VZCZCXRO9854
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #2085 2261525
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141525Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3391
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0344
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0051
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 0068
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 0048
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 0121
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2479
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002085 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2017 
TAGS: EU PGOV PREL KV YI UN
SUBJECT: TURKEY VIEWS KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE AS INEVITABLE 
 
REF: A. STATE 109526 
 
     ¶B. ANKARA 1938 
     ¶C. STATE 102187 
 
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Kelly Degnan for Reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) We delivered REF A points to MFA Deputy Director 
General for the Balkans and Western Europe Hasan Asan.  Asan 
reiterated that Turkey remains committed to resolving 
Kosovo's final status and acknowledged that Kosovo 
independence is inevitable.  Furthermore, Turkey strongly 
supports the principles behind the Ahtissari plan as the 
foundation for contniued Contact Group negotiations.  Asan 
assured us that GOT policy on Kosovo closely parallels that 
of the U.S. and EU.  However, recent Russian behavior in the 
UNSC and the discussion of Kosovo independence outside a 
UNSCR has left Turkey hesitant to get politically ahead of 
the U.S. and EU (REF B). 
 
¶2.  (C) Asan said the GOT has utilized every opportunity to 
engage Pristina and Belgrade on this issue.  During several 
meetings with Kosovo PM Ceku, Asan reported that PM Erdogan 
has repeatedly advocated patience and faith in the UN 
process.  Ceku assured Erdogan that the Kosovars would not 
consider pushing for independence until after Flag Day, 
November 28.  Asan warned that comments regarding 
partitioning, like those made by EU Representative to the 
Troika German Ambassador Wolfgang Ichinger in Pristina, would 
further exacerbate an already tenuous situation. 
 
¶3.  (C) Should Kosovo unilaterally declare independence, 
Turkey will not be one of the first countries to extend 
formal support. Nevertheless, Asan and other officials have 
assured us that, once the lead nations have taken the brunt 
of the backlash from Serbia and Russia, the GOT will 
inevitably extend full diplomatic recognition.  Domestically, 
GOT support for Kosovo's independence cuts across party 
lines.  The several million Turks of Albanian descent 
constitute a sizable voting bloc that every party, including 
the ruling AKP, readily acknowledges.  The political will 
exists to support Kosovo independence, but political resolve 
to face the repercussions of a leadership role remains weak. 
Asan emphasized the importance of a unified EU position in 
Turkey's decision making rubric.  Should the EU as a whole 
join the U.S. and UK in supporting a unilateral declaration 
of independence, Turkey will rapidly follow. 
 
¶4.  (C) Turkey is an active participant in the NATO-led 
Kosovo Force and will remain so after independence, 
regardless of the means.  Asan reiterated Turkey's desire to 
play a key role in any post-independence international 
civilian oversight body, construct or lead agency 
notwithstanding.  Turkey has productively participated in 
similar institutions in Bosnia and believes it could make a 
useful contribution in Kosovo as well. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ 
 
MCELDOWNEY