VZCZCXRO6433
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2930/01 2441312
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 011312Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3138
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002930 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2017 
TAGS: MARR MOPS MCAP PGOV PTER PINS PNAT IZ
SUBJECT: MALIKI PREDICTS IMPROVED SECURITY CONDITIONS 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (S) SUMMARY:  An optimistic Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki 
predicted improved security conditions in Iraq due to Moqtada 
al-Sadr,s pledge to stand down his Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) 
militia and to very positive signals from his trips to Iran 
and Syria where he claimed to secure agreements to stop 
insurgent infiltration and weapons smuggling. Both he and 
General Petraeus described the most recent Karbala violence 
as a difficult test for the new Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), 
but one which was successfully passed. Maliki also lamented 
the continued delays in getting Kuwaiti diesel fuel moving 
towards Iraqi electric generators. END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------- 
Reasons for Optimism 
-------------------- 
 
¶2. (S) At their weekly security meeting on August 30, an 
optimistic Prime Minister Maliki told MNF-I Commanding 
General Petraeus and Deputy Chief of Mission Patricia Butenis 
that following the assassinations in the past two weeks of 
the provincial governors in Diwaniyah and Muthanna, the 
security situation has actually become more promising for 
several important reasons: Moqtada al-Sadr has pledged a 
six-month cease-fire by his JAM militias, Saudi Arabia plans 
to re-establish their Baghdad embassy, Iran is willing to 
change direction regarding security, and Syria has also 
reached out to improve their bilateral security relationship. 
 He added that &this is all because we are projecting 
strength.8 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Al-Sadr,s Pledge to Stand Down Militia 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (S) Maliki told General Petraeus he really was convinced 
about the sincerity of Moqtada al-Sadr,s pledge to stand 
down his JAM militia. He was further encouraged by meetings 
in Karbala with Sadr-trained provincial council members who 
denounced the rogue militia members that started the violence 
as &gangsters and criminals.8 When General Petraeus asked 
him about al-Sadr,s six-month cease-fire, Maliki called it 
almost irrelevant since he believed the JAM militias would 
disappear and JAM as an organization would be substantially 
different by then. For this reason, he urged General Petraeus 
to &calm things down with JAM8 and to give the cease-fire 
time to take hold. Maliki said he wanted to take advantage of 
this new development and bring JAM members back into the 
political process. General Petraeus cautioned that rogue 
militia members who committed criminal acts should still be 
vigorously pursued. 
 
------------------------------- 
New Iranian and Syrian Promises 
------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (S) When General Petraeus pressed him about Iranian 
support for JAM, Maliki said he had already secured a 
commitment from the Supreme Leader Khamenei himself to halt 
Qods Force actions in Iraq.  Maliki said Khamenei had issued 
what was, in effect, a &fatwa8 that prohibited attacks 
against Coalition Forces (CF). When General Petraeus 
expressed concern about the increasing number of attacks 
involving Iranian weapons -- particularly explosively formed 
projectiles (EFPs) -- Maliki said he believed these attacks 
would significantly decrease very soon based on these 
commitments. 
 
¶5. (S) Turning to Syria, General Petraeus described 
disturbing intelligence reports about militia training camps 
there and insurgent infiltration into Iraq.  Maliki responded 
that he was aware of this intelligence.  He related that 
during his most recent visit to Damascus, he directly 
confronted President Bashar Assad with details about these 
camps and infiltration routes, including specific names and 
places. He told Assad that he was sick and tired of 
interference in Iraqi internal affairs by Assef Shawkat, 
deputy director of Syrian intelligence (Note: Shawkat is 
Assad,s brother-in-law. End note).  Maliki said Assad 
assured him those days were over because MOI Chief of the 
Political Security Branch Muhammad Mansurah would now manage 
their bilateral affairs.  Maliki told General Petraeus this 
was a very good sign because he has known Mansurah for over 
25 years when he worked with the Iraqi Dawa and he trusted 
him. 
 
----------------------------- 
Continuing the Al-Qaeda Fight 
 
BAGHDAD 00002930  002 OF 002 
 
 
----------------------------- 
 
¶6. (S) Although National Security Advisor Mowafaq Rubaie was 
also encouraged by these positive new developments, he told 
General Petraeus he was worried that Al-Qaeda (AQI) could 
still act as a spoiler with a spectacular attack on either 
Shia citizens or shrines, potentially unraveling Sadr,s 
cease-fire pledge. He said the Iraqi government intended to 
develop contingency plans in order to respond effectively to 
a high-profile attack. General Petraeus agreed, saying AQI 
was on the run but still very dangerous. Using a current 
operations chart, General Petraeus described in detail the 
numerous engagements between CF and AQI during the last few 
days, showing a continuous series of AQI set-backs and 
defeats.  He assured Maliki this fight would continue. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Karbala Violence: a Difficult Test 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (S) General Petraeus complimented PM Maliki,s leadership 
during operations to suppress the violence at the Shia 
Shrines in Karbala on August 28 and 29 saying that Maliki had 
turned a potential defeat into a success. Maliki thanked 
General Petraeus for the use of a CF helicopter which flew 
him back from Karbala.  (Note:  Maliki had driven to Karbala 
in a heavily-armed 52-vehicle convoy.  End note) The Prime 
Minister described a chaotic scene on the ground caused by 
weak leadership of the local government and security forces. 
PM Maliki said that upon arriving in Karbala, he quickly 
re-established control and ordered a battalion-sized, quick 
reaction force into action against 25 separate targets in the 
very difficult neighborhoods around the shrines. NSA Rubaie 
recalled a brief hesitation by these troops to deploy into a 
particularly tough area, but after PM Maliki -- who was 
carrying a rifle and had a pistol strapped to his waist -- 
volunteered to lead them, they quickly moved out under their 
own commander. Within a few minutes of the arrival of the 
quick reaction force in the area, most of the armed 
resistance melted away. PM Maliki expressed pride in these 
troops and said they taught him an important lesson about the 
great effectiveness of even a small number of well-trained 
soldiers. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
Continued Delays in Getting Kuwaiti Diesel Fuel Moving 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶8. (S) PM Maliki lamented continuing bureaucratic roadblocks 
in getting Kuwaiti diesel fuel to Iraqi electric generation 
plants.  For example, some Iraqi Ministry of Oil personnel 
feared that money paid to Kuwait would somehow find its way 
back to Sunni militias in Iraq.  An exasperated Maliki told 
General Petraeus that he personally called ministry 
officials, reminding them that Kuwait was very rich and -- if 
it chose to do so -- could fund these groups with or without 
Iraqi money. Reluctantly, these officials had moved forward 
with the order. Maliki also reported new transportation 
issues, such as a problem with permits or placards, were now 
reportedly delaying moving the fuel across the border. 
General Petraeus said that he would look into any problems 
that could be holding up the transport of the fuel. (Comment: 
General Petraeus confirmed later that there are no roadblocks 
from the MNF-I side.) 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Saudis Recognize Problems with Charities 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (S) PM Maliki came back to the problem of militia funding. 
 He told General Petraeus that the Saudis finally seemed to 
recognize that some of their many charities actually 
supported extremist militias and were run by criminals. 
Ironically, he said, there might even be some Wahabis in JAM. 
He said he had secured a commitment from Saudi Arabia to 
discontinue support for these extremist charities. 
 
CROCKER