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INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003261 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2017 
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: JAAFARI AND QASSIM COOKING UP NEW COALITION TO 
OUST MALIKI 
 
Classified By: Pol Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: In separate meetings, former Prime Minister 
Ibrahim al-Jaafari and senior Shia Independent CoR legislator 
Qassim Daoud told us of their ongoing efforts to form a 
non-sectarian coalition with the aim of unseating Prime 
Minister al-Maliki.  They claimed they have received the 
blessing of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and other senior 
Shia clerics to build a "new" United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), 
the Shia coalition formed in 2005, and Jaafari and Qassim 
want to move the "new" UIA away from a sectarian grouping 
into a nationalist-oriented coalition that includes Sunnis 
and Kurds.  While they claimed to have made substantial 
progress in enlisting coalition partners, a Fadhila Party 
leader told us they have mustered only 60 seats.  Qassim said 
Sistani confided he was "fed up" with the Sadrists and 
advised Qassim and Jaafari not to include them in the "new" 
UIA due to their troublemaking tendency.  Qassim said the new 
coalition would not initiate a no confidence process against 
Maliki until it had already agreed on his replacement, since 
no one wants a repeat of the protracted leadership vacuum 
that led to Maliki's rise.  Qassim told us that while he 
thinks Moqtada al-Sadr is under Iranian influence and his 
Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia is a "terrorist" group, he 
nonetheless favors including the Sadrists in mainstream 
politics as the only way to contain the movement.  He warned 
of a widespread Shia street perception that MNF-I is 
attacking JAM while arming Sunni groups.  Jaafari and Qassim 
both complained of Kurdish intransigence over the 
Hydrocarbons law and urged USG pressure to bring the Kurds to 
a reasonable position.  End Summary. 
 
Seeking Sistani's Blessing for a "New" UIA to Oust Maliki 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶2. (C) In our September 26 meeting with Qassim and September 
27 meeting with Jaafari, both were unsparing in their 
criticism of the Maliki government and spoke at length of 
Maliki's perceived faults and failures.  Qassim remarked that 
"even an artist can not change the dull to the bright" when 
describing Maliki's leadership record, and Jaafari alleged 
that Maliki's Group of Four alignment (of which both branches 
of the Da'wa party are members) violated the Iraqi 
Constitution by conferring executive power on a presidency 
council.  Jaafari and Qassim are both reported to harbor 
ambitions to succeed Maliki, and Jaafari in particular 
appeared to use our meeting as an opportunity to preen and 
tout his claimed ability to unite Iraq and solve its many 
problems.  For example, he rattled off a list of claimed 
accomplishments from his tenure as Prime Minister, adding 
with a tinge of bitterness that his opponents had brazenly 
usurped credit for his achievements.  He maintained that 
while Maliki speaks of 2008 as the year in which he will 
begin to improve national security and delivery of services, 
Jaafari by contrast would take such steps immediately so that 
Iraq could enjoy the success of these measures in 2008. 
Qassim alleged that Maliki had been chosen as Prime Minister 
"as a compromise candidate known to have no ability, no 
vision, and a sectarian approach," and that recent USG 
statements of support for the Maliki government had "abused 
the present situation" and helped prolong Maliki's 
incompetent rule.  Jaafari stated tartly that the USG must 
"face reality" about Maliki's limited leadership ability. 
 
 
¶3. (C) Stating that the Iraqi Council of Representatives 
"needs a signal to change governments," Qassim explained that 
he and Jaafari are working to revamp the United Iraqi 
Alliance (UIA), the sect-based grouping that swept Shia 
politicians to power in 2005 elections, with the aim of 
toppling the Maliki government and helping to form a 
successor government.  For his part, Jaafari said he sought 
to restore UIA unity but not with the aim of supporting the 
Maliki government.  Both Jaafari and Qassim said the "new" 
UIA would have a nationalist rather than sectarian 
orientation, and would be open to Sunnis and Kurds as well as 
Shia in order to promote national unity.  Qassim said he and 
Jaafari obtained blessing for this new alliance from Grand 
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani during a widely-publicized 
three-hour meeting on September 22, and he claimed they also 
received approval from the three other Najaf Marja'iyah as 
well as Fadhila Party spiritual leader Sheikh Muhammad 
al-Yaqubi.  With the assistance of Sistani's son, Qassim 
averred he and Jaafari are in the process of establishing a 
14-person committee comprised of two representatives from 
each of the seven original UIA partners (Da'wa, Da'wa Tanzim, 
Fadhila, the Sadrists, the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council 
(ISCI), ISCI's Badr, and a bloc of independents led by 
Qassim) to chart a future course for the alliance.  Qassim 
said he had first grown close to Sistani while serving as 
then-Prime Minister Ayad Allawi's Security Minister, an 
experience that also resulted in bad relations with Moqtada 
 
BAGHDAD 00003261  002 OF 003 
 
 
al-Sadr due to his role in the 2004 security crackdown on 
Sadrists in Najaf. 
 
¶4. (C) Qassim asserted that the Sadrists, Fadhila, Da'wa 
Tanzim and most Shia independents were already on board and 
that ISCI/Badr was positive about the project, leaving only 
Maliki's branch of Da'wa squarely on the outside.  Hassan 
al-Shammari, bloc leader of Fadhila's 15 CoR members, 
disputed this assertion, however, telling us that Fadhila had 
not agreed to either rejoin the UIA (the party withdrew from 
the alliance earlier this year) or to join any other 
alliance.  Shammari claimed that "the Jaafari Bloc" currently 
had about 60 CoR seats comprised of the Sadrists, Jaafari's 
Da'wa allies, Da'wa Tanzim, and Qassim's "Solidarity Bloc" of 
independents.  Qassim also claimed to be in discussions with 
leaders of Sunni parties regarding their inclusion in the new 
alliance, noting that Saleh al-Mutlaq of the National 
Dialogue Front had agreed to join provided the new alliance 
adopted a name other than the UIA.  Qassim emphasized that, 
once formed, the new alliance would not move to take down 
Maliki until they had sorted out in advance an orderly 
succession process, noting that he wishes to avoid a repeat 
of the protracted post-Jaafari leadership vacuum, a "tragic 
period" that permitted the bombing of Samarra's Askari Mosque 
and led to Maliki's rise. 
 
Iran-Influenced Sadrists No Good, But Better In Than Out 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶5. (C) While Jaafari asserted flatly that Maliki's Group of 
Four had destroyed the UIA, Qassim averred that friction 
between the "refined" ISCI and the "aggressive" Sadrists had 
caused the latter to play a "destructive" role within the 
alliance.  Qassim says he has long argued with Sistani and 
other Shia leaders for the inclusion of Sadrists in 
mainstream Shia politics in order to contain their movement 
and "help them understand the meaning of democracy."  While 
the Sadrists "are far from being exemplary politicians," 
their behavior has improved since the 2005 elections. 
Jaafari sounded a similar theme, arguing that Sadrists must 
be brought into the political fold, even though there are 
criminals among them, because they represent the voice of the 
poor.  Qassim confided that Sistani is "fed up" with the 
Sadrists and advised him and Jaafari not to bring the 
Sadrists into the "new" UIA because they would continue to be 
unreliable and troublesome alliance partners.  Sistani told 
Qassim that Sadr had asked him for advice on whether the CoR 
Sadrist bloc should rejoin the UIA, and that he refused to 
provide such advice because Sadr had not asked for guidance 
prior to withdrawing his bloc from the UIA.  Qassim further 
stated that Sistani had even used an Arab proverb that can 
best be translated as "in some circumstances the wastrel is 
preferable to the man of faith" to convey the notion that the 
GOI needs people who can deliver to the people, using the 
example that it would be preferable to bring back Saddam's 
Minister of Trade, who has a proven track record of 
competence, than the current Minister who delivers nothing to 
an impoverished and needy people. 
 
¶6. (C) Jaafari did not broach the issue of Iran's role in 
Iraq, but Qassim stated that Moqtada al-Sadr and the Jaysh 
al-Mahdi (JAM) are under Teheran's influence.  He denounced 
JAM as a terrorist group, noting with a wry grin that even 
though al-Qaeda and JAM are the same type of group, Iraqis 
call the former "terrorists" and the latter "a militia." 
Qassim claimed to have warned Iran's Ambassador to Iraq not 
to create another Hezbollah through the JAM, and that he told 
Iranian Qods Force leader Sulaimani that Iran was playing a 
dangerous game in Iraq that threatened the welfare of Iraqi 
Shia, the very people Tehran claims to support.  After 
meeting with Iranian government officials such as a top 
National Security official, the Foreign Minister, and former 
President Rafsanjani during an official December 2006 visit 
to Iran, Qassim said he concluded that the extent of Iranian 
influence in Iraq was far greater than he had previously 
suspected.  He said the Iranian Ambassador had told him Iran 
played "an important role" in bringing about Sadr's JAM 
freeze order, but Qassim opined that JAM elements that do not 
comply with the order are funded and armed by Iran. 
 
Shia Street, Police Plan, Pressure the Kurds 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Like many Shia politicians we meet with, Qassim 
exhibited an imperfect understanding of MNF-I efforts to 
encourage local citizens in Anbar to battle al-Qaeda, and we 
clarified for him - as we have done with others - that MNF-I 
is not arming Sunni militias in Anbar.  Nonplused, Qassim 
warned that it is "very dangerous" to allow Sunnis to form 
militias, particularly Sunnis of unknown loyalties and 
motivations, and he expressed doubt that such fighters could 
be integrated into Iraqi Security Forces.  He warned that a 
 
BAGHDAD 00003261  003 OF 003 
 
 
common perception exists among the Shia masses that MNF-I is 
creating Sunni militias while at the same time MNF-I is 
hitting hard at JAM, the only Shia group that stepped in to 
protect the Shia from rampaging Sunni bands after the 2006 
Sammara mosque bombing.  He said that this was unfortunate, 
particularly as it builds undue sympathy for JAM at a 
"historic moment" in which JAM prestige is extremely low 
after the August Karbala mayhem and the assassination of two 
southern governors.  On the topic of police, Qassim said he 
agrees with the conclusions of a Congressional report on the 
Iraqi police by retired Gen. James Jones.  He floated a plan 
to recruit 1000 new future police leaders from among Iraq's 
40,000 new and mostly unemployed college graduates, and then 
ship them off to European - not Arab - capitals to train and 
observe how paramilitary police forces function in a 
democratic society. (We note that this plan seems to be 
making the rounds, as VP Abdel Mehdi advisor Zuhair Hamadi 
recently told us he is pushing for a similar approach). 
Finally, both Qassim and Jaafari complained at length about 
the uncooperative and allegedly unconstitutional approach of 
the Kurds on the Hydrocarbons law, and both implored the USG 
to pressure the Kurds to take a reasonable position on the 
draft bill. 
CROCKER