tribunal.  At some stage March 14, too, will have to use "all 
available means," Gemayel quietly threatened.  "We need a 
Plan B," he argued, intimating that March 14 forces are 
preparing their own non-political measures. 
 
¶9. (C)  March 14 has chosen alternate meeting sites in case 
Berri refuses to convene parliament in late September, but is 
still trying to rally the simple majority of MPs it needs to 
hold an election.  Gemayel is waiting for Saad Hariri to 
return before hosting a coalition meeting to discuss the 
presidency, and the group is working on a media campaign. 
Gemayel expects that influential Lebanese and foreign allies 
will convince fence sitters such as Mohammad Safadi, Boutros 
Harb, and Bahij Tabbarah to vote with March 14.  Harb, who 
recently said he would withdraw his candidacy if he could not 
obtain the support of two-thirds of the parliament, can no 
longer be considered a candidate, Gemayel reasoned. 
 
LOOKING TO U.S. ASSISTANCE 
-------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C)  The United States can help by promising 
international support to the candidate March will elect with 
a simple majority, Gemayel continued, by helping the group 
remain unified.  In addition, the US has the most potential 
influence over and can "seduce" Sleiman to relinquish his 
hope of an interim presidency with an offer of greater 
support for him in a later political role.  Sleiman is 
uncomfortable with the Syrians who put him in place, Gemayel 
argued, and would prefer a western sponsor. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶11.  (C)  Unlike in previous meetings, Gemayel did not hint 
that he should be considered the savior president (although 
much of his message sounded "presidential" in tone).  In 
fact, he offered a more cogent, strategic view of what is 
happening than what he usually gives us.  While he had no 
specific examples, the allegations of Aounists arming 
themselves for offensive action correspond with many other 
rumors we have heard.  Gemayel did not seem to be trying to 
 
BEIRUT 00001345  003 OF 003 
 
 
settle scores with a hated rival (whose candidate beat him in 
the recent Metn by-elections) but instead appeared truly 
concerned about Aoun joining with Hizballah in violent street 
action designed to prevent parliamentary elections. 
FELTMAN