VZCZCXRO5478
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHLI #2046/01 2210634
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 090634Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6122
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0036
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0037

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LISBON 002046 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KV UNYI EU PO
SUBJECT: PORTUGAL ON KOSOVO NEXT STEPS 
 
REF: A) STATE 109526 B) LISBON 1974 C) 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. David Ballard for reasons 1.4 (B) 
 and (D). 
 
Summary 
-------- 
 
¶1.  (C) Portugal's MFA political director Vasco Bramao Ramos 
acknowledged to Charge on August 8 that the 120-day period of 
additional negotiations on Kosovo was unlikely to produce a 
breakthrough.  He said there is a growing realization within 
the EU that Kosovo will declare independence shortly after 
December 10, and he is working with his EU counterparts to 
find a legal basis, in the absence of a UN Security Council 
Resolution, for individual member states to recognize Kosovo 
and to deploy a crucial ESDP rule of law mission.  He 
clarified that the "extra time" needed beyond the 120-day 
period was not for additional negotiations but, rather, to 
permit the EU to manage its response to Kosovo's expected 
declaration of independence.  The key meeting for the EU in 
that regard -- when Portugal hopes to secure consensus of 
foreign ministers on the way forward -- will be the General 
Affairs and External Relations Council in November.  Portugal 
has delivered blunt messages to  Serbian and Russian leaders 
that Kosovo independence is inevitable and that Belgrade and 
Moscow will have to live with it.  Foreign Minister Amado 
intends to reiterate that message in a visit to the region, 
perhaps in late August.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  CDA, accompanied by Poleconcouns, delivered ref A 
talking points to MFA political director Vasco Bramao Ramos 
on August 8.  Bramao Ramos was joined by his deputy, Jorge 
Cabral, and Balkans advisor Carla Monteiro. 
CDA reviewed the latest developments, including formation of 
the Contact Group troika, and stressed our view that December 
10 should be a firm end date for the negotiations, at which 
point we and our European allies would have some decisions to 
make.  He solicited Bramao Ramos' assessment of current EU 
thinking on the way forward. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Bramao Ramos said the EU continues to consider 
carefully a "Plan C," as he had told EUR A/S Fried in Lisbon 
in mid-July.  He reiternated his earlier point to A/S Fried 
that the EU will likely need U.S. help in securing the assent 
of key parties to an additional few weeks after December 10 
in order to reach an acceptable agreement.  There is "more or 
less" an understanding within the EU on the need to be 
flexible and imaginative.  Asked what he meant, the political 
director emphasized the EU's commitment to most principles in 
the Ahtisaari plan.  In private, though, the Ahtisaari plan 
could no longer be viewed as the "absolute Bible" on Kosovo 
(although he was quick to emphasize they wouldn't make that 
point publicly.).  If we go into this 120-day exercise saying 
to Belgrade that there can be no outcome other than Kosovo 
independence, then the 120 days is "useless." 
 
Serbian leadership 
------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C)  Bramao Ramos said it is critical that the U.S. and 
EU continue to deliver clear, unequivocal messages to the 
Serb leadership.  President Tadic "tells us every time to do 
what you have to do" and he will look the other way.  PM 
Kostunica, on the other hand, is more hard-nosed.  When PM 
Kostunica was recently in Lisbon, PM Socrates, FM Amado, and 
Bramao Ramos spent a two-hour lunch telling the Serbian 
leader that he should have no illusions -- independence for 
Kosovo is the end game and there are no alternatives.  He 
should understand that Europe is opening its arms to Serbia, 
but in turn Kostunica must be prepared to be flexible.  This 
inevitability may be sinking in with Kostunica, but so long 
as he believes giving up Kosovo would end his political 
career, he won't budge. 
 
Russia 
------ 
 
¶5.  (C) Portugal, the political director insisted, has been 
forceful in saying to the Russians that they must be part of 
the solution.  For them, Kosovo is a matter of principle and 
precedent and, in opposing independence, they are asserting 
that they are once again a major international player.  There 
is only a slim chance we can bring the Russians on board but 
we have to try, Bramao Ramos urged. 
 
Post-December 10 
---------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  Bramao Ramos was skeptical that any progress will 
have been achieved by December.  The EU will need to move 
 
LISBON 00002046  002 OF 002 
 
 
forward nonetheless at that point and will need a couple of 
additional weeks "to get our act together."  That will be a 
very delicate time, he said, and if we don't do the right 
things, the situation could go very wrong. 
 
¶7.  (C)  The planned ESDP mission is fundamental, and it is 
extremely important it be deployed on the ground alongside 
KFOR, according to Bramao Ramos.  If there is no UN Security 
Council Resolution, however, it is Portugal's view that an 
ESDP mission will be in violation of international law.  "I 
know that is not the U.S. view," he added, noting that he had 
discussed the legal issues in depth with Legal Advisor John 
Bellinger during the latter's visit to Lisbon in late July 
(ref B).  Asked whether this view was shared EU-wide, the 
political director acknowledged a lack of EU consensus on the 
topic.  In any case, the EU will need to be creative.  It is 
critical to get the ESDP mission on the ground as soon as 
possible and, in the absence of a UNSCR, the EU must find 
another legal basis to do so.  We haven't found one yet but 
we will find a way to do it, Bramao Ramos vowed.  There is a 
much stronger coherence within Europe than two months ago on 
the need to "do what we must when we must." 
 
¶8.  (C)  The CDA asked Bramao Ramos to clarify why the EU 
planned to seek several additional weeks beyond December 10. 
Did he understand correctly that the extra time would not be 
used simply to extend negotiations but, rather, to give the 
key players time to develop and implement next steps? 
"Exactly that," Bramao Ramos replied.  There are certain 
steps we cannot take before December 10 because they would 
send the wrong signals and perhaps undermine the 
negotiations.  During the 120 days, we need to be entirely 
focused on trying to reach agreement.  After the 120 days, we 
will be looking at managing a unilateral declaration of 
independence by Kosovo and subsequent recognition by some 
countries (at this point, it is unclear which ones).  If we 
play it well, it would be the endgame in the Balkans for the 
next generation.  He cautioned, though, that independence not 
blessed by the UN would buttress those who support formation 
of a "greater Albania." 
 
EU decision-making 
------------------ 
 
¶9.  (C)  The Charge asked whether the informal Gymnich 
gathering of foreign ministers September 7-8 would endorse an 
EU position on the way forward post-December 10.  The 
ministers at that meeting would certainly take stock of 
developments to that point, the political director replied, 
but they almost certainly will not reach any consensus on 
Kosovo.  The key meeting in that regard -- particularly in 
determining the legal basis for the recognition of 
independence and for the ESDP mission -- would be the 
November General Affairs and External Relations Council 
(GAERC). 
¶10.  (C)  Bramao Ramos reported that FM Amado still hopes to 
travel to Belgrade and Pristina, and is currently looking at 
the end of August.  His message to leaders in both places 
will be that independence is inevitable and that they must 
find a way to make it work. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11.  (C)  We were encouraged that there appears to be a 
consonance of views with Portugal over the way forward, at 
least at the strategic level.  According to Bramao Ramos, 
Portugal's position is that Kosovo independence is 
inevitable, and Lisbon has been delivering that message to 
both the Russian and Serb leadership.  Although Bramao Ramos 
was not prepared to write off the 120-day period, he was not 
optimistic about the chance for a breakthrough.  He appears 
increasingly focused on managing what happens after December 
10, particularly finding a legal basis for individual EU 
members states to recognize Kosovo's independence in the 
absence of a UNSCR and for subsequent deployment of the 
planned ESDP mission. 
 
Ballard