VZCZCXYZ0013
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKO #3600/01 2182247
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 062247Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6200
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 8230
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2262
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 2014
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0503
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1802
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 4294
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 6558
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 003600 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR D, AND EAP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2027 
TAGS: PREL AF PREL PGOV AS CH TW KS KN RS PG JA
SUBJECT: THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH VICE FOREIGN 
MINISTER YACHI 
 
Classified By: Deputy Secretary John Negroponte, for reason 1.4(B)/(D) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  The Abe Cabinet is committed to moving 
forward on extending the Anti-Terror Special Measure law 
despite the LDP's defeat in the Upper House election, Vice 
Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi told Deputy Secretary 
Negroponte on August 3.  The two agreed that the U.S.-Japan 
alliance was indispensable to the maintenance of peace and 
stability in the region.  Ambassador Schieffer observed that 
the U.S. and Japan were making substantial progress in a 
bilateral, multi-agency effort to strengthen information 
security, which the Deputy Secretary noted will lead to 
greater sharing of sensitive information. VFM Yachi detailed 
a number of Japan's foreign policy priorities, including the 
concept of an arc of freedom and prosperity running from the 
Nordics to Mongolia.  Yachi noted that PM Abe's visit to 
China as well as PM Wen's visit to Japan had provided "good 
direction" and that Japan-China relations were in "good 
shape," even though some problems continued to exist.  End 
Summary. 
 
LDP Defeat Unrelated to Foreign, Security Policies 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶2.  (C)  Vice Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi welcomed the 
Deputy Secretary, noting his visit was timely, coming 
immediately after the Upper House elections.  Yachi noted he 
had spoken with Prime Minster Abe on August 1.  Based on that 
conversation, Yachi characterized the Upper House elections 
as a big defeat for PM Abe, the LDP and the coalition 
government, but emphasized that foreign policy and security 
policy were not issues in the campaign, nor did the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) raise any objections to these 
policies during the campaign.  Instead, the dominant issue in 
the campaign was the pension issue, involving 50 million 
missing pension records.  The second issue was economic and 
social disparities, including gaps rich and poor, between big 
cities and rural areas, and the working poor.  The third 
issue was the politics and money problem; despite the small 
amount of money involved, the electorate demanded very strict 
political ethics. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Yachi emphasized that despite the severe judgment on 
the Abe Administration evident in the elections, PM Abe would 
maintain his foreign policy strategy.  He added that the 
majority of Japanese supported Abe's security and foreign 
policies, including some within the DPJ such as 
Representatives Maehara and Nagashima.  Regarding extension 
of the Anti-Terror Special Measure law authorizing the Indian 
Ocean refueling mission, some in the DPJ support it, but the 
DPJ as a whole is against its extension.  Yachi said that 
extending the law, which expires November 1, will be 
"politically very difficult."  Yachi explained that with the 
ruling coalition's two-thirds majority in the Diet's Lower 
House, extension of the law would take place after sixty days 
even if the Upper House fails to act.  (Note:  The Japanese 
Constitution allows the Lower House to consider a bill as 
rejected by the Upper House if the Upper House fails to act 
within 60 days.  The legislation then returns to the Lower 
House, where the law can be passed with a two-thirds 
majority, thereby overruling the Upper House's assumed 
rejection.)  The DPJ was not of one mind in opposing the 
extension, Yachi said, but timing could be difficult.  Even 
though PM Abe intends to begin the Diet session as soon as 
possible, the Special Measure extension cannot be dealt with 
immediately, since other Diet business, such as 
interpellation of the Prime Minister takes precedence. 
Extension may come after November 1, Yachi stated, and could 
create a "gap of ten to twenty days" in Japan's logistic 
support in the Indian Ocean. 
 
Foreign Policy Priorities 
------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  Yachi noted that PM Abe's foreign policy priorities 
included having five countries -- the U.S., Japan, China, 
Russia, and India -- take more responsibility for the 
maintenance of peace and stability in Asia.  He cited three 
major areas of importance: 1) maintaining and strengthening 
the U.S.-Japan alliance; 2) strengthening Japan's ties with 
India and Russia; and 3) strengthening Japan's ties with its 
neighbors, especially China and the ROK.  A second priority 
 
was to strengthen partnerships with countries on the margins 
of the Eurasian continent, the "arc of freedom and 
prosperity" running from the Nordic countries through the 
Baltic, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia, South 
Asia, and to Mongolia.  Japan did not see itself as leading 
this partnership but, as Yachi described, a "co-runner in a 
marathon."  He emphasized Japan's contribution would provide 
economic assistance, not military power. The Deputy Secretary 
observed that the U.S. concept of strengthening relations 
with the countries of central Asia might be complimentary to 
what Yachi described.  He noted that Secretary Rice had 
talked of having those countries turn more towards a 
North-South axis, instead of relying primarily on their 
traditional ties with Russia.  The Deputy Secretary noted the 
possibility of projects linking central Asian countries to 
India and Pakistan, e.g., linking electrical grids and 
creating markets for central Asian gas, alternative to 
Russia. 
 
¶5.  (C)  PM Abe's third foreign policy emphasis involved 
several diplomatic items:  North Korean missiles, the 
abduction issue (Japan's number one priority, Yachi noted), 
the Northern Territories problem, where discussions with 
Russia were already underway, and UNSC reform.  On the latter 
issue, Yachi noted the GOJ appreciated the U.S. consistent 
support for Japanese membership on the council, but suggested 
that "we made need some more flexibility" on reform, i.e., 
something other than the G-4 proposal.  Turning to climate 
change, Yachi noted PM Abe's proposal made in Germany and 
said Abe looked forward to promoting this idea at the G-8 
meeting in Hokkaido next year. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Yachi also emphasized the need for a stable 
diplomatic balance among countries in the region, noting that 
Japan supported ASEAN 3 the EAS, APEC, and stronger bilateral 
ties with Australia.  The planned September bilateral meeting 
and trilateral breakfast during APEC would provide good 
opportunities for Prime Minister Abe to discuss regional 
cooperation with President Bush, Yachi noted. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Turning to security issues, Yachi said the GOJ 
wished to "accelerate" realignment of U.S. bases in Japan. 
On the subject of collective self-defense, he noted creation 
of an experts group that would issue a report in September or 
October.  In response to the Ambassador's question about 
whether the Upper House elections would affect that process, 
VFM Yachi replied that it would and that the issue would 
become more contentious.  The Ambassador also asked if the 
collective security issue might put at risk the LDP's 
coalition with Komeito.  Yachi replied it was difficult to 
say; if Abe were able to consolidate his political base he 
could obtain Komeito acquiescence, but if Abe's position 
continued to weaken it would be difficult to get Komeito 
support. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Yachi mentioned Japan's plan to establish a national 
security council, noting a bill was already in the Diet and 
the government would seek enactment in the fall.  Yachi said 
the proposed NSC would have 5 members -- the Prime Minister, 
the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Defense Minister, Foreign 
Minister, "maybe" a National Security Advisor, and a small 
secretariat lead by a secretary-general.  VFM Yachi also said 
 
SIPDIS 
that Japan needed a law covering peace-keeping operations 
(PKO).  So far the government had enacted special measures 
for participation in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Japan needed a 
general law, he pointed out, authorizing the government to 
decide at any time when Japan should participate in PKOs, 
noting such a law would be sought next year. 
 
U.S.-Japan Alliance 
------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C)  The Deputy Secretary emphasized that our alliance 
with Japan remained the cornerstone of our posture in Asia. 
He said it was reassuring to hear Yachi's comments that 
despite the election, Japan shared that view and was 
committed to strengthening the alliance.  VFM Yachi said the 
U.S.-Japan alliance was indispensable, particularly given the 
security environment with North Korea and a Chinese military 
buildup without sufficient transparency.  He noted the GOJ 
would continue to support realignment of U.S. forces in Japan 
and missile defense cooperation.  Yachi noted the good 
 
channel of communication provided by Ambassador Schieffer, 
adding that he hoped the Deputy Secretary would also take a 
leadership role in "paying more attention to Japan."  Yachi 
noted PM Abe's upcoming visit to India, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia from August 19-26 and his September 8-9 attendance 
at APEC, noting that planned official visits to Australia and 
New Zealand had had to be canceled this time in order for PM 
Abe to return quickly to the Diet session.  Yachi said the 
GOJ wished to have a Japan-U.S. summit of 30-40 minutes at 
APEC and a Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral breakfast meeting 
also at the leaders' level.  He noted President Bush's 
invitation to PM Abe and his wife to visit Crawford next year 
and said they were both very interested in doing so. 
 
Information Security 
--------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C)  Yachi turned to the issue of strengthening 
information security, an issue of great importance.  He noted 
we had agreed on the substance of a General Security of 
Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and that the GOJ 
hoped to sign the agreement next week.  The Ambassador 
confirmed he would be available and be pleased to sign the 
agreement.  DG Nishimiya said that the initial Bilateral 
Information Security Task Force (BISTF) meeting had not been 
conclusive, but the GOJ had now done its "homework" and was 
making progress.  He was very hopeful final agreement could 
be reached in the afternoon. The Ambassador observed that we 
were making substantial progress in this bilateral, 
multi-agency effort, which was moving in the right direction. 
 The Deputy Secretary said improved protection of classified 
information will lead to better use of sensitive information 
and increase the amount of information shared. 
 
Japan's Ties with China 
----------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C)  Stepping up cooperation and increasing mutually 
beneficial ties with China would continue to be a cornerstone 
of Japan's foreign policy, Yachi noted.  Yachi noted that PM 
Abe's visit to China as well as PM Wen's visit to Japan had 
provided "good direction" and that Japan-China relations were 
in "good shape," even though some problems continued to 
exist.  Prime Minister Abe was seeking to boost environmental 
cooperation with China in bid to reduce pollution, mitigate 
the water supply shortage, and increase energy efficiency, 
noting Japanese energy efficiency is ten times higher than 
China's.  Nuclear energy is another area for future 
cooperation, Yachi said.  PM Abe's efforts to improve 
relations were an important step forward, but stumbling 
blocks such as the dispute over joint energy development in 
the East China Sea continued to impede relations. 
 
¶12.  (C)  Japanese political leaders were facing strong 
domestic political pressure to begin drilling for gas in 
disputed waters in the East China Sea but remain reluctant 
due to fears of Chinese military intervention, Yachi stated. 
China was only willing to agree to small-scale development 
because it is aiming to develop a larger area for its 
exclusive use, Yachi explained.  China used a similar 
strategy when negotiating a joint development agreement with 
other countries, such as in the Spratly Islands, Deputy 
Secretary Negroponte noted.  Japan was willing to resolve the 
 
SIPDIS 
dispute via international arbitration but China opposed that 
option. 
 
Taiwan 
------ 
 
¶13.  (C)  Turning to Taiwan, China remains suspicious of Chen 
Shui-bian and is increasingly concerned over his aims for 
Taiwanese independence, Deputy Secretary Negroponte noted. 
Yachi agreed it was important to discourage Taiwan from 
taking unilateral action in a bid to achieve independence. 
Beijing was not just simply posturing, Yachi emphasized, but 
seriously worried about cross-strait relations.  Chinese 
Ambassador to Japan Wang Yi mentions Taiwan every time he 
calls on the phone, Yachi said.  Yachi remarked that Beijing 
had excellent intelligence operatives in Taiwan and was aware 
of every move Japanese politicians make concerning 
cross-strait relations. 
 
¶14.  (C)  Japan stands by its 1972 Joint Declaration with 
China, respects and understands that Taiwan is an integral 
part of China, and will not change that stance, Yachi stated. 
 Japan has told Taiwan that Tokyo opposes its UN bid. Japan 
supports a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question and is 
against unilateral action by any party to change the status 
quo.  The Deputy Secretary agreed that the cross-straits 
dispute needed to be settled by peaceful means and stated the 
U.S. does not support Taiwan's independence referendum. 
 
¶15.  (U)  August 3, 2007; 10:30; Tokyo, Japan. 
 
¶16.  (U)  Meeting Participants: 
 
U.S. 
Deputy Secretary Negroponte 
Ambassador Schieffer 
Deputy Assistant Secretary David Sedney, Dept of Defense 
James Zumwalt, Director of Japan Affairs, Dept of State 
Kaye Lee, Special Assistant 
Ted Wittenstein, Special Assistant 
James Pierce, A/POL, US Embassy (Notetaker) 
Mary Wilson, Second Secretary, US Embassy (Notetaker) 
 
Japan 
Shotaro Yachi, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Shinichi Nishimiya, Director-General, North American Affairs 
Bureau 
Junichi Ihara, Councilor, Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau 
Nobukatsu Kanehara, Director, Policy Coordination Division 
Takeo Mori, Director, First North America Division 
Masahiro Mikami, Assistant to Vice-Minister for Foreign 
Affairs 
Mr. Miyamoto, Principal Deputy Director, National Security 
Policy Division 
Mr. Yoshitake, Deputy Director First North America Division 
Mr. Fukushima, Official, First North America Division 
SCHIEFFER