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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 SHANGHAI 000546 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SECDEF PASS OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 
CNO ALSO FOR POLAD 
DIA FOR DDH/DDHN-1G/DHO-3 
USPACOM FOR J5 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/29/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MCAP MARR OVIP CNO ADMIRAL MULLEN CH TW
SUBJECT: CNO ADMIRAL MULLEN'S AUGUST 22 BREAKFAST WITH SHANGHAI 
ACADEMICS 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth Jarrett, CONSUL GENERAL, U.S. Consulate 
General, Shanghai, China, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary.  Shanghai scholars of strategic and American 
studies urged the United States to suspend arms sales to Taiwan 
through the May 2008 Presidential election in an August 22 
meeting with United States Chief of Naval Operations Admiral 
Michael Mullen.  Chen Shui-bian was described as a dangerous 
figure still intent on moving Taiwan to independence, and the 
extent of China's reaction to Chen's referendum on UN membership 
or other actions is not certain.  China, Taiwan and the United 
States thus face a dangerous year ahead, and the USN and USG 
should work with China to prevent the Taiwan issue from becoming 
a crisis.  The new joint efforts of the United States, Japan, 
Australia and India will shape China's perception of its 
security environment and may be seen as exclusionary and 
threatening.  Fudan University's Center for American Studies and 
the U.S. Institute for Peace will launch a multi-year crisis 
management workshop this autumn in Shanghai, and will seek 
participation of academics, government officials and military 
officers.  One scholar said Chinese television news coverage had 
underscored the seriousness and successfulness of the CNO's 
visit. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (C)  Summary continued.  Admiral Mullen urged work on crisis 
management, internally and bilaterally.  Collaborative efforts 
with other democracies are intended as a positive development 
and not directed against China.  Cooperative efforts on North 
Korea -- and Iran -- are imperative.  Admiral Mullen urged that, 
if trust is to be built, the success of his visit should not be 
a one-off event never replicated in the future.  He also urged 
establishment of a Pentagon - National Defense Ministry hotline, 
and having an informed and empowered interlocutor available at 
the Beijing end should such hotline ever be used.  End summary. 
 
 
 
¶3.  (C)  Five Shanghai scholars conversant on Taiwan, security 
and American issues met with Admiral Mullen at an August 22 
breakfast hosted by the Consul General.  (See para 13 for list 
of participants.)  Fudan University Center for American Studies 
(CAS) Director Shen Dingli said China held the highest respect 
for the U.S. Navy and the Taiwan issue was the only issue about 
which there are differences.  He asked whether the U.S. military 
could play a constructive role in riding out the turbulent times 
through Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian's May 20, 2008 end of 
term.  Chen was dangerous and counting on the PRC to be 
constrained from dangerous reactions by domestic stability 
concerns even if provoked by a UN membership referendum on 
Taiwan.  Chen's purported evaluation is not necessarily correct. 
 Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS) Strategic 
Studies Department Director Xia Liping (a retired PLA Colonel) 
averred that Chen held two goals for his planned UN membership 
referendum:  (a) influencing the outcomes of the presidential 
and Legislative Yuan elections, and (b) using the referendum 
results as another step forward in Chen's approach to Taiwan 
independence. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (C)  Shen further suggested that the United States suspend 
arms sales to Taiwan until the post-Chen administration has 
taken office.  China was opposed to arms sales to Taiwan on 
principle but dealt with the issue constructively.  Shen 
recognized that such a move by the United States would be a 
political, not military decision, but said such a move would 
clearly signal to the Taiwan public that the United States would 
not support irresponsibility and to the Chinese public that the 
 
SHANGHAI 00000546  002 OF 005 
 
 
United States was working to contain a dangerous issue.  Admiral 
Mullen replied that any change of policy would be a political 
decision, but the United States was not in the business of 
walking away from its friends.  The United States understood the 
significance of the Taiwan issue for China.  Improved crisis 
management capabilities and further contacts and deepened 
understanding were important means to address the coming 9-12 
months.  Neither side should be making up policy steps on the 
fly over the next few months.  Taiwan or other press reports of 
proposed arms sales should not be reacted to as if the weapons 
were already deployed in Taiwan's military.  The Admiral noted 
that the Taiwan domestic political repercussions of a cessation 
of arms sales were by no means certain. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
The Security Dilemma:  More Cooperation While 
 
Preparing for the Worst 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶5.  (C)  Professor Xia noted increased bilateral economic 
interdependence, cooperation on non-traditional security issues 
such as drug trafficking, trafficking in persons and global 
warming, and increased cooperation on issues such as the Korean 
Peninsula and Taiwan.  At the same time, the United States has 
prepared for other scenarios, even confrontation with China.  In 
response, the PLA has also prepared for worst case scenarios. 
The Asia-Pacific region places great importance on the concept 
of major powers.  Sino-American cooperation on Korean Peninsula 
issues has sent an important signal to the region.  (The Admiral 
interjected that cooperation on Iran was also needed.)  The 
United States effort to form a Japan-Australia-India-United 
States alliance based on shared democratic values would have a 
negative effect on security cooperation with China in the 
Asia-Pacific region.  Democracy was a universal value, and 
China, in accordance with its Constitution, was moving towards 
democracy on a step-by-step basis.  Was establishment of this 
alliance likely?  How would that alliance impact U.S.-China 
relations?  CAS Deputy Director Wu Xinbo expressed similar 
concerns about the balance between cooperation and deterrence 
and that the Japan-Australia-India-United States security 
coalition would have a major impact on shaping China's 
perception of its security environment.  Wu urged more mil-mil 
cooperation with China.  SIIS Department for American Studies 
Director Chen Dongxiao said the coalition could polarize rather 
than stabilize the Asia-Pacific region and make security 
architecture building more exclusionary than inclusionary. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (C)  Admiral Mullen said that globalization has moved nearly 
all nations closer together.  Militaries must prepare for worst 
situations.  Having or developing a high-end Navy did not mean 
that nations must have confrontations.  The goal of the 
"thousand-ship Navy" was to protect the global maritime trade 
from which China, the United States and so many other countries 
derived tremendous economic benefits.  The cooperation between 
the four countries should be seen as a positive relationship and 
not directed against China.  The Admiral took note of China's 
great concerns about Chen Shui-bian and Taiwan and recalled 
Chinese officials' unhesitating comments in Beijing earlier 
during his visit that China would choose necessary action on 
Taiwan over a successful Olympics.  The Admiral reiterated the 
need for cooperative efforts among many nations, including 
China, to solve difficult issues such as North Korea and Iran. 
 
 
 
SHANGHAI 00000546  003 OF 005 
 
 
 
¶7.  (C)  Admiral Mullen explained that increased mil-mil 
cooperation with China actually started under the leadership of 
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and PACOM Admiral Fallon, and their 
successors continued that emphasis to this day.  The most recent 
Quadrennial Review clearly showed a shift in emphasis to the 
Asia-Pacific region.  One of the reasons the Admiral had 
traveled to China was to hear and better understand China's 
concerns.  The United States sought positive outcomes and did 
not seek to increase suspicions. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
Crisis Management Preparations and More Pressure on CSB 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
 
 
¶8.  (C)  SIIS Department for American Studies Director Chen 
Dongxiao cautioned that Chen Shui-bian was trying to mobilize 
domestic pressures in Taiwan by deliberately defying pressure 
from the United States.  China had not yet defined what steps to 
take against Taiwan movements towards independence, and had not 
yet defined the referendum on UN membership as a step towards 
independence.  However, Chinese officials had already described 
the planned referendum as a grave threat.  That left little room 
for maneuver for China and made crisis management that much more 
important.  China, the United States and others should prepare 
for crisis management, and should put more pressure on Chen 
Shui-bian so that he sees the costs of his actions as too high 
for him and his people. 
 
 
 
¶9.  (C)  Admiral Mullen urged creation of fora to discuss 
concerns such as these and to address crisis management 
capabilities and preparations.  Since the end of the Cold War, 
deterrence had disappeared.  Nuclear weapons proliferation could 
occur in locations that could hurt the United States, China and 
many other nations.  Crisis management preparations were needed 
to create off-ramps and avoid escalations of differences to 
confrontations.  The United States and China should engage to 
deliberately recognize where we are and what may be next.  Many 
challenges confronted the bilateral relationship, such as 
espionage, information security and space policy.  His visit was 
intended in part to develop trust but trust would not be 
accomplished overnight. 
 
 
 
¶10.  (C)  CAS Deputy Director Wu Xinbo, less than one month back 
from a year at the U.S. Institute for Peace (USIP), explained 
that he had tried to identify potential bilateral crises and how 
they could be managed.  Different crises would need different 
approaches and different solutions.  He had found no systemic 
studies of future bilateral crises.  CAS and USIP will launch a 
multi-year project, beginning with a preparatory session in 
Shanghai this autumn, on crisis management.  CAS and USIP will 
each be responsible to obtain the participation of academics, 
government officials and military officers, matching the 
participation of the other side.  Admiral Mullen expressed 
interest in learning more and said he would discuss the project 
with USIP's Ambassador Solomon. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
Successful Visit Should Not be a One-Off Occurrence 
 
 
SHANGHAI 00000546  004 OF 005 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
 
 
¶11.  (C)  Jiaotong University Center for National Strategy 
Studies Vice Director Zhuang Jianzhong noted that Chinese prime 
time television news coverage on August 21 (CCTV channel 9) had 
demonstrated the seriousness and successfulness of the Admiral's 
visit by broadcasting news about the Admiral first, ahead of 
news of Communist Party and national leaders' activities. 
Zhuang asked for further views of promotion of mil-mil relations. 
 
 
 
¶12.  (C)  Admiral Mullen outlined the steps he had taken to make 
PLA (Navy) Commander Admiral Wu Shengli's recent stateside visit 
successful and the unprecedented access he in turn had enjoyed 
on this trip, after having postponed his arrival in China until 
knowing that he had a substantive schedule.  The success of this 
visit should not be a one-off event, but rather one to be 
matched or exceeded in the future.  Other needed improvements to 
mil-mil relations included changing the programs for visiting 
National War Colleges and Industrial College of the Armed Forces 
delegations, who should not be sent to the same aged destroyer 
year after year.  The Chinese military should extend greater 
transparency to cover those sorts of visitors.  Transparency and 
reciprocity needs to be kept up.  More young PLA officers should 
study in the United States.  PLA Navy officers should be at the 
Naval War College in Newport, even if Taiwan Navy officers are 
there.  If China wanted to be able to de-escalate cross-Strait 
crises, it made sense for officers to have studied together. 
Mil-mil hotlines should be established and someone at the 
Chinese end should be able to pick up the phone and talk. 
China's January anti-satellite test had been of great concern to 
the United States and the PACOM Commander's calls to China had 
gone unanswered.  Mil-mil hotlines would enhance mil-mil 
relations, trust and crisis management only if someone could 
pick up the phone and could talk. 
 
 
 
¶13.  (U)  This report has been cleared by Admiral Mullen's 
delegation. 
 
 
 
(U)  U.S. Participants 
 
 
 
Admiral Michael Mullen, Chief of Naval Operations 
 
 
 
Kenneth Jarrett, Consul General, Shanghai 
 
 
 
Donald Camp, Political Advisor to the Chief of Naval Operations 
 
 
 
Captain Bill Moran, Executive Assistant to the Chief of Naval 
Operations 
 
 
 
Captain Thomas Mangold, Naval Attachi, Embassy Beijing 
 
 
 
Christopher Beede, Political/Economic Section Chief, U.S. 
Consulate General, Shanghai 
 
SHANGHAI 00000546  005 OF 005 
 
 
 
 
 
(U)  Chinese Participants 
 
 
 
Professor SHEN Dingli, Director, Center for American Studies, 
Fudan University 
 
 
 
Professor WU Xinbo, Deputy Director, Center for American 
Studies, Fudan University 
 
 
 
Senior Fellow CHEN Dongxiao, Director, Department for American 
Studies, Shanghai Institute for International Studies 
 
 
 
Professor XIA Liping, Director, Department of Strategic Studies, 
Shanghai Institute for International Studies 
JARRETT