VZCZCXRO8006
PP RUEHDE
DE RUEHAD #1292/01 2131304
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 011304Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9472
INFO RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 7211
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ABU DHABI 001292 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR P STAFFER HMUSTAFA, NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, PM/FO, S/P 
TREASURY FOR U/S LEVEY 
DOD/OSD FOR A/S LONG, DAS KIMMITT, KELSO, QUINN, ANDERSON 
CENTCOM FOR CCJ5 - MG FINDLEY, REYES, RODRIGUEZ 
NSC FOR NRAMCHAND, EABRAMS 
JOINT STAFF FOR MG BREEDLOVE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2017 
TAGS: PREL PTER PARM MOPS MARR IR LE AE
SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR VISIT TO UAE BY U/S BURNS AND U/S 
LEVEY 
 
REF: A. ABU DHABI 1286 
     ¶B. ABU DHABI 1273 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (S) U/S Burns and U/S Levey:  Embassy Abu Dhabi looks 
forward to your upcoming visit to the UAE.  Your meetings 
with UAE's leaders come at a time when their attention is 
focused on U.S. policy in the Middle East and what this might 
mean to the UAE in the context of the violence in Iraq and 
Iran's aggressive regional posture.  While the U.S. has long 
enjoyed a strong defense cooperation relationship with the 
UAE, the State-DOD-NSC-led Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD) has 
provided an opportunity to deepen that relationship.  The UAE 
delivers strong support in the war on terror and has 
cooperated with us in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and with 
security assistance to the Palestinians.  UAE also provides 
critical basing and over-flight for U.S. reconnaissance and 
refueling assets as well as naval logistics support. 
 
¶2. (S/NF) While the UAE has offered political support for 
Iraq and identifies the first priority for the region as 
Iraqi stability, the UAE's (all-Sunni) leadership has 
exhibited a hardened attitude toward Prime Minister al 
Maliki, perceiving him as subservient to Iran and incapable 
of moving beyond sectarian bias to lead a unified Iraq.  The 
UAE has in the past favored former Prime Minister Iyad 
Allawi, played an active role in the "Group of Six," and has 
stalled on its commitment to Iraqi debt relief in order to 
avoid al Maliki claiming any credit.  The UAE has expressed 
concern over the situation in Baghdad, the failure of the al 
Maliki government to improve overall security in the country, 
and has privately castigated Iran for playing a "spoiler" 
role in Iraq.  This scene setter should be read in 
conjunction with "Potential Arms Sales:  Strengthening UAE 
Defensive Capabilities" (Ref A).  End Summary. 
 
¶3. (S) We offer the following background on issues facing the 
UAE and our bilateral relationship: 
 
¶I.   U.S. Defense Interests (para 4) 
II.  Iraq (paras 5-7) 
III. Iran (paras 8-11) 
IV.  Gulf Security Dialogue (paras 12-13) 
¶V.   Counterproliferation/Financial Isolation (paras 14-16) 
VI.  Other Regional Issues:  Afghanistan, Lebanon, the 
         Palestinians (paras 17-21) 
VII. UAE Interlocutors (para 22) 
 
-------------------------- 
¶I.  U.S. DEFENSE INTERESTS 
-------------------------- 
 
¶4. (S/NF) As will be highlighted during the August 2 visit by 
Secretary of Defense Gates to Abu Dhabi, the UAE's 
 
SIPDIS 
contribution to U.S. defense interests and regional stability 
has been extensive and enduring.  The ports of Jebel Ali and 
Fujairah are vital to U.S. Navy interdiction operations, 
re-supply and sustainment, and combat support efforts across 
the region.  Jebel Ali has hosted more port visits for each 
of the past three years than any other port outside the 
United States.  Quantitative measures of UAE support include: 
 
--- 1,300 USAF personnel at Al Dhafra Air Base; 
--- a vigorous training schedule at the 
    multilateral Gulf Air Warfare Center at Al Dhafra; 
--- the F-16 Block 60 program; 
--- approximately 500 port visits last year; 
--- more than 150,000 U.S. servicemen and women 
    enjoying liberty annually in the UAE; and 
--- 250 UAE Special Operations forces serving with the 
    Coalition in Afghanistan. 
 
 
ABU DHABI 00001292  002 OF 005 
 
 
You might again express appreciation for this outstanding 
partnership. 
 
---------------------------------- 
II. IRAQ -- UAE LACK OF CONFIDENCE 
    IN PM AL MALIKI 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (S) In recent months there has been a definite hardening 
of the UAE leadership's attitudes toward Prime Minister al 
Maliki, who is viewed by the Emiratis as little more than an 
"Iranian puppet."  The UAE leadership has told us they do not 
see "much hope in investing in Iraq or much light on the 
horizon with al Maliki and his government."  UAE leaders 
perceive him as biased and incapable of leading a 
non-sectarian, unified Iraq.  Earlier UAE commitments to 
forgive most of the $3.5 billion in Iraqi debt the UAE holds 
remain  unfulfilled, with the UAE leadership asking why it 
should give al Maliki a chance to claim credit for debt 
relief.  (Note:  Although the UAE has not forgiven the debt, 
it is not collecting payments on it.  End Note.) 
 
¶6. (S) Meanwhile, the UAE has been engaged in regional 
efforts to facilitate reconciliation between Sunni and Shi'a 
forces.  The UAEG has frequently expressed alarm regarding 
Iranian influence in Iraq, and has made attempts to reach out 
to moderate Shi'a to encourage their engagement in the Iraqi 
political process independently of Iran.  The UAE values and 
seeks reassurance of continued close consultation on U.S. 
plans and strategy involving Iraq and opposes any precipitous 
U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. 
 
¶7. (S) While al Maliki has not visited the UAE in a year, 
Iraqi National Security Adviser Muwaffaq Al Rubaie was in Abu 
Dhabi on June 28, briefing the UAE National Security Advisor 
and Foreign Minister on security developments in Iraq. 
Reportedly, Al Rubaie was told that the Group of Six nations 
(UAE, Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait) would 
invite Iraq's security chief to its next meeting.  According 
to the UAE leadership, during this visit Al Rubaie took the 
attitude that UAE outreach actions in Iraq were hostile and 
also indirectly justified the Iranian influence.  Al Rubaie 
reportedly focused his efforts on urging the Emiratis not to 
support Iraqi Sunnis. 
 
--------------------------------- 
III. IRAN - UAE BALANCING PRIVATE 
RHETORIC WITH PUBLIC CAUTION 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (S) The UAE's political relations with Iran have been 
strained over Iran's nuclear aspirations, its interference in 
Iraq's internal affairs, and Iran's ongoing 36-year 
occupation of three disputed islands )- Abu Musa and the 
Greater and Lesser Tunbs.  The UAE has repeatedly asked for 
more detail on U.S. plans vis--vis Iran, as it fears being 
caught in the cross-fire if Iran is provoked or attacked. 
The UAE may also be concerned that as talks between the U.S. 
and Iran continue, the U.S. may "cut a deal" with Iran 
without first consulting the GCC nations. 
 
¶9. (S) In meetings with us, UAE leaders have called for 
"action sooner rather than later against Iran" and privately 
speak in caustic terms about Ahmadinejad.  Abu Dhabi Crown 
Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MbZ) has opined that any 
attempt at dialogue by Iran should be regarded as a pure 
faade, but at the same time he has emphasized that the UAE 
must think carefully about risks in the region and about its 
own future.  The leadership has told us that they are not in 
a position to sacrifice $16 billion in annual trade with 
Iran, while realizing that this same neighbor and major 
trading partner is also a potential threat. 
 
¶10. (S) It has been estimated that up to 400,000 Iranians 
reside in the UAE (mostly in Dubai running various 
businesses) while many prominent Emirati merchant families 
trace their roots to Iran.  Thus, cultural ties are historic 
and strong.  It is worth recalling that immediately after the 
 
ABU DHABI 00001292  003 OF 005 
 
 
May 10-12 visit of Vice President Cheney, Iranian President 
Ahmadinejad made an official one-night stop in Abu Dhabi, 
where he was received with full honors as a Head of State, 
and then gave a defiant anti-U.S. speech at a Dubai sports 
arena to a mostly Iranian audience.  The timing of 
Ahmadinejad's visit was perceived by many Emiratis as a 
reminder of Iran's position as a major power in the Gulf and 
perhaps a warning to them of the need to maintain "balanced" 
relationships. 
 
¶11. (S) However much they may assist our mission in the 
region, the Emiratis are conscious of being wealthy, 
vulnerable players in a rough and unforgiving neighborhood 
that has the potential to boil over with Islamic extremist 
fervor which would directly threaten their way of life and 
the diverse, multi-national business-friendly atmosphere that 
characterizes the Emirates.  The UAE leadership has 
consistently pursued a cautious, non-confrontational public 
posture towards Iran.  They are reluctant to make public 
statements about Iran, often citing a "Chernobyl-like 
accident" as the basis of the threat from Iran's nuclear 
program rather than the possibility of launching or 
responding to an attack.  In the past the UAE has been 
hesitant to participate in Gulf military exercises.  The UAE 
did, however, send observers to Exercise Leading Edge 07 in 
October 2006 in the Gulf, which had a Proliferation Security 
Initiative theme.  Similarly, the decision to host Exercise 
Eagle Resolve 2008, with a Theater Air and Missile Defense 
theme, should be seen as a praiseworthy step. 
 
--------------------------- 
IV.  GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE 
--------------------------- 
 
¶12. (S) In Ref A, we provided an overview of what the UAE 
leadership seeks in order to enhance its defensive 
capabilities.  While the UAE acquisition priorities expressed 
do not exactly match what may be achievable from our 
perspective, the UAEG is eager to obtain an overarching Air 
and Missile Defense system at a cost of $8-12 billion as soon 
as possible.  The UAE currently has over $3.2 billion in 
Foreign Military Sales cases and another $8.5 billion plus in 
direct commercial sales in the Block 60 F-16 program.  Since 
the May 2007 Gulf Security Dialogue and earlier meetings of 
the Joint Military Committee working groups and Air and 
Missile Defense working group, we have seen progress in our 
bilateral relationship in the areas of defense cooperation 
and regional security. 
 
¶13. (S) The UAEG has indicated strong interest in purchasing 
12 Patriot PAC-3/GEM-T anti-ballistic missile batteries and 
other missile defense systems in order to create an 
overarching air and missile defense architecture.   The UAE 
has also expressed interest in Surface Launched Advanced 
Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile and Theater High Altitude Air 
Defense missile system.  In addition, both Boeing and 
Northrop-Grumman are providing Requests for Information on an 
Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft later this year. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
¶V.   COOPERATION ON COUNTERPROLIFERATION 
AND FINANCIAL ISOLATION ISSUES 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (S) We should continue to impress upon the UAEG the 
importance of tight controls on materials of proliferation 
concern -) including dual-use items.  The UAE has proven 
cooperative in stopping shipments to Iran as long as it can 
make a tie to UNSCRs 1737 and 1747.  It continues to hold two 
containers shipped from China to Iran in May, but has asked 
for USG assistance with the Chinese in returning these 
shipments. 
 
¶15. (C) On the financial side, the UAE froze the assets of 
the Iranian Bank Sepah within four days of the UN resolution. 
 According to the UAE Central Bank and the UAE's report to 
the UN, the bulk of the assets were trade finance, which in 
this case would pay non-Iranian banks for goods ordered prior 
 
ABU DHABI 00001292  004 OF 005 
 
 
to the imposition of sanctions.  On June 25, the UAE notified 
the 1737 Committee that it intended to unfreeze trade finance 
debit accounts under the name of Bank Sepah owed to six UAE 
banks.  We have requested that the UAE consider delaying or 
withdrawing this notification and provide more information on 
the nature of the transactions.  On August 1, the Central 
Bank Governor told Ambassador that the accounts were still 
frozen, but that his intention was still to release 
"innocent" accounts of which the funds were not going to 
Sepah (septel).  Central Bank officials confirmed that they 
were preparing a report to the UAE MFA explaining the issue 
in response to our request and the UN's request for 
information. 
 
¶16. (S) It is unclear how much the UAE has done to isolate 
Iran financially as requested by the USG.  The Abu Dhabi 
Investment Authority (ADIA) does not invest in Iran, but does 
use outside financial institutions and external fund managers 
to manage some of its assets.  At the request of UAE Foreign 
Minister, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (AbZ), Treasury 
created a list of international financial institutions 
dealing with Iran, which we then passed to AbZ. 
 
¶17. (S) We continue our largely successful interagency 
cooperation efforts with the UAE through the 
counterproliferation Task Force (CTF) and the Joint Terrorism 
Finance Coordinating Committee (JTFCC).  In June, we held a 
CTF Working group to discuss the UAE's draft export control 
law.  The law has been passed by the UAE's Federal National 
Council, but is still awaiting ratification by the rulers of 
the seven emirates before it can be promulgated into law.  In 
April, we held the 4th JTFCC and discussed proliferation 
finance, and issues such as Somali/Taliban financing, 
charities regulation, and operational training to target bulk 
cash courier smuggling. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
VI.  OTHER REGIONAL ISSUES: 
      AFGHANISTAN - UAE SPECIAL OPS TROOPS 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶18. (S) While the UAE contributes 250 Special Operations 
troops to the Coalition effort in Afghanistan (with a 
potential increase of 50), it has not yet publicly 
acknowledged this participation in Operation Enduring 
Freedom.  One of MbZ's oft-stated interests in sending 
Emirati Special Ops troops to Afghanistan is to get his 
military forces "bloodied" and battle-hardened so they may 
effectively confront imported or domestic extremism.  The UAE 
Special Operations Command estimates that it has expended 
$10.5 million in humanitarian assistance supporting Combined 
Joint Special Operations Task Force ) Afghanistan during 
Operation Enduring Freedom.  The UAE pursues Afghanistan 
reconstruction aid with an emphasis on road networks, 
mosques, medical facilities and schools and has made efforts 
at political mediation between Pakistan and Afghanistan.  In 
January 2007 LTG Eikenberry escorted Afghan Armed Forces 
Chief of Staff General Bismillah Mohammadi Khan to Abu Dhabi 
in a bid to deepen direct engagement between the UAE and 
Afghanistan.  The UAE Armed Forces Chief of Staff declared 
himself willing to help in any way possible, including 
training Afghan troops.  UAE subsequently disbursed another 
$30 million in general assistance and is renovating two 
runways in Afghanistan for military use.  During the June 
visit of Afghan Defense Minister Wardak to Abu Dhabi, MbZ 
agreed to donate nine Mi-17 helicopters to Afghanistan. 
 
------------------- 
LEBANON (AND SYRIA) 
------------------- 
 
¶19. (S) The UAEG provides significant humanitarian and 
security assistance to Lebanon and views Hezbollah and other 
Islamic extremists as hostile to its interests -) although 
it would hesitate to make a public statement to that effect. 
The UAE has been at the forefront of reconstruction efforts 
in Lebanon, continuing a longstanding de-mining operation, 
and contributing resources for school construction and 
 
ABU DHABI 00001292  005 OF 005 
 
 
hospitals.  UAE Air Force C-130s and helicopters have been 
used in relief efforts.  The UAE has also provided 
UAE-manufactured pistols and ammunition to the LAF.  The UAE 
Foreign Minister recently had a conversation with Lebanese PM 
Siniora on a proposal for a Muslim force for Lebanon (under 
UN mandate). 
 
¶20. (S) The UAE seeks to strengthen the Siniora government, 
having delivered $300 million in assistance to Lebanon this 
year, while also seeking engagement with other parties.  UAE 
President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan and other senior 
UAE officials paid a July 15-16 visit to Damascus, announcing 
the donation of $10 million towards the support of Iraqi 
refugees and $100 million to establish a hospital in 
Damascus.  The UAE has conveyed private frustration and 
displeasure with Syrian meddling in Lebanon and has said it 
would express its (and our) concern about foreign fighters 
entering Iraq through Syria to the Syrian leadership.  One 
goal of Sheikh Khalifa's visit, according to AbZ, was to try 
to persuade Syrian President Bashar Al Asad that he belongs 
"with the Arabs" and that he should loosen his close ties to 
Iran. 
 
------------------ 
PALESTINIAN ISSUES 
------------------ 
 
¶21. (S) The UAE has argued for the primacy of the Palestinian 
problem in resolving various Middle East crises and would 
like to see tangible progress on the Middle East Roadmap.  It 
would welcome the idea of a U.S.-sponsored peace conference 
as well as a two-state solution and may have thoughts on the 
question of timing and attendance.  The UAE rejects the Hamas 
agenda as fundamentally anathema to its own national 
survival, and continues to support the Palestinian people 
through more than $400 million in housing and humanitarian 
assistance since 2000.  MbZ and his brothers, Foreign 
Minister Abdullah and National Security Advisor/State 
Security Director Hazza, are in close contact with President 
Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad.  As the result 
of the May 2007 visit of USSC General Dayton, the UAE 
transferred $80 million to the Palestinian president.  During 
General Dayton's July 29 visit (Ref B), the UAE received our 
request to talk to the Saudis about restarting the Arab 
Quartet.  The UAE has issued a public statement supporting 
the choice of Tony Blair as the Quartet envoy. (Blair visited 
the UAE on July 24.) 
 
----------------------- 
VII.  UAE INTERLOCUTORS 
----------------------- 
 
¶22. (S) As always, Crown Prince MbZ will be eager to hear the 
views of senior USG officials and to offer his views on 
issues of regional security and stability.  Prime 
Minister/VP/Ruler of Dubai Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al 
Maktoum, we hear, will be out of the country.  Governor of 
the UAE Central Bank Sultan Nasser al Suweidi looks forward 
to seeing you; we will confirm availability of Sheikh Ahmed 
(Abu Dhabi Investment Authority) and Foreign Minister AbZ as 
soon as possible. 
 
SISON