VZCZCXRO7481
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKB #1099/01 2471259
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 041259Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3819
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 2353
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0136
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0446
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 0683
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0681
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 001099 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR EUR/CARC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS AM AJ
SUBJECT: FORUM ON KARABAKH ADVOCATES SETTING A DEADLINE FOR 
MINSK GROUP PEACE PROCESS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Representatives from the Forum on Karabakh 
-- a nascent association of opposition-leaning individuals -- 
on August 29 told the Ambassador that their organization is 
increasingly impatient with the Minsk Group process due to 
its lack of progress in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict.  The Forum advocates setting a three to five year 
timeline on the Minsk Group's efforts, and also urges 
enhanced GOAJ efforts to lobby other countries to label 
Armenia as the aggressor in the conflict.  The Forum supports 
the use of force to retake NK and the seven occupied 
territories if negotiations fail.  The Forum representatives 
argued that the continued status quo of the unresolved 
conflict is not in the interests of Azerbaijan or the U.S, 
adding that Azerbaijanis' generally favorable view of the 
U.S. is declining because many Azerbaijanis question the U.S. 
commitment to serve a solution to the NK conflict due to the 
Minsk Group,s continuing failure to resolve the conflict. We 
believe the Forum,s views increasingly represent a growing 
trend in Azerbaijani society that must be countered to ensure 
that the peace process is not disrupted.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) On August 29, the Ambassador met with three 
representatives from the Forum on Karabakh, at their request, 
to hear the group,s perspectives gauge popular opinion on 
resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  Each also heads a 
small opposition party.  The Forum on Karabakh is an informal 
association of several opposition-leaning individuals who 
have held several meetings to address the NK conflict.  The 
Forum is not a tight-knit, well-organized group, but a 
nascent umbrella organization.  Their most recent meeting was 
in July, and they have sent a letter, which outlines their 
recommendations for settling the NK conflict, to President 
Aliyev.  While the movement is nascent, we believe it 
reflects growing opinion within Azerbaijani society that the 
Minsk Group is not capable of resolving the conflict and 
other means to secure a resolution must be explored.  (The 
three representatives and their political affiliation are: 
Ahmad Oruj (Azadliq Party), Taleh Aliyev (Azerbaijan Way), 
and Hasan Hasanov (Azad Azerbaijan).) 
 
¶3.  (C) The Forum provided the following eight proposals to 
President Aliyev, suggesting a new approach to resolving the 
NK conflict.  The Forum also is preparing a broader plan for 
a Government-wide approach to resolving the conflict. 
Informal Embassy translation of the eight points follows: 
 
-Disclose the framework of negotiating principles. 
-Stop looking for internal enemies and eliminate internal 
clashes so Azerbaijan is more unified in its approach to 
resolving the NK conflict. 
-Raise the issue of the withdrawal of Russian troops from 
Armenia. 
-Put a deadline on the work of the OSCE Minsk Group. 
-Establish a Karabakh or Territorial Problems Institute to 
deepen Azerbaijan's approach toward the conflict. 
-Nationalistic groups should start a campaign to call on the 
U.S., Russia, France, and Iran to stop supporting Armenia. 
-Azerbaijan should lobby neighboring countries to label 
Armenia as the aggressor in the NK conflict, paving the way 
for economic and political sanctions. 
-Create a Karabakh Commission within the Parliament. 
 
Status Quo Not in Azerbaijan's Interest 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) The Forum representatives argued that Azerbaijanis 
increasingly believe that Azerbaijan should not continue with 
the Minsk Group process unless there are clear results.  Oruj 
said a number of recent statements by the OSCE Minsk Group 
Co-Chairs -- including the U.S. Co-Chair's August interview 
that mentioned American revolutionaries and Karabakhis -- 
have heightened Azerbaijanis' immediate frustration with the 
Minsk Group process.  However, he noted that there also is a 
more long-term trend of mounting skepticism toward the Minsk 
Group.  One of the Forum's key recommendations is that the 
GOAJ should put a clear timeline on the Minsk Group's work. 
Specifically, the Forum believes that the GOAJ should set a 
three to five year deadline on Minsk Group negotiations.  If 
negotiations fail after this period, the GOAJ should retake 
 
BAKU 00001099  002 OF 003 
 
 
NK and the seven occupied territories. 
 
¶5.  (C) Oruj argued that the GOAJ should be more proactive in 
pursuing Azerbaijan's interests vis-a-vis NK and not assume 
that other countries will necessarily act in Azerbaijan's 
best interests.  Despite their opposition affiliation, the 
Forum representatives advocated a more cohesive national 
consensus between the government and the Azerbaijani people 
regarding NK.  Oruj said that if the GOAJ broadens the public 
dialogue on NK, this would create greater trust and 
solidarity between the Azerbaijani population and President 
Aliyev.  Oruj said some oppositionists would put aside their 
political agenda if President Aliyev moved forward with 
concrete actions to settle the NK conflict in a manner more 
consistent with Azerbaijan's interests. 
 
¶6.  (C) The representatives commented that the continuation 
of the status quo increases the risks of a country or 
international fora recognizing NK's independence.  In 
particular, Oruj was nervous about Moscow taking this step. 
 
. . . or the US' Interest 
------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Aliyev observed that the current stalemate is 
decreasing Azerbaijanis' generally favorable impressions of 
the U.S.  Anti-U.S. forces are playing on this theme.  In 
response to the Ambassador's question, Aliyev said there is 
no homogenous group of anti-U.S. forces, as it includes a 
range of politicians, NGO activists, journalists, and 
intellectuals.  Just as the U.S. provides grants to a range 
of civil society groups, Russia and Iran actively maintain 
their own outreach tools.  Aliyev and Oruj said Russia seeks 
to exacerbate ethnic tensions between Azerbaijanis and 
several non-Turkic minorities, including Lezgis, Talysh, and 
other groups indigenous to Dagestan.  On the other hand, Iran 
has outreach efforts to religious groups in Azerbaijan. 
 
Recognize the Aggressor 
---------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Oruj argued that the Minsk Group's basic stance is 
not terribly different from the position of the Soviet Union 
because neither actor distinguishes between the aggressor and 
the victim.  The Forum's appeal to President Aliyev called 
for increased GOAJ lobbying efforts for other countries to 
label Armenia as the aggressor in the conflict because it is 
"unjust" to ignore the distinction between aggressor and 
victim.  The representatives suggested the GOAJ should work 
with the Azerbaijani diaspora to achieve this goal. 
 
Territorial Integrity is Key 
---------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Taleh Aliyev said the only alternative to maintaining 
Azerbaijan's territorial integrity is war.  Aliyev and Oruj 
cautioned that while Azerbaijanis generally are quiescent, 
they can also be emotional and would never accept a 
compromise when it comes to Azerbaijan's territory.  If 
Azerbaijan did not make such a compromise when it was a weak 
state in the 1990s, why would Azerbaijan now make a 
compromise from a position of greater strength, asked Oruj 
While arguing for the inviolability of Azerbaijan's 
territorial integrity, the representatives underscored the 
importance of granting all ethnic Armenian Azerbaijani 
citizens clear minority rights in their proposal. 
 
Treat Azerbaijan as a Partner 
----------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) The representatives' appeal was grounded in a 
favorable -- albeit receding -- view of the U.S. and 
Azerbaijan's Euro-Atlantic orientation.  (COMMENT:  As a 
variety of polling shows, the majority of Azerbaijanis have a 
favorable view of the U.S., but this has been gradually 
declining over the past several years.)  Oruj stated that the 
U.S. is the only country in the Minsk Group that Azerbaijan 
can trust and that Azerbaijan and the U.S. have created a 
strong partnership, which is in both states' interests.  He 
complained, however, that the partnership is one-sided. 
Reflecting a common sentiment, he argued that while 
 
BAKU 00001099  003 OF 003 
 
 
Azerbaijan has been a consistent partner for the U.S. in the 
areas of counterterrorism and energy, the U.S. has not 
adequately treated Azerbaijan as a strategic partner.  Oruj 
cited Armenia's acceptance into the Millennium Challenge 
program and the U.S. Congress' financial assistance to NK as 
evidence of the U.S.' lack of a fair approach toward 
Azerbaijan. 
 
Push GOAJ on Democracy Agenda 
----------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) The representatives asked that the U.S. take a 
stronger stand on pressuring the GOAJ to undertake democratic 
reforms.  They argued that the U.S. faces an image problem 
among average Azerbaijanis, who perceive that the U.S. is 
toning down its criticism of the GOAJ's democratic failings 
on the altar of U.S. energy interests.  Noting that "we 
expect a lot from the U.S. as our strategic partner," Oruj 
asked for the U.S. to not soften its criticism of the GOAJ's 
undemocratic behavior, particularly in the area of rigging 
elections and the clampdown on independent media. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12.  (C) We believe the representatives' criticism and 
impatience with the Minsk Group peace process reflects 
growing opinion within Azerbaijani society.  The majority of 
everyday Azerbaijanis and a number of educated Azerbaijani 
commentators routinely state that the Minsk Group process is 
ineffective and has little legitimacy.  This sentiment 
appears to be growing, along with the number of Azerbaijanis 
who favor the GOAJ taking more robust diplomatic, economic, 
and military steps to regain NK and the seven occupied 
territories (septel).  This is in keeping with a broader 
sense -- fueled in large part by Azerbaijan's energy wealth 
-- that Azerbaijan is an increasingly important regional 
player, whose views on the conflict should carry greater 
weight.  As we consider how best to advance the peace 
process, we will need to take into account Azerbaijanis' 
growing skepticism and its increased ability to act in 
support of its perceived interests. 
DERSE