VZCZCXRO9340
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHKB #1072/01 2361352
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241352Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3776
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 001072 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2017 
TAGS: ENRG ETRN PBTS PGOV PREL IR AJ
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR PROVIDES 
READOUT ON IRANIAN PRESIDENT AHMADINEJAD'S VISIT TO BAKU 
 
REF: A. STATE 98631 
     ¶B. BAKU 1017 
     ¶C. BAKU 1052 
 
BAKU 00001072  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  According to Presidential Foreign Policy 
Advisor Novruz Mammadov, Iranian President Ahmadinejad sought 
to use his August 21-22 visit to Baku to counter his 
international isolation.  Mammadov said the visit - including 
four new bilateral agreements and a joint declaration - 
served Azerbaijan's economic and cross-border interests. 
Ahmadinejad sought to play a larger role in the resolution of 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and proposed that Azerbaijan 
and Iran cooperate on the transportation of Turkmen gas, 
initiatives Mammadov said the Government of Azerbaijan (GOAJ) 
rejected as not in accordance with Azerbaijan's strategic 
interests.  With regard to Iran's nuclear programs, Mammadov 
said that President Aliyev had urged Ahmadinejad that "we 
must act in conformity with the international community if we 
want peace, security, and prosperity in the region."  Deputy 
Transport Minister Musa Pahanov separately downplayed the 
importance of two of the transportation agreements, noting 
that key details remained to be resolved and, until the 
Nagorno-Karabakh issues is solved, Azerbaijan has no choice 
but to work with Iran on these issues.  Ahmadinejad's visit 
was in keeping with the overall bilateral relationship: 
low-key and focused on pragmatic border issues, with the 
Azerbaijanis resisting Iranian political and energy 
overtures.  End Summary. 
 
Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Mammadov on the Visit 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶2.  (C) On August 24, Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor 
Novruz Mammadov provided the Ambassador with a read out of 
Iranian President Ahmadinejad's August 21-22 visit to Baku, 
noting that he had no information to share from the 
Presidents' tete-a-tete.  Characterizing the visit as 
"satisfactory and important," Mammadov said that the visit 
went well for both countries.  Mammadov said that Ahmadinejad 
was seeking any opportunity to make foreign visits "given the 
situation he is in," referring to Iran's increasing political 
isolation and that was the main goal of his visit to 
Azerbaijan.  Outlining Iran's repeated requests for an 
official visit - in March, May, and again in June - Mammadov 
said that it was impossible for Azerbaijan to keep turning 
down the Iranian requests.  Characterizing Azerbaijan's 
relationship with its larger neighbor as "complicated" and 
pointing out that "Iran plays a great role in Azerbaijan," 
Mammadov said that he was pleased with the five agreements 
signed during the visit.  Mammadov said that Azerbaijan was 
interested in all of the five agreements - a joint 
declaration reflecting on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
(emailed to NEA/IR and EUR/CARC separately) and four MOUs 
dealing with "minor economic issues and Nakhchivan" - because 
they "served our purposes." 
 
¶3.  (C) Mammadov described the Iranian position during the 
visit as "very simple and straightforward."  According to 
Mammadov, Ahmadinejad stressed that Iran was interested in 
peace, security, and stability in the region, "acting as if 
he was looking for partners in this."  In response, Mammadov 
said that President Aliyev brought up Azerbaijan's position 
on the Iranian nuclear program, with Aliyev telling 
Ahmadinejad that "we must act in conformity with the 
international community if we want peace, security, and 
prosperity in the region." 
 
¶4.  (C) According to Mammadov, Ahmadinejad wanted greater 
cooperation in the energy sector, suggesting that moving 
Turkmen natural gas through Iran and Azerbaijan in order to 
reach world markets would be "very lucrative" for both 
countries.  While not surprised by Ahmadinejad's interest in 
greater energy cooperation, Mammadov was struck that 
Ahmadinejad had presented this proposal "in a more concrete 
way," something Mammadov attributed to interest from the 
Turkmen side.  Mammadov said that Ahmadinejad had "close 
relations" with Turkmenistan's President, adding that this 
was "evident from his remarks."  Mammadov told the Ambassador 
"I think it is important for us all - the EU, US, and Turkey 
- to continue working with Turkmenistan due to the great 
potential and opportunities located there, and to counter 
Iranian influence.  Mammadov sai, "Azerbaijan did not 
respond" to Ahmadinejad's rquest because "they remained 
political ideas haning in the air" and "we (Azerbaijan) 
 
BAKU 00001072  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
understand accepting this would undermine the strategic 
choice we've made." 
 
¶5.  (C) Mammadov said that Ahmadinejad demonstrated "an 
active position" on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, indicating 
a clear desire to become more involved in the issue. 
Although the Azerbaijani side was not surprised by this 
overture from the Iranians because Iran had previously made 
several similar proposals, Mammadov was surprised that Iran's 
expression of interest "was presented so openly and clearly 
at the presidential level."  Telling the Azerbaijanis that 
the West will never help Azerbaijan resolve the problem, Iran 
claimed that it could be more efficient than the OSCE because 
it had good relations with Armenia.  Characterizing the 
Iranian proposal as "bad" because it contradicting 
Azerbaijan's strategic interests, Mammadov said that 
President Aliyev told Ahmadinejad that he was hopeful that 
Nagorno-Karabakh could be resolved within the international 
framework, adding that while additional initiatives were not 
welcome, assistance was.  Commenting that Iran knows that 
resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is Azerbaijan's top 
foreign policy objective, Mammadov said that he believed the 
Iranians were simply "using it for maneuvering - we will not 
accept their overtures." 
 
¶6.  (C) Mammadov said that Ahmadinejad did not show much 
interest in the Qabala radar station in any of the meetings 
that Mammadov attended, but noted that he was not in the two 
Presidents' one-on-one meeting.  Concerning the upcoming 
Summit of Caspian Littoral Heads of State, Mammadov said that 
President Aliyev does not wish to attend, but would feel 
obliged to if the other heads of state did.  According to 
Mammadov, Ahmadinejad told Aliyev that the other heads of 
state had agreed to attend, including the President of 
Kazakhstan.  However, Mammadov maintained no firm date or 
place had been decided.  While acknowledging that discussions 
had taken place concerning the visa regime between the two 
countries, Mammadov said that no agreement had been reached 
and "we want to keep it that way." 
 
Most Agreements Related to Transportation 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) As reported reftel, several of the agreements signed 
during the visit focused on transportation.  Deputy 
Transportation Minister Musa Panahov, who negotiated the 
transportation agreements with the Islamic Republic of Iran 
(IRI), characterized the two Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) 
as "very beneficial for Azerbaijan."  Under the first 
agreement, the GOAJ and the IRI agreed to construct a new 
bridge at the Culfa border crossing.  Panahov said that 
the current bridge has severe structural damage and is 
unusable.  Under the MOU, the Iranians agreed to finance 
design costs; the two governments will share construction 
costs "50-50."  Under the second MOU, the two governments 
agreed to open a passenger bus service between the 
Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan and Baku.  Panahov 
stressed that the MOU was an expression of intent only, 
adding that it did not address any of the key operational 
details such as the route or visa requirements.  Under the 
MOU, the two sides agreed to work out these details over 
the next two months.  Panahov was skeptical that they would 
be able to do so, noting that the visa questions were 
especially problematic. 
 
¶8.  (C) Panahov dismissed press reports of a new north-south 
railroad agreement as an exaggeration.  The 
Iranians made a surprise proposal during the visit to link 
the Iranian city of Kazvin with the Azerbaijani city of 
Astara, Panahov said, adding that this stretch of railroad is 
the missing link in the Iranian-Russian plan to build a 
north-south corridor to the Persian Gulf.  Panahov said the 
GOAJ agreed to consider the proposal if the Iranians would 
build the stretch between the Iranian cities of Kazvin and 
Rasht; Azerbaijan would then build the stretch between 
Astara and Rasht.  Panahov was skeptical that the Iranian 
Government would agree to these terms. He also noted that, 
from Azerbaijan's perspective, the IRI's proposed north-south 
corridor would soon be made irrelevant by the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad, which will reach the 
Mediterranean Sea in a much shorter distance. 
 
¶9.  (C) Panahov was skeptical of Iran's overall intentions 
toward Azerbaijan, pointedly noting that Iran is one of 
Armenia's largest trading partners.  Referring to 
Nakhchivan's isolation between Armenia and 
 
BAKU 00001072  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Armenian-occupied territories, Panahov commented that 
"Nakhchivan is our biggest transportation problem, and we 
have to find ways to provide services to Nakhchivan."  Until 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is resolved, he said 
that Azerbaijan has no choice but to work with Iran on these 
issues. 
 
Local Analysts Downplay Visit's Significance 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Political analysts still are digesting the substance 
of the visit.  Local political commentator 
Ilgar Mammadov told us the visit was not very important, 
downplaying the substance of the five agreements 
(four memorandums; one joint declaration).  He characterized 
the four memorandums on transportation 
and economic cooperation as part of normal state-to-state 
interaction.  Asked about the broader joint declaration, 
Mammadov argued that this was a typical Soviet-style 
agreement.  Mammadov speculated that if there was a more 
important private deal reached during the visit, it likely 
would involve Iran making concessions on Caspian 
delimitation in exchange for Azerbaijan not supporting any 
U.S. attempts in the UN to further sanction Iran. 
Despite Mammadov's assertion that no date had been agreed, 
President Ahmadinejad announced on August 22 that the 
next meeting of Caspian littoral states will be in Tehran on 
October 18  He also announced that all five Caspian 
leaders have confirmed their participation.  Respected 
commentator Rasim Musabayov also argued that the visit 
probably lacked substance, given the limited importance of 
the public agreements.  Musabayov observed that the 
visit was part of President Ahamadinejad's broader effort to 
reach out to a variety of countries.  Musabayov, too, 
speculated that Ahmadinejad may have leaned on Aliyev not to 
support any further attempts by the U.S. to sanction 
Iran through the UN. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11.  (C) Based on Mammadov's readout and press coverage of 
the visit, it appears that the GOAJ lived up to its 
promises that it would keep Ahmadinejad's visit low-profile. 
In general, the visit was in keeping with 
Azerbaijan's complex relationship with Iran.  While the GOAJ 
has a real need to work out daily border and 
transportation issues with its much larger neighbor, it is 
rightfully wary of Iranian attempts to meddle in 
Azerbaijan's internal affairs or regional developments of 
critical importance, such as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
or energy security.  Mammadov in his readout underscored the 
point that closer energy or Nagorno-Karabakh 
cooperation with Iran would undermine Azerbaijan's "strategic 
choice."  We are encouraged that President 
Aliyev engaged President Ahmadinejad on Iran's nuclear 
program, pointing out to his guest that working with the 
international community was critical to ending the impasse. 
We have requested meetings with Foreign Minister 
Mammadyarov and President Aliyev to gain further perspective. 
DERSE