VZCZCXRO5819
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #1872/01 2431546
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311546Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6957
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 001872 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO), EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS), NSC FOR 
BRAUN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KCRM KJUS PINR EUN BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - BOSNIAKS TORPEDO PROSPECTS FOR POLICE 
 
REFORM 
 
REF: A. SARAJEVO 595 
     ¶B. SARAJEVO 1663 
     ¶C. 06 SARAJEVO 3271 
     ¶D. 05 SARAJEVO 2374 
 
Classified By: DCM Judith B. Cefkin.  Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)s 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Since assuming office in July, High Representative 
Miroslav Lajcak has stated publicly that his first major task 
would be concluding an agreement on Police Reform in 
September, allowing Bosnia to initial an SAA with the EU. 
Lajcak circulated a draft of the proposal in private talks 
this week with Quint embassies and Bosnian political parties. 
 The draft walks back some of the more politically 
contentious elements of previous proposals in an effort to 
bring Bosnian Serbs on board but remains, according to the 
EU, consistent with the three EU principles on policing.  The 
day after meeting the High Representative, Haris Silajdzic 
and Sulejman Tihic publicly rejected the Lajcak proposal. 
Milorad Dodik and Serb party leaders followed suit one day 
later.  The rejection of the proposal on which Lajcak has 
publicly staked his credibility represents a serious 
challenge to the new High Representative.  Unless he acts 
quickly and forcefully to reassert his authority, Lajcak 
faces being ignored by Bosnian politicians for the remainder 
of his tenure.  End Summary. 
 
Silajdzic and Tihic Reject Lajcak's Police Reform Proposal 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶2. (C) High Representative Miroslav Lajcak on August 27 
shared with Quint Ambassadors a new proposal for a police 
reform agreement.  Citing instructions from Brussels, Lajcak 
said he had made police reform his top priority and that he 
aimed to conclude an agreement by September 30 (Ref B). 
Lajcak told the Quint that a deal before October would allow 
the EU to initial a Stabilization and Association Agreement 
by the end of the year.  On August 30, Silajdzic and Tihic 
held a joint press conference in which they rejected Lajcak's 
proposal.  Their press conference came just one day after 
Lajcak had presented the proposal to them and before Lajcak 
had even completed his consultations with other party 
leaders. 
 
¶3. (C) Silajdzic and Tihic claimed that they remained 
committed to police reform, noting that they had accepted 
previous proposals (e.g., the Martens Report, the Vlasic 
Agreement, and the Police Reform Directorate Report), but 
asserted that Lajcak's proposal violated all three principles 
the EU said must guide police reform. (Note: The three 
principles are: 1) All legislative and budgetary competencies 
for all police matters must be vested at the State level, 2) 
No political interference with operational policing, 3) 
Functional local police areas must be determined by technical 
policing criteria, where operational command is exercised at 
the local level. End Note.) Lajcak's proposal represented 
further concessions to the RS, both Silajdzic and Tihic said. 
 
¶4. (C) In addition to their "technical objections" to 
Lajcak's proposal, Silajdzic and Tihic also raised political 
concerns.  They argued that the reform would impact the 
Federation only by forcing it to disband Federation Police 
while leaving in place the RS and Cantonal police forces. 
Silajdzic also repeated previous claims that the 
International Court of Justice had found the RS guilty of 
genocide, stressing that he could not support reforms that 
legitimated these crimes, the institutions that committed 
them, or the "ethnocracy" that resulted from them.  Silajdzic 
defiantly acknowledged that the Bosniaks were taking a risk 
in publicly rejecting Lajcak's proposal before talks had even 
begun, but asserted that in doing so they were defending a 
"multiethnic Bosnia." 
 
¶5. (U)  The following day, Republika Srpska President Milan 
Jelic and other representatives of Serb political parties met 
to discuss the proposal.  In a public statement released 
following the meeting the Serb parties announced they also 
found the Lajcak proposal unacceptable and would forward 
their own draft law on police reform to the state parliament. 
 
SARAJEVO 00001872  002 OF 003 
 
 
 Serb parties described the Lajcak proposal as 
"unconstitutional."  The press release stated that the Serb 
proposal would leave existing police structures in the RS and 
the Federation intact and simply establish a consolidated 
national police budget. 
 
¶6.  (C) At the weekly meeting of the PIC Steering Board, a 
clearly disconcerted High Representative commented that the 
reaction by Silajdzic and Tihic was unfortunate, unfair and 
had violated assurances of confidentiality under which he had 
discussed the proposal with party leaders.  He stated, 
however, that the negotiation process on the agreement would 
continue.  EC Ambassador Kourkoulas said that Brussels had 
taken note of the actions of Silajdzic and Tihic and Olli 
Rehn was preparing a strongly worded response adding that the 
"European perspective of the country is at stake."  He noted 
that the assertion by Tihic and Silajdzic that the proposal 
was inconsistent with the three EU principles was spurious 
and that it was the EU, not Bosnian leaders, that is charged 
with making this assessment.  Steering Board ambassadors 
expressed support for the High Representative and pledged to 
use bilateral contacts to press political leaders to sign on 
to the agreement. 
 
One State-level Structure 
------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Under the Lajcak proposal all local police districts 
will fall under the authority of the State-level Ministry of 
Security and be governed by State-level legislation.  As with 
earlier proposals, an office of the Director of Police would 
be established to oversee and coordinate the work of local 
police operations.  The Director would have three subordinate 
Assistant Directors responsible for policing in the territory 
of the RS, Federation, and Brcko District.  The Lajcak 
proposal sidesteps the contentious issue of the continued 
existence of the entity Interior Ministries but implicitly 
provides them with a "consultative role" through a new 
Ministry of Security "Collegium".  Silajdzic's staff told us 
that they view the Collegium, despite its advisory role, as 
providing an avenue for RS leaders to exercise political 
influence over police operations 
 
¶8. (C) The current proposal is silent on the politically 
sensitive issue of naming local police units, specifically 
whether to retain the name RS Police.  During the last round 
of negotiations (Ref A), Silajdzic rejected any agreement 
that would allow retention of the name RS Police, labeling it 
a "genocidal institution." The current report simply refers 
to Local Police Bodies on the territory of the Republika 
Srpska, the Federation, and the Brcko District.  However, it 
also refers to "RS Police Administration," which Silajdzic's 
staff told us is unacceptable.  They argue that it confirms 
the RS police's continued existence despite the new 
State-level control of Local Police Bodies. 
 
Softening the Line on Local Police Areas 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) To date, the EU has maintained that local police areas 
must be based on technical criteria without regard for the 
current inter-entity boundary line (IEBL).  The RS strongly 
opposed police zones crossing the IEBL, and as a result, OHR 
and EU concessions reduced the number of IEBL crossings 
until, by the March proposal, it was crossed only in the 
greater Sarajevo metropolitan area.  The Lajcak proposal 
eliminates any provisions for cross-IEBL police zones calling 
simply for more than one local police body in the RS and the 
Federation, and one in Brcko.  The Lajcak proposal does call 
for a local police area covering the Srebrenica municipality. 
 It is debatable whether this provision is in line with the 
requirement for "technical efficiency" in the second 
principle. 
 
Concessions on Police Budgets 
----------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) The Lajcak plan's most significant concessions to the 
RS are related to budgetary control.  To date, OHR and the EU 
have insisted on state-level control of the police budget. 
In a February 22 letter to RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, 
former High Representative Christian Schwarz-Schilling wrote 
 
SARAJEVO 00001872  003 OF 003 
 
 
that "there is no room under (the first) principle for entity 
and cantonal institutions to exercise budget responsibility 
of any kind."  However, in an effort to bring the RS on 
board, the Lajcak proposal seeks to create the appearance of 
a role for the entities and cantons.  The proposal calls for 
local police districts to prepare draft budgets for approval 
by the RS National Assembly, Cantonal Assemblies, and Brcko 
District Assembly.  Assemblies would then forward budget 
proposals to the Ministry of Security.  The Ministry of 
Security Collegium would approve them by consensus or 
majority (as long as the majority includes a representative 
of each Entity and each constituent people).  Separate escrow 
accounts would be created for the RS, each of the Cantons, 
and the Brcko District.  Funds earmarked to cover the 
expenditures of the local police bodies located in the RS, 
the Cantons, and Brcko District would be channeled through 
them. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) It is not surprising that Silajdzic and Tihic have 
objections to Lajcak's proposal.  It does include further 
concessions to the RS beyond those already offered in a 
series of negotiations which ended unsuccessfully on March 14 
(Ref A).  It is also weaker than even the model suggested in 
the Police Reform Directorate Final Report (Ref C), and it is 
a far cry from the technical criteria envisioned in October 
2005 when the EU principles were established.  Nonetheless, 
their decision to publicly blast the High Representative's 
proposal before talks began raises profound concerns about 
their willingness to make the compromises necessary for 
Bosnia to sign a Stabilization and Association Agreement 
(SAA). 
 
¶12. (C) Our judgment is Silajdzic and Tihic, now joined by 
Serb parties, have virtually eliminated any prospect for a 
police reform deal in September, which admittedly were never 
all that bright to begin with.  The High Representative now 
finds himself at a pivotal point in his tenure.  He staked 
his reputation, credibility and authority on a September 
police reform deal.  The Bosniak challenge over police reform 
comes on the heels of RS PM Dodik's anti-Dayton rhetoric and 
decision to essentially ignore a warning from Lajcak to cease 
and desist.  Lajcak's staff have told us that the High 
Representative understands he must react.  "Do nothing is not 
an option," one aide told us.  The aide is right, and given 
the disdain Serbs and Bosniaks have displayed, Lajcak's 
response will need to be robust.  We need to indicate our 
full support for any action Lajcak takes and help him stiffen 
the resolve of the Europeans to confront both Dodik and 
Silajdzic. 
MCELHANEY