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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003264 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2017 
TAGS: MOPS PGOV PHUM PTER IZ
SUBJECT: SEPTEMBER 25 MCNS FOCUSES ON BASRAH SECURITY, 
CHOLERA OUTBREAK, AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION 
 
REF: BASRAH 88 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih led 
focused discussions at the September 25 Ministerial Council 
for National Security (MCNS) on Basrah security issues, the 
cholera outbreak, national reconciliation, and a proposed 
intelligence exchange on al-Qaeda operations with Algeria and 
Morocco. Concerning Basrah, the ministers had differing 
perceptions about the level of violence, but concurred on the 
need for a robust response by both local and national 
security forces. They also agreed on the need to contain the 
cholera outbreak which has spread from northern Iraq to 
Baghdad.  The Ministry of Health recommends as its primary 
solution the doubling of the chlorine content in Baghdad 
water supplies. All Baghdad districts except Doura have an 
adequate supply of chlorine; the government is addressing 
shortages.  The ministers confined their discussions on 
national reconciliation to GOI assumption of Coalition Force 
(CF) contracts and Iraqi legal restrictions on granting 
amnesty, which may hinder accepting all previously contracted 
personnel. The MCNS concluded with a brief update on a GOI 
proposal to exchange intelligence information about al-Qaeda 
with Algeria and Morocco.  In both cases, the GOI has made 
overtures to GOA and GOM, but neither has positively 
responded. END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Basrah Security - Glass Half Full or Empty? 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (S) The September 25 Ministerial Council for National 
Security (MCNS) began with a spirited discussion about the 
security situation in Basrah.  Minister of State for National 
Security Shirwan al-Waeli said his recent trip to Basrah 
convinced him that the situation there was rapidly 
deteriorating which required national government 
intervention.  He claimed that "foreign neighbors" were 
directly interfering in local affairs and instigating 
politically motivated violence.  He called for the Ministry 
of Defense to quickly complete both the reinforcement of 
local security forces with a tank battalion and the swap-out 
of the 8th and 10th Iraqi Divisions.  He strongly urged the 
MOI to support local police with their training of new 
recruits and to provide badly-needed fuel for their vehicles. 
 
¶3. (S) Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih said Basrah 
parliamentarians had recently approached him with similar 
concerns.  He said they described the situation in Basrah as 
"out of control" and alleged local police and port authority 
personnel were completely infiltrated by militias.  Salih 
explained that these were their words and he was just the 
messenger, but he tended to believe them because they all had 
the same assessment and came from a wide variety of political 
persuasions. 
 
¶3. (S) The Deputy Minister of Interior dismissed these 
allegations as "old problems" which already had corrective 
actions in place.  He reminded the MCNS that the Interior 
Ministry had twice swapped out senior Basrah police 
leadership with those from other provinces and had 
transferred over 130 Basrah police intelligence officers to 
Baghdad. Minister of Defense Abdul Qadr added that deploying 
a tank battalion into Basrah and swapping out two Army 
divisions (which brought in soldiers from outside the local 
area) requires more time to be fully effective -- even so, 
violent incidents in Basrah had already gone down by almost 
30 percent.  MOD Qadr cited additional data compiled by both 
the MOD and MOI showing a significant decrease in violence in 
several different categories without any high visibility 
attacks (Reftel). (Note: Abdul Qadr did not count as "high 
visibility" the four shooting attacks against Basrah Chief of 
Police Jalil in the last few weeks.  End note.)  MOD Qadr 
also dismissed the statements by members of parliament as 
motivated by a government proposal to drastically cutback the 
2,500 police serving in their Personal Security Details (PSD). 
 
¶4. (S) The Minister of Defense turned to the future of the 
Basrah military commander, Lieutenant General Mohan.  MOD 
Qadr described Mohan,s command of the Basrah garrison as 
only a "temporary three-month appointment" after which a 
permanent commander would be found. Many members of the MCNS 
 
BAGHDAD 00003264  002 OF 003 
 
 
expressed surprise at this statement.  Joint Forces Commander 
Babakir told the Defense Minister it was a mistake to limit 
Mohan,s command to such a short term.  Ambassador Crocker 
urged the MOD to reconsider his decision, given the difficult 
situation in Basrah.  UK Ambassador Christopher Prentice 
concurred and added that General Mohan had an excellent 
working relationship with British forces in Basrah which they 
hoped would continue.  Deputy MNF-I Commanding General Rollo 
also voiced strong support for keeping Mohan in place beyond 
three months, saying it was important to maintain continuity 
in this difficult situation. DPM Salih acknowledged these 
comments and said they convinced him to recommend keeping 
General Mohan in command at Basrah for a longer term. (Note: 
General Mohan was appointed to his command by Prime Minister 
Maliki.  End note.) 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Cholera Outbreak -- Will Increased Chlorine Help? 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (S) Concerning the recent outbreak of cholera in Iraq, 
Deputy Prime Minister Salih said the disease was now 
"epidemic and spreading" from its origin in rural Kurdistan, 
through the cities of Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah with hundreds 
of infections, and was now in Baghdad with two confirmed 
cases.  DPM Salih called for a comprehensive governmental 
effort to fight the disease and requested help from MNF-I and 
the U.S./UK embassies. 
 
¶6. (S) At the request of DPM Salih, the Deputy Minister of 
Health (MOH) briefed the MCNS on the current situation. He 
noted that cholera was endemic to Iraq; this is the third 
outbreak in 10 years. He described the initial effort by the 
MOH in August to contain the disease within northern Iraq 
including medical assistance teams, educational programs, and 
a media campaign.  Unfortunately, according to the Deputy 
MOH, those programs slowed but did not stop spread of the 
disease because the root cause was contaminated ground water 
in places that had few alternatives.  He said the MOH was now 
focusing its efforts at stopping the spread of infection 
within Baghdad by doubling the content of chlorine in the 
public water supply.  But the MOH faced two significant 
problems: a shortage of chlorine in some areas and uneven 
chlorine dispersion within the water distribution system. 
This meant people close to the chlorine insertion point could 
be exposed to high enough concentrations to cause dental 
problems, while those faraway might not get enough to combat 
cholera.  When questioned by ministers about preventative 
vaccines and antibiotics, the Deputy MOH responded that these 
alternatives had been carefully considered, but the MOH 
concluded that increasing the chlorine concentration in water 
supplies would be the most effective solution now. 
 
¶7. (S) Deputy MNF-I Commanding General Rollo reported that 
the latest Coalition Force (CF) survey showed adequate 
supplies of chlorine available for every district of Baghdad, 
although there was mixed reporting for Doura (in the south 
part of Baghdad); but the CF was addressing the need to have 
the position there confirmed.  The Deputy MOH concurred with 
that assessment and added that the problem in Doura was 
compounded by a lack of adequate infrastructure there.  On 
the other hand, he said the current level of effort -- if 
continued -- should be enough to contain the disease. 
 
¶8. (S) Ambassador Crocker expressed concern that rumors of an 
epidemic and its causes often traveled faster than the 
disease itself.  He strongly urged the MOH to increase their 
media efforts so that Iraqi citizens had all the facts.  DPM 
Salih agreed and concluded the discussion with a request that 
the MOH provide a complete briefing for the Cabinet on 
September 26. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
National Reconciliation and Outreach to Former Insurgents 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶9. (S) Deputy National Security Advisor Safa opened the 
discussion on national reconciliation by asking the MCNS to 
approve his previously submitted implementation plan.  DPM 
Salih endorsed the plan without changes and asked for 
comments.  General Babakir expressed support saying that many 
tribes were ready to support the government, but the 
government,s response had been too slow -- this plan would 
 
BAGHDAD 00003264  003 OF 003 
 
 
speed the process. 
 
¶10. (S) As part of the overall reconciliation plan, Deputy 
NSA Safa briefed the MCNS about the process by which the GOI 
would take over contracts that Coalition Forces (CF) had made 
with so-called Concerned Local Citizens and similar groups. 
Even though some were former insurgents, the goal was their 
potential integration into government service, most likely as 
local police.  At issue was vetting and amnesty.  Because 
members of these groups had not been vetted by Iraqi 
authorities, the GOI plan called for creation of local 
councils/control groups which would monitor these individuals 
for a specified period of time.  If they performed well 
during this probationary period, the government intended to 
issue a special amnesty if the individual signed a written 
pledge of honor.  Several ministers raised objections because 
of current legal restrictions in hiring admitted felons or 
former criminals.  Prior to their approving the overall plan, 
they wanted a legal opinion about the authority of the 
government to issue an amnesty.  DPM Salih directed Deputy 
NSA Safa to obtain this legal opinion prior to resubmission 
of the plan to the MCNS. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Sharing Intelligence with Algeria and Morocco 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (S) Regarding a proposal for intelligence sharing on 
Al-Qaeda with Algeria and Morocco, Director of the Iraqi 
National Intelligence Service (INIS) Mohammed Shahwani voiced 
two objections: there was no quid pro quo and neither country 
had responded to repeated Iraqi overtures on the issue. 
Deputy PM Salih countered that Iraq should not barter 
information in the fight against al-Qaeda -- it was important 
to share the information freely.  The Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs agreed to approach both countries again and 
offer an expert team to present the information.  DPM Salih 
concurred and closed the meeting. 
 
CROCKER