VZCZCXRO5783
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0657 2211135
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 091135Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8058
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0920

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000657 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/SE, IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SE KO CY
SUBJECT: NO CHANGE ON CYPRIOTS' APPROACH TO KOSOVO 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 109526 
 
     ¶B. NICOSIA 496 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (SBU) In response to Ref A, PolChief August 8 delivered 
Kosovo-related points to Constantinos Chrystomides in the 
Cypriot Foreign Ministry's European Affairs division. 
Covering a staffing gap and admitting Kosovo and the broader 
Balkans were not his regular beat, Chrystomides offered only 
the barest-bones response to our demarche:  Cyprus favored a 
solution acceptable to both ethnic Albanians and Serbs; a UN 
Security Council Resolution blessing the agreement was a 
must; and, in the case the talks break down without 
agreement, Cyprus would not recognize Kosovar Albanians' 
unilateral declaration of independence. 
 
¶2.  (C) COMMENT:  "Kosovo" remains a dirty word in Greek 
Cyprus, synonymous with a Cyprus Problem solution imposed by 
Western powers solely for their own benefit or in the name of 
international stability.  As proof, newly-named Foreign 
Minister Erato Marcoullis July 27 warned her countrymen that, 
should the UN-brokered July 8 Process fall by the wayside, a 
real danger of a "Kosovo-type" (two-state) solution existed. 
Unfounded or not, Greek Cypriots fear that independence for 
Kosovo represents a negative precedent for all sovereign 
states facing separatist threats.  We should expect no 
support from the RoC for any solution not sanctioned by the 
Serbs and Russians, and not backed by a UNSCR (Ref B). 
SCHLICHER