VZCZCXYZ0028
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKG #1250/01 2261917
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 141917Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY KINGSTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5180
INFO RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L KINGSTON 001250 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL/LP BOZZOLO, BROWN, FOR WHA/CAR 
AND FOR DS/IP/WHA AND DS/IP/ITA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2017 
TAGS: SANR PREL ASEC JM
SUBJECT: JAMAICA: CRIME STATISTICS TRENDING IN THE WRONG 
DIRECTION, BUT ONLY MINOR LINKS TO UPCOMING ELECTIONS 
 
REF: KINGSTON 1237 
 
Classified By: NAS Director A.Lewis for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: NAS Director and RSO met with Deputy 
Commissioner of Police Mark Shields on August 3 to discuss 
the current crime statistics and the Jamaica Constabulary 
Forces' preparations to prevent major politically motivated 
violence during the run up to the August 27 election. 
Shields agreed that the crime statistics year-to-date were 
trending in the wrong direction, e.g. murders are up by 6%, 
but remained firm in his belief that the "intelligence-driven 
hot spot" policing which he implemented last year with great 
success was holding the lid on what would otherwise have been 
an even bloodier toll.  In Jamaica's current politically 
charged climate, the papers are labeling every incident as 
"politically motivated," however, Shields disagrees. In his 
view, only a fraction of the violent crimes, such as murder, 
have anything to do with politics.  In Shields' opinion, 
despite a slow start, the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) 
will be ready on election day, and he is pleased with the 
cooperation and collegial atmosphere between the JCF and the 
Jamaica Defense Force (JDF) that will also provide security 
on election day.  End Summary 
 
Preparations by the Security Forces to quell political 
violence 
 
¶2. (C)  Shields was clearly frustrated by the lack of 
preparation island-wide to counter politically motivated 
violence prior to the election and on polling day.  Despite 
the fanfare around an earlier press conference by the Jamaica 
Constabulary Force (Ref A), it wasn't until the Commissioner 
called all the Area Commanders, Assistant and Deputy 
Commissioners of Police to an all-day marathon meeting on 
July 31 to review each area's tactical plans that Shields 
believed that any detailed planning occurred.  He shared with 
us that in some cases, when it seemed that the Area 
Commanders (St. James Parish was one example) were not 
prepared, the Commissioner called the Senior Sergeant from 
the area on the phone to verify that he was aware of the 
plans as outlined by the Area Commander, in most cases the 
Sergeants were not.  It is indicative of general failure of 
management at the JCF, that the Commissioner had to call 
everyone in, wasting an entire day of work time, to ensure 
that tactical planning was done for the election.  In 
addition to the tactical plans developed for each Area 
Command, the JCF intends to man a command center, and its 
Special Branch has promised weekly threat assessments and a 
compilation of any crime deemed by the JCF to be "politically 
motivated."  Shields stated that the threat assessments are 
being prepared but not circulated as widely as he would like; 
however, he has yet to see the tabulation of "political" 
crimes. 
 
¶3. (C) On the "good news" front, Shields did say that the 
Jamaica Defense Force seems well prepared and that 
cooperation between the JCF and JDF is better than it has 
ever been.  The JDF plans to reinforce the JCF and will 
assist in particular with security in 19 constituencies of 
special concern, such as the Mountain View constituencies of 
East St. Andrew and South East St. Andrew where political 
violence has occurred in the past.  Shields told us that in 
these areas, it is his intention to force the JCF to target 
gang leaders and known gunman, something that is not 
currently being done.  He wants the officers to conduct 
regular patrols, conduct street-side searches, and hopefully 
lock the individuals up prior to election day.  It is his 
hope that with this very public show of force, the JCF will 
give members of the community confidence to turn-out on 
election day.  He admitted that he needs to plan the 
operations very carefully to ensure as much as possible that 
they target Opposition and Government areas equally, even 
simultaneously if possible. 
 
Links Between Crime and Politics 
 
¶4. (C) During a discussion on the current crime statistics, 
Shields stated that the press was overstating the links 
between the upcoming election and crime.  For example, since 
July 30, there have been five murders in Jamaica, but only 
one was politically motivated.  However, in at least four of 
the cases, the press found some sort of political link. 
Shields acknowledged that prior to the election, criminals 
took the opportunity to settle grudges, believing that 
politics would be the default excuse.  He is pushing for all 
allegations of political violence to be taken seriously, and 
he will continue to do all he can to increase the separate 
reporting of statistics on all crimes that contain reasonable 
 
links politics. 
 
General Crime Statistics: the trend is in the wrong direction 
 
¶5. (C) Shields admitted that Jamaica's year-to-date crime 
statistics show a disturbing trend in the wrong direction. 
Murders in particular are up nationwide from last year by 6%, 
with gang-related murders up by an alarming 40% vis-a-vis 
last year's statistics.  When you look parish-by-parish, it 
is clear that Shields' "hot spot" police techniques are 
working in some areas; the murder rate in Eastern Kingston, 
for example, is down by 41% over last year's already reduced 
number.  However, parts of the Kingston Corporate area such 
as Western Kingston (up 79%), St. Andrew Central (up 36%) and 
St. Andrew South (up 36%) show that the JCF still has a long 
way to go to quell violent crime.  In the Kingston Corporate 
area's worst locations, listed above, Shields stated that it 
was a combination of inaction by police and gang wars which 
account for the marked increase in murder.  The story is the 
same in the outlying parishes: where there is good local 
management, and committed officers, such as in Manchester and 
Westmoreland, murders are down; where you have poor and/or 
corrupt management, such as in Clarendon, St. Mary and St. 
Elizabeth, the murder rate is up.  Shields stated that were 
it not for a few committed officers, the murder rate would be 
much worse, rather than a 6% overall increase vis-a-vis last 
year, we would see an increase in excess of 10%. 
 
¶6. (C) Comment:  Shields is one of five British police 
officers brought to Jamaica to promote institutional change 
from within the Jamaica Constabulary Force.  His high-profile 
and multiple television appearances in March and April, after 
the death of Pakistan's cricket coach, won him no new friends 
in a force already resentful of his position as Deputy 
Commissioner of Police for Crime.  In addition, the already 
frosty relationship Shields had with the current Commissioner 
of Police, Lucius Thomas, has almost descended into open 
dislike between the two, with Thomas visibly doing all he can 
to block and undermine Shields' efficacy.  It is evident that 
Shields remains frustrated with the utter lack of strategic 
leadership within the JCF.  In the year and a half that he 
has been in Jamaica, he has only been able to nibble at the 
edges and make minor changes in an institution that is rife 
with problems, mismanagement and corruption.  While Jamaica 
has thus far avoided a 1980's style meltdown into massive 
pre-election killing, the JCF's inability to plan and manage 
its limited resources effectively will remain a problem as 
long as there is not fundamental change within its leadership 
core.  Squeaking by during this election season shouldn't be 
good enough.  End Comment 
JOHNSON