VZCZCXRO7302
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTH #1619 2221446
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 101446Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WSHDC PRIORITY 9919
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITCAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 001619 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV GR KV SR
SUBJECT: FURTHER GREEK VIEWS ON KOSOVO NEXT STEPS 
 
REF: A) ATHENS 1609 B) STATE 109526 
 
Classified By: CDA TOM COUNTRYMAN.  REASON:  1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY AND COMMENT:  In an August 10 introductory 
call on new MFA Secretary General Agathocles, Charge reviewed 
ref B points on Kosovo next steps.  Agathocles reiterated the 
long-standing Greek concern regarding the legal basis for any 
future status decision.  He also shared two ideas (which he 
characterized as rumors):  a "Montenegro" option along the 
lines crafted by EU Foreign Policy rep Solana several years 
ago, and a confederal formula.  Charge underscored that the 
U.S. would agree to any solution agreed to by the parties. 
However, in our view, supervised independence as envisaged by 
Ahtisaari remained the best proposal; it was essential for 
the international community to be prepared to act should 
there be no progress by December.  Comment: Agathocles's 
"rumors" likely represent Greek wishful thinking.  At the 
same time, Agathocles clearly implied that the "Montenegro 
option" had received some official consideration -- though 
whether by selected Serbian officials or EU authorities was 
unclear.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Charge reviewed ref B points on Kosovo next steps 
(which he had already discussed August 9 in a meeting with PM 
Karmanlis's diplomatic advisor, ref A).  Charge underscored 
that the U.S. looked forward to progress in the additional 
period of intensified discussions available to the parties. 
At the same time, we and our allies must be prepared for the 
possibility that, in December, we are faced with the status 
quo.  In our view, we would need to find another way to move 
to supervised independence as envisaged in the Ahtisaari 
plan.  At the same time, we wanted to assure our allies that 
the United States remained fully committed to KFOR; we looked 
to other substantial contributors, such as Greece, for a 
similar commitment. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Agathocles believed the primary obstacle, for the 
EU, was the lack of a legal basis for supervised independence 
should negotiations between the parties fail.  Without a 
legal basis, it would be difficult for Greece (and others) to 
recognize a unilateral declaration of independence. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Agathocles told Charge he had heard two "rumors" 
recently.  The first (which he suggested came from 
"semi-official" sources) was that Western nations might be 
prepared to accept a "Montenegro" solution for Kosovo.  While 
this had been relayed in a hush-hush manner, Agathocles noted 
wryly that, two days later, Kostunica had publicly rejected 
such a strategy.  The second (un-sourced) rumor was that 
"someone" had explored with various Kosovar factions the 
possibility of accepting a form of confederation with the 
Serbs.  While some Kosovar politicians had reportedly 
rejected this out of hand, others had been prepared to 
consider it provided a date for referendum was set and the 
ultimate right to independence provided for.  Agathocles 
suggested that, in his view, these two ideas might offer a 
productive way out of the current dilemma.  But making 
independence a precondition for the current negotiations gave 
the participants very little maneuverability. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Charge responded that, in principle, the U.S. would 
support whatever solution the two parties agreed to.  But all 
of us needed to consider the question of what course we would 
take in December in order to preserve stability in Kosovo and 
the region.  The U.S. was not seeking to dictate the process; 
we were working closely with the Contact Group.  Agathocles 
argued that Serbia needed to find a solution that would allow 
them to postpone a final decision on the Kosovo issue for 
several years.  A solution along the lines of that crafted by 
EU Foreign Policy rep Solana for Montenegro would allow 
Serbia time to deepen its relationship with the EU and 
improve its economy.  That would, in his view, ultimately 
make Kosovo less problematic to solve. 
COUNTRYMAN