VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAS #1336/01 2620857
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 190857Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4480
INFO RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0249
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY 1301
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 6045
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 1942
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 6794
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEPGBA/CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 001336 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2022 
TAGS: REL MARR AG ML
SUBJECT: ALGERIAN MFA:  WE ARE WAITING FOR TOURE TO KEEP 
HIS PROMISES 
 
REF: A. BAMAKO 1029 
     ¶B. BAMAKO 1015 
     ¶C. BAMAKO 1017 
     ¶D. ALGIERS 1278 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Robert S. Ford, reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C)   Summary:  MFA Director General (A/S equivalent) 
for African Affairs Chergui told Ambassador on 9/17 that 
Malian 
President Toure must pull troops out of Kidal and take 
steps to start reintegrating Tuareg fighters back into 
their communities in order to end the fighting in northern 
Mali.  Chergui said that both measures were integral parts 
of the Algiers Accords and there was no hope of securing 
the terms of the accords without them.  Chergui said the 
Algerian government is sending in more supplies to the 
Malian garrison besieged in Tinzawaten, and he acknowledged 
that rebel leader Bahanga is also getting supplies, although 
he claimed it was only indirectly.  He underlined that while 
the Algerian government thinks the Malian army should quit 
Kidal, it also hopes the Malians will have a credible 
garrison permanently in Tinzawaten, backed by Tuareg special 
security units under Malian control, in order to police the 
Algerian-Malian border.  He asked for an American 
contribution to the small fund established to help 
reintegrate Tuareg fighters into their communities.  End 
Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
ALGIERS: MALIANS AND TUAREGS ARE TALKING READILY 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶2.  (C)  Chergui asserted that lines of communication 
between the Malian government and Bahanga were open.  He 
thought that Iyad ag Ghali was playing a useful role and 
seemed surprised when Ambassador noted we were hearing 
reports to 
the contrary.  Chergui then brushed the issue aside and 
noted that the Algerian ambassador in Bamako has a mandate 
from Algiers to work with both sides to end the dispute. 
The Algerian ambassador, he stated, has good contacts with 
both the government and the ADC as well as Bahanga. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
BESIEGED TOWN OF TINZAWATEN AND THE GARRISON'S FUTURE 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  Chergui said that as part of an agreement with the 
GoM dating to the beginning of September, the Algerian army 
provided food supplies to the besieged Malian garrison in 
Tinzawaten on September 17.  The Algerians had agreed 
to supply the Tinzawaten garrison for thirty days during 
which time they hope a more durable settlement can be 
reached; the September 17 delivery was ten days' worth of 
food. 
Chergui noted that the Algerian army carefully calculates how 
many Malian soldiers are in the garrison and exactly how many 
supplies they need.  (Comment:  This must come easily for 
the exasperatingly lawyer-like Algerians.  End Comment.) 
He commented that the Algerians are not directly supplying 
the Bahanga forces surrounding the town.  Rather, under 
the broad supervision of the Algiers Accord implementation 
committee, the Algerians are delivering supplies to Tuareg 
civilians linked to the ADC.  Those civilians in turn, 
he stated, may choose turn over supplies to Bahanga's men 
"for the prisoners."  Chergui insisted that the GoA is not 
working directly with Bahanga, nor is it prepared to let 
him or his men transit Algerian territory. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Chergui said that the GoA is being careful not to 
interfere in Malian internal affairs, but that President 
Toure (or, he noted, the Malian government) must withdraw 
Malian soldiers from Kidal.  The Malian insertion of troops 
into Kidal had helped start the current conflict and the 
Algiers Accords require them to withdraw from the town. 
(Chergui observed that the only reason the Malian army sent 
the soldiers there in the first place was to tighten 
control over the Tuareg, a strategy doomed to failure.  He 
wondered about the credibility of the Malian promises about 
Kidal.)  Chergui said that were the Malians to withdraw, 
Bahanga would accept a ceasefire around Tinzawaten and 
release 
the prisoners he holds.  He said the Algerians had not 
discussed 
 
sequencing of steps with either side, and they had not 
communicated to Bahanga that his forces should pull back from 
besieged Tinzawaten.  Instead, he opined that were the Malian 
army to pull out of Kidal Bahanga would be left isolated 
among the ADC since many of its leaders had denounced 
Bahanga's May 2007 coup effort. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Chergui underlined that the Algerian government 
wants a credible Malian army presence in Tinzawaten and 
that there is nothing preventing it in the Algiers 
Accord.  Were the town garrisoned, he observed, it would be 
harder for the Malian government to claim ignorance about 
movements of terror groups in that area of the border. 
Chergui said the Algerians also are urging the Malian 
government 
to move forward with forming all four of the Tuareg special 
security units foreseen in the Algiers Accord to help block 
terrorist group movements in northern Mali.  Two of the 
four units are being assembled and Algeria would like to 
see the other two created as well.  One could, he noted, be 
based at Tinzawaten. 
 
--------------------------- 
ECONOMIC PROJECTS ARE VITAL 
--------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  Chergui repeated what he told us last week about 
the Malian government also needing to move ahead with a 
small economic development program to help reintegrate 
former fighters into northern communities.  He underlined 
the utility of even a small American contribution to the 
fund established under the terms of the Algiers Accords. 
Without movement on reintegration of Tuareg fighters and a 
redeployment out of Kidal, Chergui asserted that there was 
little hope of real stability in northern Mali. 
 
¶7.  (C) Chergui believed that the best way to deal with the 
current conflict was through negotiations, though he 
acknowledged that the military reinforcement of the 
Tinzawaten garrison from Kidal might end the fighting "in the 
next 48 hours."  He asserted that the situation in Tinzawaten 
could return to normality "very quickly," but it would 
require the Malian government to decide to withdraw from 
Kidal.  Doing so, Chergui claimed, would reinforce the 
relationship between the ADC and the government, and further 
isolate Bahanga from the ADC.  Chergui acknowledged that, 
even with a negotiated settlement, Bahanga's situation would 
become "very difficult."  Bahanga knows, Chergui said, that 
he has made a big mistake. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  At no point in this friendly conversation did 
Chergui 
state that Algeria was seeking to back President Toure; 
indeed, he stayed studiously neutral in tone.  (Part of 
this may stem from Chergui's long diplomatic career, but we 
suspect it also results at least in part from Algeria's 
particular interest in the Tuaregs.)  We also think that 
the Algerians probably know more than their MFA is telling 
us so far, and we'll have to keep up the conversation to 
extract more from them.  Chergui commented that Algeria 
hoped the Tuaregs and the Malian government would find 
peaceful ways to resolve their differences but he put the 
burden of next steps very much on the Malian government. 
So far, here in Algiers we sense that the Algerians are 
entirely ready to watch the Malian government twist in the 
wind while they wait for Toure to make some gesture on 
Kidal and economic re-integration. 
FORD