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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 001141 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR EUR/CARC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2017 
TAGS: PREL ENRG PHUM KDEM KNNC MARR IR AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJANI FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES AHAMDINEJAD 
VISIT, ENERGY, AND OSCE HDIM 
 
REF: A. STATE 126089 
     ¶B. BAKU 01072 
 
BAKU 00001141  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  During a September 11 meeting with the 
Ambassador, Foreign Minister Mammadyarov said Iran 
increasingly supports Iraq's territorial integrity, but 
President Ahmadinejad will not change his position on Iran's 
nuclear program.  During President Ahmadinejad's August visit 
to Baku, the Iranian side raised their "concern" with 
U.S.-Russian negotiations over Gabala.  (According to the 
Turkish Ambassador here, Ahmadinejad was very harsh with 
Aliyev on Gabala.)  Mammadyarov explained that Iran's support 
for Azerbaijan's position on Nagorno-Karabakh during the 
visit was not a significant shift in substance, but Iran did 
agree, for the first time, to put it in writing in the joint 
declaration.  On energy issues, Mammadyarov said Kazakh 
President Nazarbayev will meet Turkmen President 
Berdimuhamedov on September 13 and would discuss a possible 
trilateral energy summit between Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and 
Turkmenistan.  Mammadyarov said he did not have any problems 
with the U.S.' NGO principles, which we proposed to the GOAJ 
to endorse before the OSCE Human Dimension Implementation 
Meeting in Warsaw, but said it was impossible for Azerbaijan 
to release the seven journalists prior to the meeting. 
Mammadyarov confirmed that he will lead the GOAJ delegation 
to UNGA and President Aliyev and the Azerbaijani First Lady 
will not attend.  End Summary. 
 
Iran Tidbits 
------------ 
 
¶2.  (C) Commenting on Iranian President Ahmadinejad's August 
21-22 visit to Baku, Mammadyarov said Iran has "strongly 
changed" its policy on Iraq and it now supports Iraq's 
territorial integrity.  Tehran increasingly understands that 
Iraq's dissolution is not in Iran's interests, Mammadyarov 
observed.  (Mammadyarov suggested that Damascus influenced 
Tehran's more supportive stance concerning Iraq's territorial 
integrity.)  Mammadyarov regarded Muqtada al-Sadr's 
willingness to work with the Iraqi government as a signal of 
this Iranian policy shift.  Mammadyarov also noted that 
Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki "highly assessed" the 
U.S.-Iran talks, saying there was a "good atmosphere." 
 
¶3.  (C) In Mammadyarov's personal opinion, Ahmadinejad's 
personal position on Iran's nuclear program will not change 
because his legitimacy is closely wed to this issue, and as 
Ahmadinejad has said, "he burned his bridges" on the issue. 
Mammadyarov suggested that other Iranian elites may not be so 
inflexible.  Mammadyarov observed that the Azerbaijani 
Embassy in Iran has reported increased discussions among the 
Iranian elite in the past six months, some of whom are 
questioning Ahmadinejad's more confrontational policies. 
 
¶4.  (C) Ahmadinejad raised concerns with U.S.-Russian 
discussions on Azerbaijan's Gabala radar station, obliquely 
warning the GOAJ not to do anything that would hurt their 
"brothers in Iran."  One of the Iranian Deputy Foreign 
Ministers also told Mammadyarov that Tehran understands 
Azerbaijan is an independent state, while asking for 
Azerbaijan to maintain a balanced foreign policy.  In 
response to the Ambassador's question, Mammadyarov said the 
GOAJ did not raise the issue of Iranian incursions onto 
Azerbaijani territory because this trend shows a decline and 
Azerbaijan is increasing its own capabilities.  Mammadyarov 
also confirmed that there was no change in the visa regime 
policy between the two countries as a result of the visit. 
 
¶5.  (C) In response to the Ambassador's question about the 
inclusion of Iran's support for Azerbaijan's position on NK 
in the joint Azerbaijani-Iranian declaration, Mammadyarov 
said this was not a significant shift in substance.  (NOTE: 
Per ref A, Azerbaijan and Iran signed five agreements during 
Ahmadinejad's August 21-22 visit to Baku, including a joint 
declaration.)   However, Mammadyarov said while Iran publicly 
has supported Azerbaijan's NK position in the past, the GOAJ 
secured Iran's support in a written declaration for the first 
time.  The GOAJ had not planned to issue such a declaration 
on the occasion of the visit, but agreed when Iran offered to 
include the statement on NK.  Mammadyarov suggested that Iran 
offered this support because Ahmadinejad is looking for 
 
BAKU 00001141  002 OF 003 
 
 
politicalsupport for his regime. 
 
¶6.  (C) Mammadyarov hopd Iran would adopt a more flexible 
position during the mid-October Heads of State summit for the 
Caspian littoral countries in Tehran.  He noted that Kazakh 
President Nazarbayev will visit Tehran on October 15, and 
Russian President Putin will visit Tehran on October 17. 
Given that the other Caspian leaders have agreed to the 
summit, President Aliyev also will attend this summit. 
 
Energy Update 
------------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  Mammadyarov said Kazakh President Nazarbayev will 
meet Turkmen President Berdimuhamedov on September 13, and 
said the Kazakh Ambassador confirmed Nazarbayev will raise 
the issue of the trilateral Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and 
Turkmenistan energy summit.  Nazarbayev wants to host a 
trilateral summit because he seeks to be "the senior Central 
Asian leader," according to Mammadyarov.  Mammadyarov pledged 
to share any information he receives on Nazarbayev's visit or 
a possible trilateral summit. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Mammadyarov complained that the EU has failed to 
engage substantively with Azerbaijan on energy, even though 
he has raised this issue with EU Commissioner Benita 
Ferrero-Waldner.  Mammadyarov said he looks forward to the 
upcoming energy conference in Lithuania, although the outcome 
is still unclear.  Looking to the future, Mammadyarov said 
the GOAJ supports the idea of a heads of state conference 
with the EU focused on energy, possibly timed to the 10th 
anniversary of TRACECA in 2008.  he strongly argued that EU 
Commission President Barroso needs to be more personally, 
visibly, and actively engaged. 
 
Open to GOAJ Participation at OSCE HDIM 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C)  Ambassador delivered ref B demarche on the September 
24 - October 5 OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting 
(HDIM) meeting in Warsaw, highlighting this as an opportunity 
for the GOAJ to send a positive signal on democracy-related 
issues.  She suggested that specific steps as proposed in the 
demarche, accompanied by a strong public affirmations of 
Azerbaijan's commitment to democratization, would be 
important in light of recent negative developments here. 
 
¶10.  (C) The Ambassador reminded Mammadyarov of A/S Fried's 
recent comments that Azerbaijan needs to make equal progress 
on our three core bilateral interests and underscored the 
growing perception of democratic backsliding in Azerbaijan. 
Mammadyarov read through the demarche carefully and said the 
request to release seven journalists before the HDIM was 
"impossible" because it would create the perception that 
Azerbaijan is caving into international pressure. 
Mammadyarov also took issue with the demarche's final point 
on working with international legal experts on trial 
monitoring, observing that this should not be particularized 
to the Farhad Aliyev trial, which the Armenia lobby has been 
using to give Azerbaijan a bad reputation.  Mammadyarov, 
however, agreed to the general principle of trial monitoring. 
 
¶11.  (C) On the 2008 Presidential election, Mammadyarov said 
negotiations over the Council of Europe's (COE) Venice 
Commission's recommendations still are ongoing between the 
GOAJ and the COE.  Mammadyarov sighed and obliquely blamed 
unspecified GOAJ officials for having the wrong "mentality" 
toward the elections. 
 
¶12.  (C) On civil society, the Ambassador suggested that it 
would be helpful for President Aliyev to endorse the 
Secretary's Guiding Principles on NGOs, Mammadyarov, 
 
SIPDIS 
recalling that A/S Lowenkron had made the same request in 
March,  said he would reexamine these principles; he thought 
the GOAJ could support them.  The Ambassador noted that the 
implementation of President Aliyev's July 27 decree on NGOs 
was very important, as this could be a positive or troubling 
development depending on whether the decree in practice 
supports civil society development or attempts to control NGO 
activity.  Mammadyarov agreed that how the decree is 
implemented is central. 
 
¶13.  (C) As an aside on OSCE-related issues, Mammadyarov said 
 
BAKU 00001141  003 OF 003 
 
 
the GOAJ supports Kazakhstan's bid for the OSCE chairmanship. 
 He warned that if the U.S. does not support Kazakhstan's 
bid, Russia likely will use this U.S. position to block all 
candidates for OSCE positions. 
 
UNGA Bilateral 
-------------- 
 
¶14. (C)  Mammadyarov said he will lead the GOAJ delegation to 
UNGA, arriving September 26 and departing for Baku on October 
¶3.   Mammadyarov said he would be happy to discuss the full 
range of bilateral issues with U.S. officials, but especially 
energy.  The Ambassador underscored the importance of 
continuing the democracy dialogue and intensifying it when 
A/S Lowenkron's successor is named.  Mammadyarov agreed but 
recalled the understanding at its launch that it would not be 
formalized, "like the energy dialogue, under an MOU." 
DERSE