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FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3579
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEUITH/TLO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002234 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2022 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH PRESIDENT GUL:  RISKS, CHALLENGES, 
OPPORTUNITIES 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 2223 
     ¶B. ANKARA 2213 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Abdullah Gul comes to office as Turkey's 
president already experienced on the international scene. 
His victory is one of personal and political tenacity; many 
had written him off after the military's e-memorandum 
derailed the attempt to elect him president in April. 
Looking ahead, Gul's greatest challenges will lie at home, 
where he must consolidate his leadership, especially with a 
highly skeptical military, in order to pursue his agenda of 
normalization and moderation.   End summary. 
 
From the Jaws of Defeat and Crisis 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) One has to blink twice to be sure it really happened. 
Abdullah Gul's August 28 election and installation as 
Turkey's 11th president mark a victory for his Justice and 
Development Party (AKP), and for grit and determination in 
Turkish politics.  It is also an amazing personal victory for 
Gul himself, snatched from the jaws of crisis, defeat and 
humiliation last April when many here wrote him off.  It was 
widely thought that PM Erdogan would eventually opt for a 
"consensus" candidate for president.  There was even talk 
that a dispirited Gul would resign from politics rather that 
reprise his role as foreign minister.  But just as he 
insisted on his presidential candidacy in April if it was not 
to be Erdogan, so he insisted upon it again now ... and won. 
 
¶3. (C) In hindsight, Gul appears to have maintained his 
resolve throughout:  For much of the general election 
campaign, Gul was paired with Erdogan as a star attraction. 
The undemocratic interruption of the presidential election 
was an AKP campaign centerpiece.  Gul personified AKP 
determination to stand up to the Turkish General Staff (TGS) 
and overcame a concerted military/Republican People's Party 
(CHP) assault on democracy and representative political 
institutions.  Despite the old elite's efforts to define the 
debate as secularism versus Sharia, Gul (and AKP) 
successfully framed the issue as one of democracy and 
stability versus militarism and the past. 
 
Who is Abdullah Gul? 
-------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Prior to entering national politics, Gul earned 
degrees in economics from Istanbul University and studied in 
the UK. He taught university-level economics in the early 
1980s and gained international experience as an economist for 
the Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah from 1983-1991.  First 
elected an MP in 1991 with Necmettin Erbakan's pro-Islam 
Welfare Party, he was re-elected in 1995, and served as state 
minister and government spokesman in Erbakan's short-lived 
government.  One of AKP's founding members in August 2001, 
Gul has been both Erdogan's closest political partner and 
rival.  His humble family origins and energetic rise in 
politics reflect the entrepreneurial spirit of his central 
Anatolian hometown, Kayseri.  Gul is personable and 
understands how to talk about things in a way he thinks will 
get listened to. 
 
¶5. (C) Gul's brief stint as prime minister -- from December 
2002 until March 2003 when Erdogan took over the AKP 
government reins -- faltered when he miscalculated the March 
1 vote to authorize a US invasion of Iraq from the north. 
Since then, as foreign minister, Gul has generally valued his 
relationship with the US, worked hard to communicate 
regularly and built an effective partnership with Secretary 
Rice.  He has been a leading proponent of the political 
reforms needed to pursue EU accession, the case for which his 
August 28 inaugural remarks reasserted.  When thorny issues 
have arisen over the past four years, Gul has approached them 
calmly and pragmatically, at times in stark contrast to PM 
Erdogan's more off-the-cuff, emotional style.  But he can 
deliver the tough messages, too.  He sees himself as a 
problem solver. 
 
And What Does He Bring to the Presidency? 
----------------------------------------- 
 
 
ANKARA 00002234  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶6. (C) Gul brings to the presidency a good international 
reputation, including friendships and acquaintances with a 
wide range of world leaders.  He brings English language 
skills that his predecessor and Erdogan himself have lacked, 
an activist inclination, and the support of the government 
(which his predecessor also lacked).  President Gul will act 
more like Turgut Ozal or Suleyman Demirel on the world stage 
and back stage at home.  His world role will bolster his 
credibility and help protect himself vis-a-vis secularists, 
the military and others who do not wish him well.  He will 
supplement and work in tandem with Erdogan; in some cases, he 
may eclipse his friend the PM. 
 
¶7. (C) On issues that matter to the US, Gul will be an 
important partner.  He wants to be helpful on Iraq, a 
portfolio on which he was active as FM.  He will likely 
extend the invitation to Iraqi President Talabani that 
predecessor refused to provide.  Gul has made clear his 
personal interest in helping broker Middle East peace, and 
his associations in the region and status as a pro-US 
president can be positive factors; he will look to the US for 
guidance.   One of Gul's early forays is likely to be to 
Islamabad.  Gul has also been helpful on the Iran nuclear 
issue, and his new presidential status may give him new 
opportunities in this effort, as well.  To be most effective, 
his relationship with his just-announced successor as FM, Ali 
Babacan, will be key. 
 
¶8. (C) The domestic side will be more of a tightrope as Gul 
seeks -- in a still contentious atmosphere -- to help 
normalize Turkey and Turkish life, including on issues like 
the role and status of religion (Islam, but Christianity as 
well); Turkey's diversity and minorities (including Kurds); 
the role of the military and proper civil-military relations; 
and the judiciary and judicial reform, which is key to 
strengthening the rule of law in this country.  Any one of 
these sets of issues is problematic; in combination, they are 
a big challenge and potentially dangerous for Gul and for 
Turkey's future. 
 
¶9. (C) Gul's new role as part of Turkey's national security 
triumvirate will be key.  The president can be an influential 
player, along with the National Security Council and the TGS. 
 President Demirel played this behind-the-scenes role well; 
President Sezer did not.  Gul's first challenge will be to 
consolidate his leadership, especially with the military. 
The TGS boycott of his swearing-in, virtually an act of 
insubordination, was a bad start, as was CHOD Buyukanit's 
strongly-worded Victory Day statement (ref B) a day before 
the final round of presidential voting.  The next test will 
come at the August 30 Victory Day ceremonies.  As foreign 
minister, Gul enjoyed a respectful relationship with the 
military, but it will not be easy to overcome the TGS 
revulsion with what it regards as an Islamist in the 
presidential palace. 
 
¶10. (C) The new president, who now lacks the parliamentary 
immunity he enjoyed for years, may also confront judicial 
challenges, particularly from prickly secularist prosecutors. 
 He will need to re-calibrate his relationship with PM 
Erdogan and balance fulfillment of his transformational 
ambitions for Turkey with the need to avoid a harsh reaction 
from the secularist street, the military and Kemalist 
hard-liners who could still bring the reform Turkey project 
crashing down. 
 
¶11. (C) Gul, Erdogan and to some extent Turkey as a whole 
have taken an enormous risk with a Gul presidency.  But 
progress rarely comes without risk.  Gul's rise represents a 
watershed.  The opportunity is in the new president and AKP's 
hands to move toward the more equal and tolerant society 
Gul,s inaugural remarks called for and toward the final end 
of the "deep state."  If the reformers succeed, their success 
will belong to them and the Turkish people.  Failure will 
rest on their shoulders alone. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ 
 
WILSON