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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SHENYANG 000153 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/CM, INR, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: AUGUST 8, 2032 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV SOCI KCUL CH
SUBJECT: THEY "WON'T LET THE PEOPLE SPEAK": PRESS CONTROL 
IN NORTHEAST CHINA 
 
 
Classified By: CONSUL GENERAL STEPHEN B. WICKMAN. 
REASONS: 1.4(B), 1.4(D) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Conservative propaganda officials in 
northeast China continue to gag, muffle or otherwise 
"manage" perceived negative news, according to Liaoning 
journalists and Party sources, who note that media freedom 
generally tends to be more restricted here than in other 
parts of China.  Propaganda authorities' recent 
"management" of news coverage of a karaoke parlor explosion 
near Benxi was only the latest example, though even some 
high-level Party officials have grumbled to us about the 
event's handling.  The hand of the censorship apparatus 
appeared again even more recently as propaganda authorities 
managed an entire news blackout of an event implicating 
social stability, when thousands of transport workers 
launched a days-long strike in Jinzhou.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) An August 1 Washington Post expose on the "muffling" 
of news coverage of the July 4 explosion of a Liaoning 
karaoke parlor in Tianshifu, Benxi County, highlighted but 
one in a long line of news events subject to controls by 
propaganda officials in northeast China's Information 
Offices (see Edward Cody, "China's Local Censors Muffle an 
Explosion").  A range of Liaoning Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) members, newspaper journalists and television 
reporters/officials in recent days discussed with us the 
nature of the Liaoning censorship apparatus and the media 
environment here more broadly. 
 
THE CONSERVATIVE NORTHEAST AND ITS CENSORSHIP APPARATUS 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
¶3. (C) Post sources generally concur that northeast China 
remains a relatively conservative corner of the country in 
terms of media freedom.  CHONG Lin (strictly protect), a 
close Post contact and Vice Director of the official 
Shenyang Daily's economic section told PAO on August 3 that 
propaganda officials she has encountered here have tended 
to be more strict on the media than in other parts of 
China.  Her reporter-friends working elsewhere in China-- 
especially in the south--have had comparatively more 
freedom to report on sensitive issues, she noted, conceding 
that the business-related focus of her work has allowed her 
more latitude than her other colleagues in town.  Although 
the orthodoxy of propaganda officials varies by province, 
Chong stressed that the propaganda officials she has 
encountered in the northeast tend to be less tolerant and 
heterodox than those in the south, adding with a grimace 
that the Liaoning propaganda officials with whom she 
interacts are largely Party hacks that have no proper 
journalistic experience. 
 
¶4. (C) The actual process of news "management" differs in 
practice between the television and the print media.  TIAN 
Wei (strictly protect), Deputy Programming Director for 
official Liaoning Television, told PAO on August 2 that she 
needs to seek the guidance of propaganda authorities on all 
potentially sensitive stories.  But she confided that she 
generally does not need to coordinate too closely with 
propaganda officials because she is already well aware of 
their views and guidelines.  If a sensitive but newsworthy 
event occurs in another province, Tian said, then Liaoning 
TV's guidance is to take its cues--and any television feed- 
-from the official television station of the province in 
question. 
 
¶5. (C) Rules for the Liaoning print media tend to be 
somewhat more flexible than those for television 
journalists, Tian explained, a point echoed by others. 
Even so, editors at the official Liaoning Daily still 
consult with propaganda authorities "frequently" on their 
stories, says GAO Xin, one of the paper's news editors. 
Certain redlines are relatively clear.  Asked on August 4 
about a recent transport strike in Jinzhou (see below) Gao 
said she had not heard of it but was quick to add that the 
Liaoning Daily generally would not be permitted to cover 
labor unrest because the subject is "sensitive." 
 
¶6. (C) Liaoning TV's Tian Wei stressed to us the well-known 
fact that news editors in many cases maintain close 
professional and personal ties with propaganda officials. 
According to a number of journalistic contacts, it is these 
personal connections that prove to be a more potent force 
in the process of censorship or (self-censorship) than 
Party membership among members of the press corps.  Why? 
Chong Lin, for instance, estimates that at the Shenyang 
Daily--a publication controlled by the Party--only one- 
 
SHENYANG 00000153  002 OF 003 
 
 
third of her colleagues are Party members.  Numbers are 
even smaller, she said, at non-Party-controlled papers in 
Liaoning.  But a sense of loyalty to the CCP is likely a 
more important element among Liaoning propaganda 
authorities, whom Chong noted tend--at least among those 
she has encountered--to be very loyal Party members. 
 
THE CENSORSHIP APPARATUS AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
-------------------------------------------- 
¶7. (C) Not everyone has been pleased with the heavy- 
handedness of the propaganda authorities, and even 
relatively high-ranking Liaoning CCP officials have 
occasionally privately vented their frustration.  On the 
Tianshifu explosion, for instance, Liaoning Party School 
Deputy Party Secretary WANG Hongsheng (strictly protect) 
confided on August 2 that he was quite "diwsatisfied" with 
the guidelines from the propaganda authorities and the 
resulting press coverage.  Wang had read the internal Party 
reports on the explosion and noted--unsurprisingly--that 
they differed substantially from the official Xinhua news 
accounts.  The Party reports broached a wide range of 
issues, including possible guilty parties, victims and 
damage, inter alia.  Motives are still unclear, Wang said, 
but revenge may have been at play.  (NOTE: The Liaoning 
Public Security Bureau is still investigating the 
explosion, Benxi Foreign Affairs Office (FAO) Director GUAN 
Shizhen told the CG on August 3, promising no further 
details until the effort was completed. END NOTE.) 
 
BLACKING OUT THE JINZHOU TRANSPORT STRIKE 
----------------------------------------- 
¶8. (SBU) Apparently subject to even harsher controls than 
the Benxi explosion was a more recent event in Liaoning 
that involved an entire news blackout and, unlike 
Tianshifu, directly implicated questions of social 
stability.  On July 18, several thousand transport workers 
in Jinzhou, a coastal city only recently revitalizing, 
launched a days-long strike to protest the impending 
privatization of the city's bus company and related 
compensation issues.  Buses lay idle for days as commuters 
bore the brunt of the strike, and the CG observed their 
conspicuous absence during a previously scheduled July 20- 
21 visit.  Most workers resumed their duties less than a 
week after the strike began, following government efforts 
to manage the situation, though according to one online 
account, at least several hundred remained on strike nearly 
a week later. 
 
¶9. (SBU) All the while, Liaoning authorities imposed a 
total news blackout, prohibiting domestic television and 
print media from reporting on the strike. (Some local 
reporters did make it to the scene, according to several 
online sources).  The sole source of information on the 
Jinzhou strike proved to be local BBS sites, blogs and a 
handful of Chinese-language overseas web pages that 
primarily re-posted BBS messages from Jinzhou residents. 
BBS boards on July 18 initially buzzed with details, 
featuring sitreps and messages of support for the strikers. 
By July 19, however, the discourse had shifted to the 
alleged "malfeasance" of ZHAO Lihui, the state-owned 
municipal bus company's general manager, who the sources 
said stood to make a handsome profit.  Netizens condemned 
Zhao's "gall" and accused her of embezzlement.  One Jinzhou 
resident warned that Zhao had "underestimated the people's 
strength."  Another exhorted readers to "wake up" and "use 
legal instruments to protect our legal rights." Watching 
all this activity online, Post observed the webmaster for 
one particular Jinzhou BBS--hosted on well-known web portal 
Sohu--quickly and systematically deleting any item that 
touched on the issue of possible corruption. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Initially, the webmasters permitted discussion of 
the basic details about the strike and the government's 
actions to redress the grievances.  The angry netizens, 
however, continued to broaden their attacks over the 
following days.  By July 22, far more explicit attacks on 
Zhao and, ultimately, the government itself appeared before 
they were promptly removed.  One Jinzhou resident groused 
that the "government...won't let the people speak."  Others 
decried the "excessive" censorship and "tyrannical," 
"unjust" deletion of their BBS posts. 
 
¶11. (C) Privately, officials seemed far less sensitive 
about the strike than their media handling might suggest. 
After Jinzhou Party Secretary TONG Zhiwu glumly fielded 
strike-related phone calls on July 20 throughout a meeting 
with the CG, FAO Director TAN Yunpeng the following day 
 
SHENYANG 00000153  003 OF 003 
 
 
openly confirmed the strike had been ongoing since July 18. 
Asked about its causes, Tan omitted the corruption angle 
but explained, accurately, that the transport workers 
feared losing their livelihoods during the privatization 
process.  Similarly, in the aftermath of the Tianshifu 
explosion, officials in Benxi also did not shy away from 
discussing the event.  Benxi Vice Mayor LIU Shangyang and 
FAO Director LU Enwei on July 11 openly told Econoff that 
while the event was frightening, they did not find it 
terribly significant. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
¶12. (C) In the run-up to the 17th Party Congress, perhaps 
it is unsurprising for the official print and television 
news media in Liaoning to play it safe and project the 
image of a stable, healthy and "harmonious" Liaoning.  This 
may be particularly important in light of Liaoning Party 
Secretary LI Keqiang's anticipated elevation to Beijing 
 
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this fall, perhaps to a Politburo Standing Committee slot. 
And this may be one reason, in addition to the sensitivity 
of the topic, why so many of Post's journalistic sources in 
Liaoning--even longtime contacts--became noticeably nervous 
when asked about the mechanics of censorship in general and 
the role of propaganda authorities in particular.  During 
an August 3 meeting at the official Northeast China News 
Web, for instance, nervous journalists actually stopped the 
meeting, consulted outside for several minutes and, upon 
their return, referred us to the provincial Information 
Office for any further questions on censorship. 
WICKMAN