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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2959/01 2471050
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 041050Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3178
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002959 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: ISCI'S AMAR AL-HAKEEM TO CODEL COLEMAN: WE'RE 
WORKING IRAN TO RESTRAIN AL-SADR 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 2906 (CRISIS IN KARBALA) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Shi,a leader Amar al-Hakeem, groomed to 
replace his ailing father as head of the Islamic Supreme 
Council (ISCI), told Sen. Norm Coleman (R-MN) on September 1 
that a violent attempt by Moqtada al-Sadr,s Jaysh al-Mahdi 
militia (JAM) to seize one of Shi,a Islam,s holiest shrines 
in Karbala had alienated Shi,a masses around the world.  He 
said he was taking a wait-and-see approach to the "veracity" 
of al-Sadr,s order for the JAM to stand-down during a 
six-month reorganization period, adding that his organization 
is working its contacts with Iran in hopes of restraining JAM 
violence, much of which has been directed at ISCI. 
Responding to Sen. Coleman,s point on the need for greater 
political reconciliation, al-Hakeem said that Shi,a 
political leaders must "embrace" the Sunni minority, speak to 
Sunnis and address their fears, and reconcile with Sunnis who 
hold "reasonable" views.  Hadi al-Amri, head of ISCI,s Badr 
militia and a senior ISCI parliamentarian, intoned that 
Americans mistakenly view Iraq,s main problem as the Shi,a 
- Sunni dispute when, in reality, the main problem is terror. 
 Al-Amri stated that while Iraq does not want the American 
military to stay indefinitely, if it leaves now "it means 
that the terrorists have won the war in Iraq."  End Summary. 
 
Reaction to Karbala Violence, Al-Sadr,s JAM Gambit 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶2. (C) Asked by the Ambassador for reaction to last week,s 
violence in Karbala and Moqtada al-Sadr,s public pledge to 
suspend JAM operations during a six-month reorganization 
period (reftel), al-Hakeem stated that the Karbala incident 
had made a very negative impression on Shi,a in Iraq and 
abroad as it brought violence to a sacred place on a holy 
day.  Clad in a black turban that distinguishes him, like 
al-Sadr, as a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, the 
thirty-eight year old Shi,a prelate stated that the coming 
days would reveal the veracity of al-Sadr,s order.  He said 
ISCI had spoken to Iranians (unnamed) about the necessity of 
putting pressure on al-Sadr and his movement to prevent such 
things as the Karbala violence, and hoped Iran would apply 
more pressure in the coming days. 
 
¶3. (C) Picking up on this theme, senior ISCI legislator Jamal 
al-Saghir said that he was recently in Tehran and could 
personally vouch for the pressure put on the Iranians by ISCI 
head Abdel Aziz al-Hakeem (who is undergoing cancer treatment 
in Tehran) to restrain al-Sadr.  He said that Iranian concern 
over JAM was heightened by the recent assassinations of the 
governors of Muthana and Qadisyah provinces, and by a JAM 
attempt to take over a southern province (unnamed) in order 
to put pressure on the GOI.  Regarding the Karbala violence, 
al-Saghir noted that ISCI received information in the past 
weeks that JAM had originally intended to launch early-August 
attacks on ISCI/Badr personnel in Baghdad and to assassinate 
the commander of the Iraqi Army,s First Brigade, but that 
ISCI/Badr,s "containment" of such plans forced JAM to strike 
in Karbala.  In a separate recent meeting, Badr militia 
supremo Hadi al-Amri told Poloffs that "JAM is hitting us 
harder than it is hitting you with Iranian weapons" and that 
Tehran,s reply to ISCI/Badr complaints about JAM was a 
demand for evidence of a JAM - Iranian link. 
 
If USG Withdraws Now, Terrorists Win 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (C) Al-Hakeem welcomed a short-term and long-term 
partnership with the USG to promote Iraq,s political 
process, reconstruction, and the development of its security 
forces.  When asked when the USG can transition from a 
military to reconstruction role, al-Hakeem said that rushed 
efforts to build the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) allowed some 
"unwanted" elements to enter and that time would be needed to 
"cleanse," train, and arm the ISF.  He also spoke of a need 
to "educate" the Iraqi people about USG military, economic, 
and reconstruction roles, and to instruct them about the 
societal dangers of forming armed groups.  When Sen. Coleman 
pressed al-Hakeem to use his influence to pressure Iran to 
respect Iraq,s sovereignty and desist from contributing to 
Iraqi instability, al-Hakeem replied that Iraq is engaged in 
a dialogue with neighboring states seeking non-intervention 
in Iraqi affairs.  He said some neighbors fear the USG 
presence in Iraq, others fear the growth of democracy in 
Iraq, while still others see Iraq as a place in which to 
settle old scores with the U.S.  He stated Iraq is happy to 
see the USG engage in dialogue with neighboring states in 
order to allay their fears. 
 
BAGHDAD 00002959  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶5. (C) Sen. Coleman stated several times that Americans are 
willing to pay the price in money and in lives to topple the 
Saddam regime and to battle Al-Qaeda, but have no interest in 
getting caught in the middle of a sectarian war in Iraq.  He 
urged al-Hakeem to use his considerable influence to promote 
political reconciliation and unity.  Al-Hakeem replied that 
Iraq,s political class now has an historic opportunity to 
seize the momentum generated by last month,s Leadership 
Agreement by bringing all political parties together to 
support the accord.  He said the Shi,a majority must 
"embrace" the Sunni minority and look to the future as well 
as the past, and that he is advising Shi,a political leaders 
to "be open minded to our Sunni brothers," to speak to Sunnis 
and address their fears, and to reconcile with Sunnis who 
hold "reasonable" views.  Hadi al-Amri chimed in that Sunnis 
have so far refused to work in partnership with the Shi,a 
majority.  However, he cautioned that Americans mistakenly 
view Iraq,s main problem as the Shi,a - Sunni dispute when, 
in fact, the main problem is actually terror.  Even in the 
event of Shi,a - Sunni reconciliation, he maintained, Iraq 
would still face the problem of terrorism and terrorists 
drawn from outside countries, as evidenced by Fatah al-Islam 
fighters in Lebanon and North African extremists who had all 
trained in Iraq.  Al-Amri closed by saying that while Iraq 
does not want the American military to stay indefinitely, if 
it leaves now "it means that the terrorists have won the war 
in Iraq." 
 
¶6. (U) CODEL Coleman did not have an opportunity to review 
this message. 
 
CROCKER