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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001343 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/HARDING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MARCH 14 PLANS FOR COUNTERING BERRI'S 
PROPOSAL 
 
REF: BEIRUT 1334 
 
BEIRUT 00001343  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By:  Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
Summary 
-------- 
 
¶1. (C) During a productive Saturday at the Serail, the 
Ambassador met on 9/1 with the Prime Minister, Minister of 
Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh, and Minister of Social 
Affairs Nayla Mouawad.  The March 14 members were all 
discussing Speaker Berri's proposal announced to great 
fanfare the previous day to drop cabinet expansion as the 
opposition's pre-condition for negotiations to seek a 
consensus presidential candidate, while asking in return for 
a commitment for a two-thirds parliamentary majority to elect 
the president.  Though Berri's motives did not fool anyone -- 
the pro-Syrian opposition would have a veto over the 
presidential election -- the GOL officials admitted that it 
was a clever piece of public relations which spoke to the 
wishes of the Lebanese people and was in concert with recent 
statements from the Patriarch.  The PM is coordinating a 
response with his March 14 colleagues, and it appears they 
may offer Berri just enough rope to hang himself.  The 
favorite of a number of options is to agree to Berri's 
conditions if he promises to remove the downtown tent city 
full of protesters immediately and require the resigned 
cabinet members to return to their posts.  If he fails on the 
pre-conditions, March 14 can take back its promise for a 
two-thirds majority.  If he complies, the constitution 
requires the cabinet to assume power at the end of Lahoud's 
term, if no president is elected, and March 14 has more than 
a two-thirds majority to take executive decisions in that 
venue.  Checkmate or is (as we predict) Berri too smart to 
take the bait?  We'll have to wait and see.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) On September 1, the Ambassador, accompanied by Special 
Assistant, went to the Serail to meet with Prime Minister 
Siniora, Ambassador Mohammed Chatah and Roula Noureddine. 
When asked for a reaction to Speaker Berri's proposal, the PM 
said he had been offered "a card of no value (dropped demand 
for cabinet expansion) in exchange for a valid card of much 
value (agreement on a two-thirds majority in parliamentary 
voting for the presidency)."  As Chatah explained separately, 
because the Siniora cabinet would expire (through a 
constitutionally mandated resignation) upon the assumption of 
office of a new president, the idea of trying to form a new, 
expanded cabinet now is already "passed the expiration date," 
although Berri cleverly used it. 
 
Responses to Berri's "Kind Offer" 
------------------------ 
 
¶3. (C)  Using the high-profile venue of the anniversary 
commemoration of Imam Musa Sadr's disappearance 29 years ago, 
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri on 8/31 proposed that the 
pro-Syrian opposition abandon its demand for a national unity 
cabinet, in favor of the March 14 majority accepting the 
requirement for a two-thirds quorum for presidential 
elections (giving, in essence, the veto to the pro-Syrian 
opposition over the presidential selection).  In doing so, 
the Speaker immediately appeared as having offered a great 
compromise, with even pro-March 14 media reporting his 
initiative in favorable terms.  The PM, who agreed that March 
14 cannot be seen as outright rejecting Berri's "compromise," 
said he had spent the evening of August 31 with his advisors 
debating three possible responses to Berri's proposal: 
 
-  Agree with the Berri on the need to negotiate for a 
consensus candidate, but refuse to accept specific 
pre-conditions (i.e., the two-thirds quorum) to these talks. 
This would allow March 14 to negotiate but to reserve the 
possibility of using a simple majority election at the end, 
if no consensus president emerged.  Berri, he admitted, has 
refused this approach for months already and is unlikely to 
change his mind now.  So this option is probably not viable. 
 
-  Agree to the talks with Berri's conditions, but renege on 
the promise in a few month's time if there was no consensus 
candidate.  This was a particular favorite of Noureddine's 
who said it was "time to call Berri's bluff."  However, 
others admitted the danger of having March 14th appear 
 
BEIRUT 00001343  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
untrustworthy, just as Michel Aoun so frequently insists. 
 
- Accept Berri's demand for a two-thirds majority, but only 
in return for the immediate removal of the downtown tent city 
of protesters and the immediate return of resigned cabinet 
members to their posts.  According to Chatah, Berri will be 
told that only these events can create "conditions for 
consensus." 
 
¶4. (C) Clearly, option three is the favorite right now.  If 
Berri fails to respond to March 14's counterproposal, it is 
he who will appear to be the obstructionist.  If he agrees, 
but fails to produce the real changes, then March 14 is 
relieved of its own obligations and can revert to a simple 
majority quorum for for presidential elections.  And, if 
Berri does come through and there is an active and sitting 
Cabinet, it is they who will constitutionally inherit 
temporarily the powers of the presidency during a vaccum 
after the end of Lahoud's term, if the two-thirds quorum 
fails to produce a consensus president.  In the cabinet, 
March 14 can easily muster the two-thirds majority needed to 
take all major executive decisions.  This, as Chatah said, 
would be the pro-Syrians' nightmare, for it would leave all 
power in the hands of the March 14-dominated cabinet once 
Lahoud leaves office, so that fear should help induce the 
pro-Syrians to come to an agreement on the presidency. 
 
¶5. (C) The Ambassador asked if Berri, an astute political 
thinker, would accept this counterproposal.  Surely he can 
play out the options and can see that the March 14 proposal 
could lead to no president and a March 14-dominated fully 
empowered cabinet assuming the presidency until elections can 
take place.  According to the Prime Minister, Berri's 
reaction is almost beside the point.  March 14 must publicly 
counter Berri's proposal with one of their own, or else the 
Lebanese voters may view the coalition as obstructionists not 
interested in the country's political stability.  Berri will 
look generous by comparison.  "If it comes down to open 
conflict, at least we can at least say we responded to their 
generous offer with one of our own," said the Prime Minister. 
 
How to Make the Next Move 
---------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The PM said he had discussed Berri's proposal with 
numerous March 14 colleagues on August 31, including Saad 
Hariri, Walid Jumblatt, Amine Gemayel, Samir Geagea, Boutros 
Harb, and Nassib Lahoud.  (Minister Mouawad's meeting with 
the PM followed the Ambassador's.)  Most seem to agree with 
the third option mentioned above, but asked for a few days to 
carefully consider the implications before making a public 
statement.  The timing is complicated, however, as the PM is 
due to depart on September 4 for visits to Rome, Berlin, and 
Cairo.  He would prefer to respond publicly as soon as 
possible but, as he told the Ambassador, "you know what it's 
like to work with my people."  He is also concerned about the 
optics of a public response which comes after international 
travel.  He doesn't want it to appear that he is using 
talking points produced in foreign capitals. 
 
Berri Actually Working for Vaccuum, 
with Aoun, Hizballah Preparing to Initiate Violence 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C)  The PM also expressed his opinion that the new 
initiative was a very calculated and orchestrated move by 
Berri.  He is sure this is another sign that the Syrian and 
Iranians do not want the Lebanese presidential elections to 
take place on time.  Berri can use the two-thirds quorum 
issue to exercise a veto over any president who is 
independent of Syria and Iran, and the March 14 majority will 
refuse to elect a president who is subservient to Syria and 
Iran.  So Berri's initiative is a well-disguised road leading 
to vacuum.  Siniora also confirmed that he had heard rumors 
that the Syrian National Party, Aounists and Hizballah were 
rearming themselves for offensive battle.  The PM is certain 
that these groups currently have enough power to make the 
first strike and spark a larger conflict that will spread 
with troubling regional implications. 
 
Other Ministerial Reactions 
--------------------- 
 
 
BEIRUT 00001343  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶8. (C) The Ambassador and Special Assistant also met with 
Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh, a close Druse 
confidant of Walid Jumblatt.  Hamadeh came right out and 
called Berri's proposal "a trap" and "an attempt to sell a 
government he doesn't even own."  Hamadeh was concerned about 
going out on a limb with option three, as mentioned above. 
"There is no way we can accept a two-thirds majority 
requirement, and we should be very careful before promising 
to do so."  He worries that, with only two months left in 
power, the PM may be inclined to act rashly.  Siniora needs 
to think about the political fortunes of March 14 beyond the 
expiration of his cabinet (which is constitutionally required 
to resign upon the assumption of office of a new president). 
Hamadeh said Jumblatt asked for a few days to study the 
proposal, and Hamadeh agrees that this is wise.  "We must 
protect the long-term interests of March 14.  We don't want 
to rush into anything that could affect our rights in the 
future." 
 
¶9. (C) During a brief conversation with the Ambassador and 
Special Assistant in the hallway of the Grand Serail, 
Minister Mouawad expressed grave concern about the public 
relations aspect of the Berri proposal because "it appears 
reasonable and attractive -- just what people want."  She was 
on her way in to meet with the PM, but said that a clear and 
unified response would be required in order for March 14th to 
maintain its public credibility. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
10, (C) Berri is up to his usual tricks with his clever 
proposal.  By appearing reasonable and conceding the March 
8-Aoun demand for a national unity cabinet now, Berri has 
successfully shifted the responsibility for deadlock and 
crisis to the March 14 leaders.  Lebanese public opinion, 
sick and tired of the political spats and the stagnant 
economy that is the result, supports some kind of compromise 
on the presidency, as does Maronite Patriarch Sfeir.  Berri 
appeared to deliver that yearned-for compromise, and everyone 
will look to see how March 14 responds.  As a byproduct of 
his initiative, Berri has burnished his own credentials as a 
leader (vice simply serving as the Hizballah "mailbox," as 
Jumblatt wickedly but so accurately noted), since he -- not 
Hassan Nasrallah and not Michel Aoun -- was the one who 
offered, seemingly on his own, the generous gesture to March 
14 and GOL leaders of giving up the national unity cabinet 
demand. 
 
¶11.  (C)  The question is whether Berri is really ready for a 
consensus president or is simply shifting the blame to March 
14 for the inevitable vacuum and crisis.  If Berri is sincere 
in going so public in seeking a consensus candidate, then he 
has essentially broken with the divisive Aoun, whom March 14 
MPs will never accept as a consensus.  If Berri has broken 
with Aoun, then he could only have done so with Hizballah's 
blessing.  But Michel Aoun's silence regarding the Berri 
initiative makes us suspicious.  It is more likely that this 
initiative was carefully coordinated with the Hizballah-Aoun 
bloc, with Aoun told that the two-thirds quorum means that 
the pro-Syrian opposition will use its veto to block any 
other presidential candidate.  Then, when the inevitable 
vacuum occurs, Aoun's chances become greater for some kind of 
extra-constitutional appointment, either now or during some 
kind of violent reaction.  In any case, the burden is on 
March 14 leaders not to fall into a trap set by the wily 
Berri but also not to appear obstructionist in the face of a 
proposition that appears reasonable (or, as Sitt Nayla said, 
even attractive). 
 
¶12.  (C)  The timing of Patriarch Sfeir's visit to the 
Vatican on 9/6 takes on more importance than ever, in the 
aftermath of the Berri initiative.  While we defer to Embassy 
Vatican as to the accuracy of this, people tell us that the 
Vatican favors compromise (but, happily, also wants a figure 
who has a good reputation that exceeds beyond Lebanon's 
borders, with Nassib Lahoud having impressed Vatican 
officials).  We know that the pro-Syrians have so frightened 
the Patriarch about vacuum and violence that Sfeir sees no 
way out except through a compromise candidate, even if that 
compromise candidate is a non-entity unable to stand up to 
Hizballah, Syria, and Iran.  We are concerned that there 
could be sufficient overlap between Sfeir's worries, Vatican 
 
BEIRUT 00001343  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
thinking, and Berri's initiative that March 14 leaders are 
cornered well in advance of the expiration of Lahoud's term 
into accepting a weak president.  To the extent that the 
Vatican and the Patriarch can come up with a strategy by 
which all Christian MPs, regardless of their political 
affiliation, feel that they have no choice but to show up to 
the parliament to vote for a president, then the question of 
quorum becomes less important.  Berri -- along with his 
Hizballah, Syrian, and Iranian masters -- is using the quorum 
issue to force his will upon the question of presidential 
succession.  The Vatican and Patriarch may be able to remove 
this card from his hand, in a way that allows a more credible 
candidate to emerge the winner. 
FELTMAN