TelegramS E C R E T   TRIPOLI   00000664 
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PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0664/01 2151238
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 031238Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2505
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY 0153
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0338
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0144
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 2866

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000664 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG; NSC FOR RAMCHAND 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/2/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP ENRG MNUC ECIN EINV ETRD KPWR FR
LY 
SUBJECT: LIBYA, FRANCE CONCLUDE "VERY GENERAL" CIVILIAN NUCLEAR DEAL 
 
REF: TRIPOLI 641 
 
TRIPOLI 00000664  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: John Godfrey, POL/ECON Counselor, AmEmbassy 
Tripoli, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (S)  Summary:  According to French diplomats, a civilian 
nuclear deal concluded between Libya and France during President 
Sarkozy's visit to Tripoli constitutes only a "very general" 
framework for future cooperation, with no clear financial 
commitment from the French side and little expectation from 
either the French or Libyan side that it will be completed soon. 
 President Nicholas Sarkozy is sensitive to and fully engaged on 
non-proliferation concerns surrounding a nuclear desalinization 
project discussed within the framework of the MOU.  Libyan 
leader Muammar Qadhafi focused on plans for a 2008 
"Mediterranean Union" head of state conference during two 
private meetings with Sarkozy, and only briefly raised the case 
of the Bulgarian medics.  High-level Libya-France consultations 
on Darfur will be reported septel.  End summary. 
 
CIVILIAN NUCLEAR MOU: A "VERY GENERAL" FRAMEWORK 
 
¶2.  (C)  French PolCouns Pierre-Antoine Molina described a 
civilian nuclear MOU August 1, signed by FMs Kouchner and 
Shalgham July 25, as only a "very general" framework for future 
cooperation on civilian nuclear power programs.  He stressed 
that the MOU is in line with previous French policies and 
emphasized that the impetus for the agreement came directly from 
President Sarkozy's office, with only marginal involvement by 
the French MFA.  MFA Americas Desk Office Director Muhammad 
Matari echoed Molina's characterization in a meeting with 
Pol/Econ Chief August 1, saying the deal was "not very detailed" 
and provided only a "general roadmap" for cooperation on nuclear 
programs, to include a nuclear-fueled water desalinization 
plant. 
 
¶3.  (S)  Molina described Sarkozy as actively engaged on 
non-proliferation concerns and recounted steps the French 
President took to ensure any French involvement in a 
nuclear-powered water desalinization plant could not be used to 
help reconstitute Libya's WMD program.  Molina said no dual-use 
technology was under discussion and that the reactor France 
envisions powering the desalinization plant would include 
safeguards that prevent it from being reconfigured to produce 
plutonium.  In addition, Sarkozy reportedly insisted on and 
received assurances that the reactor could be shut down remotely 
from France. 
 
¶4.  (S)  Contrary to Libyan press reporting, Molina said the 
July 25 MOU does not/not commit France to fund construction of 
the nuclear desalinization facility.  Details of France's 
financial commitment will be resolved during upcoming 
negotiations involving (on the French side) the MFA, energy 
officials, and the Areva company, the majority of which is 
French-owned.  The French team does not yet know who will 
negotiate modalities on behalf of the GOL, although the MFA's 
Muhammad Matari said it would be MFA Secretary for European 
Affairs Abdulati Obeidi.  The GOL expressed interest in 
completing the facility and initiating operations by 2009, but 
France views this timeline as unrealistic.  (Note: 2009 will be 
the 40th anniversary of the 1969 revolution that brought Qadhafi 
to power.  A slew of high profile infrastructure projects, 
including new power plants and a major overhaul of the Tripoli 
International Airport, are underway to help augment the visible 
benefits of the revolution.  End note.)  Privately, some GOL 
officials also acknowledge that completion by 2009 is overly 
ambitious.  Matari conceded to Pol/Econ Chief that "no one 
realistically expects this to move very quickly."  He noted that 
the deal is "a very complicated subject" that requires "much 
study" by both sides, and added that the GOL is aware that there 
are serious European sensitivities involved that could limit 
France's ability to deliver on the project. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Molina acknowledged European concerns, chiefly German, 
about the nuclear agreement, but noted that France's 
understanding is that Siemens, a 28% stakeholder in Areva, does 
not have the authority to stop the investment from moving 
forward.  He dismissed publicly-reported calls by German 
parliamentarians for Siemens to move to block the deal as 
"grandstanding," but conceded that the nuclear MOU had become a 
political issue for France and Germany that goes beyond the 
mechanics of the July 25 Libya-France deal. 
 
QADHAFI, SARKOZY DISCUSS MEDITERRANEAN UNION, IGNORE BULGARIAN 
MEDICS 
 
 
TRIPOLI 00000664  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶6.  (C)  According to Molina, Qadhafi and Sarkozy spent much of 
their time together discussing Sarkozy's plans to convene a 
Mediterranean head of state conference in spring 2008 to discuss 
migration and water management concerns (Reftel contains further 
details on Sarkozy's visit).  The French delegation described 
Qadhafi as very interested in the Mediterranean Union proposal, 
but said he voiced serious reservations about inviting Israel's 
head of state to participate in the proposed conference.  Beyond 
an opening line expressing "anger" at Bulgaria's decision to 
immediately pardon the six medics upon their return to Sofia 
July 24, Qadhafi did not discuss the case with Sarkozy. 
Claiming that the GOL considers the case of the medics to be 
closed, the MFA's Matari said the GOL tried to focus 
"exclusively on the positive" during Sarkozy's visit. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Qadhafi and Sarkozy held two, separate meetings on the 
night of July 25-26 -- one at Qadhafi's Bab Azizia compound in 
Tripoli attended by Tripoli's diplomatic corps and a second, 
more private meeting the same evening at the Corinthia Hotel. 
According to French diplomats, Sarkozy decided on July 20 to 
visit Libya.  Initially, the Libyans planned to host the visit 
in Sirt, Qadhafi's desert home about 400km east of Tripoli.  The 
GOL changed the venue four times in five days between Tripoli 
and Sirt, greatly frustrating Sarkozy's 20-person security 
advance team. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Comment: GOL interlocutors at all levels have routinely 
stressed that "average Libyans" need to see tangible rewards 
from the U.S. and Europe in response to Libya's 2003 decision to 
renounce WMD and terrorism.  Most have focused on two 
infrastructure projects -- a nuclear-powered water 
desalinization plant and a regional nuclear medicine center. 
Last week's Libya-France agreement to move forward with the 
water desalinization project will allow the GOL to boast to its 
domestic audience that it has finally secured one of these 
long-sought "tangible rewards."  Apart from a well-timed public 
relations coup, though, it remains unclear how much tangible 
benefit the GOL will actually garner from the agreement.  End 
comment. 
STEVENS