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OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #6403/01 2711431
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 281431Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2350
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 0713
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0025
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 1312
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 6614
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0358
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 4439
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 1134

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 006403 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2032 
TAGS: PREL PTER ETRD ENRG MARR ZK XD CH RS
SUBJECT: SCO SECRETARIAT, PRC SCHOLARS DISAGREE ON SCO 
MANDATE 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 
 (b/d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  Central Asian staff at the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) secretariat and Chinese 
scholars offered clashing views on the SCO's mission, 
reflecting differences between China and other member 
states.  Umad Azizov, an Uzbek at the SCO Secretariat, 
stressed the SCO's role in forging security links and 
the sharing of counter-terrorism information.  Azizov 
admitted, however, that specific security cooperation 
measures remain undefined.  Two Chinese researchers, 
on the other hand, said China views the SCO primarily 
as an economic organization and suggested Beijing 
knows it must resolve internal tension between 
security and economic goals if the SCO is to succeed. 
For the researchers, instability in Afghanistan poses 
the major potential challenge for the SCO.  All these 
contacts said Western countries misunderstand the SCO. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
Secretariat: Security is Central 
 
SIPDIS 
-------------------------------- 
 
 
¶2. (C) Umad Azizov, an Uzbek senior expert at the SCO 
Secretariat, told Poloff September 17 that security 
 
SIPDIS 
cooperation has always been the primary focus of the 
SCO.  The development of specific political, economic, 
social and other goals is still in its infancy, and 
only in the security sphere has the organization shown 
concrete progress.  The high-profile PEACE MISSION 
2007 joint military exercise in August, as well as the 
more modest joint counter-terrorism exercise 
COOPERATIVE 2007 in September, showed the primacy of 
the SCO's security agenda, he argued. 
 
¶3. (C) COOPERATIVE 2007, which focused on coordination 
between Russian and Chinese police forces, aimed 
publicly to de-emphasize the military dimension of 
security cooperation, Azizov said.  He said there are 
no near-term plans for additional military exercises, 
although security cooperation on counter-terrorism 
will continue.  Member countries are exchanging 
counter-terrorism information and developing bilateral 
efforts to deal with transnational terrorism in the 
region.  Azizov called these "Interpol-style links," 
but added tht communication under the SCO goes deeper 
thanunder Interpol.  For example, the SCO is 
developing a "unified database" for member countries 
to share counter-terrorism information. 
 
But SCO Not a NATO of the East 
------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (C) Nevertheless, Azizov insisted, the SCO is not 
comparable to NATO and not on a trajectory to develop 
into a military alliance.  Citing the lack of formal 
political and military structures within the SCO, 
Azizov added that there is no basis for such a 
military alliance among SCO member countries at 
present.  Xia Yishan, senior research fellow at the 
MFA-affiliated China Institute of International 
Studies, echoed this sentiment in a September 17 
conversation, but conceded that Russia may view the 
SCO as a counterweight to U.S. power in the region. 
He insisted that China shares many common interests 
with the United States and said Beijing does not view 
the SCO as an anti-U.S. organization. 
 
Short on Specifics 
------------------ 
 
¶5. (C) When pressed to describe the actual mechanism 
by which SCO member countries could draw on the shared 
security resources available through the organization, 
the Secretariat's Azizov acknowledged that no specific 
process is in place and that existing UN structures 
are still the primary channel for security 
coordination.  A SCO member country in need of 
security assistance may seek such support from other 
members, but this request at present would be directed 
through the UN.  For emergency situations, he added, 
 
BEIJING 00006403  002 OF 003 
 
 
"response specifics are still being developed." 
 
Economic Links Key for China 
---------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Despite media attention to security exercises, 
Xia said, for now, economics remains the SCO's 
"fundamental purpose," and development of Central 
Asia's oil resources is the "number one goal" of the 
SCO.  Beijing, Xia said, emphasizes the economic 
potential of the SCO, whereas Russia is more 
interested in opportunities for security cooperation. 
Noting Russia's long history of involvement in Central 
Asia, Xia added that Russia "cannot let go" of the 
region, even as it becomes less relevant relative to 
China.  The SCO, from China's perspective, contains 
the Russian instinct to stay involved in the region in 
a forum that China can, to a certain extent, control. 
Xia also said that in any case economic and security 
concerns are inseparable, and that cooperation on both 
is needed. 
 
¶7. (C) Xia outlined a raft of economic initiatives, 
primarily bilateral in nature, that are facilitated by 
coordination under the SCO, including road and rail 
connections, pipelines, enhanced trade and travel 
links.  As a particularly ambitious example, Xia cited 
ongoing efforts by Kazakhstan to find investors for 
its proposed highway linking western China to Europe. 
Xia called the SCO the "platform" for such economic 
cooperation and said that the development of this 
platform has led to a significant increase in Chinese 
investment in Central Asia.  He counted 21 major 
Chinese projects in Central Asia that have come about 
through cooperation under the SCO. 
 
¶8. (C) For the countries of Central Asia, Xia said, 
the development of oil fields and energy 
infrastructure is clearly the primary goal of 
participation in the SCO.  The SCO provides a forum 
for negotiating with Russia and China, and when 
necessary, enhances the smaller states' ability to 
play the two major powers off against one another. 
Xia stressed that, while oil prices are determined by 
the global market, Central Asia faces a simple 
strategic choice in the development of its oil 
infrastructure: the primary flow of exports will face 
east or west.  He stressed that Beijing understands 
this and views the SCO as a mechanism for influencing 
this decision-making process.  Chen Jiejun from the 
Ministry of State Security-affiliated China Institutes 
of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) 
amplified this view, stating that for China, security 
goals rank last out of the four major areas of SCO 
interest: 1) developing political ties, 2) deepening 
economic links, 3) fostering cultural exchange, and 4) 
security cooperation.  When pressed to address the 
significance of security coordination, he emphasized 
joint counter-narcotic activities and efforts to 
prevent ecological terrorism. 
 
Simmering Contention 
-------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Xia said that the internal tension over the 
nature of SCO between China and other SCO members, 
particularly Russia, must eventually be resolved if 
the SCO is to move forward.  Chen echoed this view, 
saying that the SCO suffers from a degree of "self- 
contradiction" stemming from "natural limitations" to 
Russia-China cooperation.  Beijing, he insists, 
understands this well and is laying the groundwork to 
mitigate this problem in the future, although he 
declined to provide more specific information. 
 
Concern over Western "Misunderstanding" 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Chen expressed concern that the Western media 
"misunderstands" the SCO.  He suggested that the SCO 
should seek opportunities to clarify the nature of the 
organizatin, perhaps via a symposium for scholars on 
both sides of the Pacific.  He said China cannot deny 
 
BEIJING 00006403  003 OF 003 
 
 
that the United States continues to have significant 
influence in Central Asia, but that China does not 
view this as a threat.  Chen denied that China is the 
primary driver of the SCO.  The organization's name is 
an accident of history, and China provides the 
preponderance of funding for the Secretariat because 
China has more resources. 
 
No Plans for New Members 
------------------------ 
 
¶11. (C) Azizov emphasized that, technically speaking, 
the SCO has an "open structure" that does not preclude 
any country from joining.  However, as a relatively 
new organization, a mechanism by which countries join 
has yet to be defined.  Furthermore, membership may 
require "changes within the applying country."  There 
are no immediate plans for expanding membership of the 
organization, Azizov said.  The two Chinese scholars 
separately repeated this message.  Azizov added that 
members are "still digesting" the outcome of the 
August Bishkek summit and thus could not comment on 
major initiatives the organization would undertake 
over the next year. 
 
Afghanistan - The Wild Card? 
---------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Xia cautioned that enhancing stability in 
Afghanistan remains a critical priority for the 
region.  Although Afghanistan is not a regular SCO 
member, it has observer status in the organization, 
and its proximity and instability makes member states 
nervous about its future.  President Karzai's 
participation in the Bishkek summit underscored the 
importance of Afghanistan to SCO member states. 
Increased instability in Afghanistan would prove an 
important test of the willingness and ability of SCO 
member states to respond to a regional crisis, but 
might also highlight the limited ability of member 
states to coordinate a response. 
 
Atmospherics 
------------ 
 
¶13. (C) The three staffers we met at the SCO were all 
Central Asians -- two Uzbeks and one Tajik, none of 
whom spoke Chinese.  The Secretariat is housed in a 
spartan villa in an up-and-coming area of Beijing, not 
far from the new U.S. Embassy compound.  Although Xia, 
Chen and Azizov were willing to discuss the SCO with 
us, one of Xia's staffers asked with palpable 
suspicion why the United States should be interested 
in an organization in which it does not participate 
and should play no role. 
Randt