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DE RUEHMU #1873/01 2202346
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 082346Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0961
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 4652
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//J2/J3/J5// IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 001873 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/FO--G. SNIDLE, WHA/CEN--S. CRAIG 
DEPT ALSO FOR INL/LP--A. MARTIN 
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2017 
TAGS: PTER PINS PREL XK
SUBJECT: EMBASSY MANAGUA ASSESSMENT OF CENTRAL AMERICA 
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
 
REF: SECSTATE 107145 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Due to recent political changes in Nicaragua, it 
remains to be seen whether the GON will continue to cooperate 
with the U.S. on broad high-level security policy.  Even so, 
day-to-day operational cooperation remains strong, 
particularly with the National Police and the military.  We 
believe that expanding our practical and direct engagement 
with appropriate Nicaraguan government agencies, especially 
the military and the national police, does present viable 
opportunities both to improve Nicaraguan security and 
institutionalize Nicaragua's regional integration.  With this 
backdrop, we present the following ideas on what policy 
actions and assistance could be effective in Nicaragua as 
part of a comprehensive regional security strategy. 
 
Success Predicated on Four Basic Assumptions 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) We believe strongly that there are four underlying 
assumptions that should apply across all countries in the 
region and that should weigh heavily in Washington's 
decisions about what policy and assistance to provide. 
 
--First, the initial phase of policy support or assistance 
needs to bring all countries to a common baseline via the 
provision of common equipment with an emphasis on systems 
that tie the countries' military, law enforcement, and 
intelligence institutions together.  This approach may mean 
providing "unequal" support to some countries. 
--Second, especially in Nicaragua, funds need to be set aside 
to carry out public diplomacy to correct misperceptions about 
and to promote U.S. assistance related to this regional 
strategy. 
--Third, assistance, particularly equipment, should include 
"sustainability packages" that allow receiving nations to 
develop native capacity to continue efforts on their own 
long-term. 
--Finally, a "burden-sharing" element should be required of 
all nations, though realistically this would be non-monetary 
in nature.  As has already been seen with the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation model, contributions of physical 
facilities, legislative remedies, and the like can go a long 
way to creating a lasting sense of ownership by the host 
country and increase the chance for success. 
 
Suggestions for Nicaragua 
------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) With respect to Nicaragua, there are six areas where 
additional assets and policies could bind Nicaragua more 
closely to its neighbors resulting in better regional 
cooperation and positive results. 
 
-- Border Control:  Nicaragua's police, military and the 
customs and immigration agencies do not possess adequate 
resources to exert sovereignty over national territory.  One 
key weakness in Nicaragua's border and immigration control is 
the lack of airport security, which could be greatly improved 
by installing a complete and functional video monitoring 
system and the comprehensive implementation of the PISCES 
immigration system.  Policy consideration should be given to 
determining how the C-4 Customs Union, of which Nicaragua is 
a member, might be strengthened to expand its defensive-ring 
potential.  Perhaps integration into the larger CAFTA-DR 
structure would produce the greatest effect.  Despite 
attendant fuel constraints, providing fixed- and rotary-wing 
air assets as well as additional water assets would improve 
activities to combat trafficking of narcotics, humans, as 
well as of rare and protected species. 
 
-- Military Cooperation:  A regional solution to improve 
security can not be successful without considering military 
cooperation.  Like nearly every other country in the region, 
Nicaragua desperately needs transportation helicopters and 
lift capacity.  To be useful, however, any new physical 
assets must be accompanied by, and should not be delivered 
without, host country agreement for a "sustainability 
package" that includes spare parts, training and maintenance. 
 Such a package should be designed to develop national 
capacity that can be sustained for the long-term.  The 
provision of any physical assets should also include 
communications systems that are mutually compatible to 
encourage cooperation between the countries.  In addition, 
systems that are interoperable with U.S. equipment should be 
considered where possible. 
 
-- Regional Command and Control:  We suggest that a regional 
command and control/coordination center be considered -- as 
SICA itself has proposed.  This center could be housed at 
JIATF in Florida or possibly in Honduras at Soto Cano.  The 
institution should at least bring together representatives 
from national counter-drug and financial crimes enforcement, 
and possibly counter-terrorism, entities from each country. 
This center would improve regional coordination and 
information sharing across national lines.  If a U.S. 
location were selected, Washington should consider providing 
stipends or scholarships to facilitate the presence of 
foreign LNOs on a rotational basis. 
 
--Police Presence:  Nicaragua has a National Police force; 
however, outside the capital and major cities the NNP has a 
limited presence with virtually no presence at all in the 
Atlantic Provinces.  Funding to increase the rural and 
regional police presence, especially in the lawless Atlantic 
region of the country, would greatly improve the NNP's 
capacity and provide a significant deterrent against the 
traffickers of narcotics, arms, persons, and other illicit 
goods that utilize routes throughout the region.  Increased 
police manpower would also result in enhanced and more 
frequent military-police cooperation particularly outside the 
capital. 
 
--Anti-corruption:  Corruption in Nicaragua is endemic and 
corrosive.  In particular, the judiciary here presents a 
particular challenge -- from top-to-bottom Nicaragua's courts 
have been stacked, politicized and are routinely manipulated. 
 However, there are some options that we believe may produce 
improvement.  Nicaragua would benefit from assistance to 
enforce financial disclosure laws already on the books. 
Nicaragua is also the only nation in the region without a 
financial intelligence unit and will almost certainly fall 
under international financial sanctions beginning January 
2008 due to the lack of progress.  We would also propose 
establishing a regional FINCEN, or help create unit within 
the existing C-4 Customs Union structure. 
 
-- Gangs:  A regional anti-gang strategy has already begun to 
be implemented.  Although Nicaragua does suffer from a 
growing problem with street gangs, especially in Managua, to 
this point foreign organizations such as the MS-13 have not 
been able to establish a long-term presence in the country. 
However, like its neighbors, there are large numbers of 
at-risk youth, who due to lack of economic opportunity and 
social mobility, present potentially fertile ground for gang 
and organized crime elements that seek to expand. 
Substantial funding for programs targeting at-risk youth 
would be a good investment. 
 
TRIVELLI