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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 001597 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO F0R POLAD 
DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI VE
SUBJECT: JEFE SUPREMO: HUGO CHAVEZ'S PERSONALITY CULT 
 
CARACAS 00001597  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR DANIEL LAWTON, 
REASON 1.4 (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  President Chavez and his supporters are 
devoting considerable resources to construct a cult of 
personality for the Venezuelan president (see Embassy Caracas 
website on Siprnet for accompanying photo essay).  Flattering 
images of the Venezuelan president dominate government 
buildings, public works, and government-run media.  Chavez 
typically appears on all local, non-subscription TV and radio 
stations on average three times a week to deliver lengthy 
speeches, in addition to hosting his "Alo, Presidente" talk 
show on state-run TV most Sunday afternoons.  Chavez is ever 
trying to position himself in the public's mind as the 
political descendant of Venezuelan founder Simon Bolivar as 
well as the living embodiment of the "will of the people." 
Jetting the globe bearing lucre, Chavez is also endeavoring 
to assume Fidel Castro's international mantle as an 
anti-American leader.  Chavez' outsized personality cult is a 
formidable political tool, but also appears to contribute to 
Chavez' alternating overconfidence and thin-skinned 
narcissism.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------- 
Here, There, and Everywhere 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) President Chavez has long relied on his personal 
charisma and popular image to secure broad political support. 
 Over the last several months, he and his Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela (BRV) government have devoted even more energy 
and resources to cultivating the Venezuelan president's cult 
of personality.  Flattering and "heroic" images of Chavez 
dominate government buildings, public works, and 
pro-government media.  For example, the BRV's tax authority 
headquarters (SENIAT) in Caracas displays an eight-story 
building-wide photo of Chavez hugging a small boy.  The 
prevailing gold standard for pro-Chavez officials is to run 
billboards, TV spots, and newspaper ads showing pictures of 
themselves next to the Venezuelan president. 
 
¶3. (C) Chavez memorabilia is a staple at many informal 
Venezuelan street markets.  The 25-inch tall Hugo Chavez 
action figure depicts the Venezuelan president in either his 
military uniform or in his trademark red short-sleeved shirt; 
a button triggers the broadcast of a brief recording of 
Chavez speaking to a cheering crowd.  Chavez wrist watches 
feature both the Venezuelan leader in military uniform or in 
a business suit adorned with the presidential sash. 
Innumerable varieties of Chavez T-shirts are also available 
at street markets, as well as posters, statuettes, key 
chains, and other "revolutionary" souvenirs. 
 
----------------------- 
Chavez on Every Channel 
----------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Chavez delivers televised speeches on average three 
times a week, and most of his speeches last a minimum of 
three hours.  Venezuelan law requires all non-subscription TV 
and radio stations, including those privately owned, to air 
Chavez's speeches and other government broadcasts whenever 
the BRV requests.  There have been over 1500 BRV-mandated 
broadcasts of Chavez' speeches since 1999, according to 
Reporters Without Borders.  Minister of Popular Power for 
Communications and Information William Lara announced July 17 
that the BRV plans to require local cable networks to air 
BRV-mandated broadcasts, including Chavez speeches. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In addition, seven government-controlled television 
stations, as well as many more community TV channels and 
local radio stations, cheerlead for the Venezuelan president, 
his closest supporters, and his policies.  Chavez also hosts 
his trademark several-hours long talk show, "Alo, 
Presidente," most Sundays on a government network.  Chavez 
experimented some months ago with moving a shorter version of 
his show to prime time during the work week, but subsequently 
returned to his original Sunday afternoon time slot and 
format.  The Venezuelan President has broadcast 289 editions 
of "Alo, Presidente" since beginning the broadcasts in 1999. 
His August 5th broadcast lasted a record eight hours. 
 
----------- 
Myth-Making 
----------- 
 
¶6. (C) Chavez and his supporters are also working hard to 
promote politically attractive myths about Chavez' rise to 
power.  Anzoaetegui Governor Tarek William Saab, a staunch 
Chavez supporter, has dedicated some USD 500,000 to build a 
plaza and scenic overlook in honor of Chavez.  The plaza is 
on the hill in the small village of San Mateo where Chavez 
claims he and a handful of other military personnel first 
formed a clandestine "People's Army" in 1977.  Chavez is 
expected to attend the inauguration of the plaza in November 
to commemorate the 30th anniversary of his determination to 
"remake" Venezuela.  Chavez's hillside pledge conveniently 
mirrors Simon Bolivar's claim that while reflecting on a 
hilltop in Rome, he vowed to secure Latin America's 
independence from Spain. 
 
¶7. (C) Chavez personally led many of the BRV's well-funded 
events to commemorate the fifth anniversary of the April 11, 
2002 interregnum.  Chavez and the BRV devoted considerable 
air time to promote an "official" history of the short-lived 
coup, claiming that Chavez never resigned from office but 
agreed to be detained by military officers to prevent 
bloodshed.  At his April 13 mass rally, Chavez blamed the 
April 11-13, 2002 events on the United States and called 
those days Venezuela's "Bay of Pigs".  Similarly, Chavez led 
the BRV's overblown efforts in February to memorialize the 
failed coup attempt that he led on February 4, 1992 as well 
as the February 27, 1989 "Caracazo" rioting that helped 
discredit Venezuela's traditional political parties. 
 
--------------- 
Chavez = People 
--------------- 
 
¶8. (C) The presumption of Chavez and his supporters that 
Chavez speaks for the Venezuelan people is a cornerstone of 
the leader's personality cult.  The Venezuelan president 
sprinkles his stump speeches with assertions that only he can 
protect the Venezuelan people from domestic "oligarchs" and 
the "empire" (United States) and feigns fatigue over the 
"burden" of power.  By this same logic, he dismisses his 
critics as "traitors" or "lackeys" of the United States. 
Chavez repeatedly weaves in anecdotes from his childhood on 
the rural plains of Barinas and early military career in his 
speeches to underscore that he is "one of the people" (and 
not a long-serving and ever more powerful sitting president). 
 
¶9. (C) Chavez exploits his self-identification as the 
embodiment of the people to justify many of his most 
controversial and anti-democratic measures.  Defending his 
proposal to amend the 1999 Constitution to eliminate 
presidential term limits, Chavez repeatedly claims "the 
people want it" (public opinion polls show a majority 
oppose).  He cautioned small, allied parties questioning 
Chavez's effort to forge a single pro-government party that 
the votes they received in the December 2006 presidential 
election were not for them, but "for Chavez."  Chavez said 
taking the popular, private Radio Caracas TV network off the 
non-subscription airwaves in May and replacing it with TVes, 
a state-funded station, would better serve the people (TVes' 
low ratings indicate otherwise). 
 
------------------ 
Move Over, Bolivar 
------------------ 
 
¶10. (SBU) Pictures of Venezuela's independence hero Simon 
Bolivar have traditionally dominated government offices, but 
Chavez portraits are starting to compete with, and even 
supplant, depictions of "The Liberator" in officialdom.  Most 
notably, Chavez swore in his new cabinet in January in front 
of an enormous picture of himself, instead of the traditional 
portrait of Bolivar.  At the same time, Chavez continues to 
stake exclusive claim to the political legacy of Bolivar, 
quoting frequently -- and very selectively -- from the 
speeches and writings of Venezuela's greatest national hero 
to try to attach historical legitimacy to his own ill-defined 
"Bolivarian revolution." 
 
¶11. (SBU) As Chavez radicalizes his own domestic agenda, he 
continues to manipulate history further to claim that Bolivar 
was a proto-socialist.  In addition, Chavez shrouds his 
proposal to eliminate presidential term limits with the 
historical aura of Venezuela's founder.  Chavez began his 
second six-year term of office after being re-elected in 
December 2006, but he openly talks about remaining president 
until 2021, Venezuela's bicentennial, or 2030, the 200th 
anniversary of Bolivar's death. 
 
------------- 
Castro's Heir 
------------- 
 
¶12. (C) By dint of a heavy travel schedule and foreign 
assistance pledges (many of which go unfulfilled), Chavez is 
making considerable efforts to export his personality cult. 
Over the last year, he visited the ailing Fidel Castro 
several times, trying to position himself internationally as 
Castro's heir.  Burnishing his anti-American credentials, the 
Venezuelan president led efforts to forge close ties with 
Iran, Syria, Belarus, and Russia.  In Latin America, 
particularly in Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Ecuador, he actively 
promoted his "Bolivarian revolution" and ALBA integration 
plan as a substitute model of development for "savage 
capitalism." 
 
¶13. (C) While Chavez basks in the international limelight, he 
also overreaches and makes mistakes.  Chavez went on a March 
8-13 "shadow tour" to Argentina, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Haiti, 
and Jamaica in an unsuccessful effort to upstage President 
Bush's March 8-14 visit to Latin America.  Chavez's infamous 
"Bush is the devil" speech at the September 2006 UNGA grabbed 
international attention but undermined the BRV's efforts to 
secure a UN Security Council seat, an international stage 
that Chavez very much coveted. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶14. (C) So far, Chavez has not erected statues of himself or 
put his visage on Venezuelan stamps and currency, but it may 
only be a matter of time.  At a minimum, Chavez and his 
supporters can be expected to use the Hugo Chavez personality 
cult for political advantage.  Chavez is already framing the 
upcoming battle over rewriting the constitution as a vote for 
or against him, thus shrouding the controversial content of 
the proposed changes.  But at the same time, Chavez 
increasingly appears to be making the mistake of believing 
his own propaganda, making him even more thin-skinned and 
narcissistic.  Chavez, for example, seems to crave public 
confrontation with senior USG officials and spends an 
enormous amount of time defining and justifying himself in 
opposition to the USG.  Ignoring Chavez and/or re-framing 
Chavez' personal insults with well-reasoned defenses of 
democracy and free enterprise continues to pay dividends. 
The high road consistently denies Chavez the international 
attention and validation he seeks. 
 
FRENCH