VZCZCXRO1090
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBM #0978 2391452
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271452Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7204
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0145

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUCHAREST 000978 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SCE AND EUR NCE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EU KV NATO YI RO
SUBJECT: ROMANIA ON KOSOVO NEXT STEPS 
 
REF: STATE 109526 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Jennifer Bonner for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary:  Romania's Kosovo policy is largely driven 
from the top, especially by President Basescu's office which 
continues to adhere to the view that no solution can be 
imposed on Belgrade and Pristina without damaging the 
fundamental OSCE principles of territorial integrity. 
Romanians also argue against the implied preeminence of 
collective minority rights over the state's responsibility to 
protect individual rights in Kosovo.  MFA lawyers reportedly 
were tasked with conducting a legal review of Basescu's 
cautionary position on Kosovo and have concurred his position 
was in fact legally correct and sound, including his concerns 
about the risk of setting a negative precedent under 
international law.  The MFA Director General for European 
Affairs told us he would like to see direct negotiations 
between Belgrade and Pristina, without international 
"middlemen" in order to give the two sides a chance to find 
common ground. He noted that even with a unilateral Kosovar 
declaration of independence, there can be no seat in the UN 
without Russia's concurrence.  He compared independence 
without Russia's concurrence to the situation facing Taiwan, 
with Kosovars gaining all of the attributes of statehood, but 
without the ultimate legitimacy conferred by UN membership. 
End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C)  Charge presented reftel points to MFA State Secretary 
(Deputy Foreign Minister equivalent) Adrian Verita on August 
9, and Poloffs followed up with MFA Director General for 
European Affairs Razvan Rusu on August 23.  Verita confirmed 
that President Basescu drove the policy on Kosovo.  Vierita 
noted that he had commissioned the MFA's legal department to 
review Basescu's cautionary position on Kosovo, especially in 
terms of its potential to set a negative precedent under 
international law with regards to the principle of 
territorial integrity and self-determination.  MFA lawyers 
had concluded that Basescu's position was legally correct and 
sound. Vierita also reported that he had heard that the 
Italians were playing with some new recipes for "improving" 
Ahtisaari's recommendations (NFI). 
 
¶3. (C)  In a follow-up meeting with Poloffs, MFA DG for 
Europe Razvan Rusu said that Belgrade has complained that the 
Contact Group has been discouraging face-to-face negotiations 
between Belgrade and Pristina.  He said that the MFA's 
assessment is that the Kosovar Albanians might be willing to 
show more flexibility if they could simply engage directly 
with Belgrade and discuss the range of options for 
substantial autonomy or even confederation along the same 
lines as Serbia and Montenegro.  He mused that these half-way 
steps might be palatable to the Kosovar Albanians if they 
were seen as irreversible.  Referencing the fundamental OSCE 
principles of territorial integrity, Rusu argued that 
collective minority rights could not take precedence over a 
state's obligation to protect individual rights in Kosovo. 
 
¶4. (C)  Rusu noted that even if Kosovo were to declare 
independence unilaterally -- and with most of Europe 
recognizing Kosovo -- it is unlikely that Moscow would be 
willing to agree to UN membership for Kosovo.  This would 
leave Kosovo in a situation akin to Taiwan, where it would 
have all of the attributes of nationhood minus the legitimacy 
conferred by UN membership.  He questioned whether Pristina 
would be willing to go the "Taiwan route."  In closing, Rusu 
agreed that there would be little likelihood of any 
substantive change by December.  He added that NATO and EU 
Allies will need to be attentive to coordinating their 
responses to the situation at that time, and stressed that 
Alliance (and EU) solidarity was paramount in order to deny 
Moscow the opportunity to exploit any fissures. 
TAPLIN