VZCZCXRO7773
OO RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHAD #1286/01 2130909
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 010909Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9468
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001286 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FPR NEA/FO DAS GRAY 
NEA/ARP TREUTER, ABAGWELL 
PM/FO AA/S MULL, PM/RSAT RROBINSON; 
T A/S ROOD; 
P HMUSTAFA; 
DOD FOR OSD PDAS MARY BETH LONG, DAS KIMMITT 
CENTCOM FOR MAJ GEN FINDLEY 
NSC FOR NRAMCHAND, MDORAN, EABRAMS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2017 
TAGS: PARM PTER MOPS MASS KNNP IR AE
SUBJECT: POTENTIAL ARMS SALES: STRENGTHENING UAE DEFENSIVE 
CAPABILITIES 
 
REF: ABU DHABI 1161 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (S) Summary. On July 31 Ambassador met with DCM, USLO 
Chief, and DATT to review UAE top priorities for upcoming 
potential military sales under the framework of the Gulf 
Security Dialogue (GSD).  We discussed which of the proposed 
systems would be most feasible both to enhance UAE capacity 
for self defense and also to increase interoperability with 
U.S. systems in responding to threats to regional stability. 
While the acquisition priorities voiced by the UAEG 
(paragraph 2) do not exactly match Post's review of the most 
realistically achievable FMS package (paragraph 3), the UAE 
has expressed interest in purchasing all/all the systems on 
Post's list, including strong interest in our top priority, 
the sale of 12 Patriot PAC3/GEM-T batteries valued at $5.5 
billion.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (S/NF) At the present time, the UAE has expressed interest 
in purchasing the following potentially offensive and 
defensive weapons systems (in estimated order of UAE 
priority): 
 
a) Armed Predator B (we note MTCR issues); 
 
b) THAAD/ER-THAAD (est. case value $1.5-3.9 billion), and 
investment in the development of ER-THAAD (investment amounts 
as high as $1 billion have been mentioned); 
 
c) SLAMRAAM (to upgrade/replace HAWK missiles) (est. case 
value $400-700 million); 
 
d) Patriot PAC3/GEM-T (est. case value $5.5 billion); 
 
e) AVENGER/STINGER missiles vehicle/ship (mounted) (est. case 
value $200-300 million); 
 
f) Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) E2-C Hawkeye 
(lease of 3 aircraft for 5 years as an interim fix until 
AEW&C platform delivered)(est. case value $150-200 million); 
 
g) AEW&C platform (Boeing "Wedgetail" or Northrop-Grumman 
E2-D "Hawkeye") (est. case value $1.5-2.0 billion for 
aircraft plus a 20 year follow on support contract est. at $1 
billion); 
 
h) Maritime surveillance aircraft (est. case value $100-200 
million); and 
 
i) Command and control upgrades (SEW, CENTRIX, LINK 11/16, 
GCCS-M) (est. case value depends on which platforms LINK 
11/16 are integrated on, such as F-16 block 60s, AEW&C, etc.). 
 
¶3. (S/NF) Post believes that a more realistic, suitable and 
achievable priority order listing would focus on improved air 
and missile defense, including shared and interoperable early 
warning systems.  These systems, specifically tailored 
towards enhancing UAE defensive capabilities, would be (in 
Post's priority order): 
 
a) Patriot PAC3/GEM-T; 
 
b) SLAMRAAM; 
 
c) AEW&C E2-C Hawkeye (lease of 3 aircraft for 5 years as an 
interim fix until AEW&C platform delivered); 
 
d) THAAD/ER-THAAD; 
 
e) AEW&C platform (Boeing "Wedgetail" or Northrop-Grumman 
E2-D "Hawkeye"); and 
 
f) C2 and early warning (SEW, CENTRIX, LINK 16 release in 
specific, etc.). 
 
¶4. (S/NF) The UAEG has made clear that it would like to have 
 
ABU DHABI 00001286  002 OF 002 
 
 
the Patriot PAC3 and SLAMRAAM systems in place by summer 2009 
(reftel).  This timetable is overly optimistic.  We, and our 
defense contractor contacts, believe this to be unachievable 
until summer 2010 (for SLAMRAAM) and 2011 (for Patriot PAC3) 
at the earliest.  The UAE is still eager to obtain an 
overarching Air and Missile Defense system as soon as 
possible, along with numerous other supporting items to 
include the C2 systems mentioned. 
 
¶5. (S) Although the FMS process ensures a "total package 
approach," post believes both FMS and DCS (where permitted) 
options and/or a hybrid option are all viable alternatives 
for military hardware and training.  In addition, for all FMS 
equipment cases, the USG should be prepared to present a plan 
for support/follow-on support cases, as well as 
logistical/transportation cases and training cases (to 
include English language training estimated at several 
hundred thousand dollars for as many as 1000 UAE personnel) 
-- vital to the success of any sales program. 
 
¶6. (S) Comment:  Post offers above assessment in order to 
provide Department, DoD, and NSC a concise overview of what 
the UAE leadership has in mind for its military/security 
needs in the context of our regional security conversations 
with Gulf states over the next several weeks.  This message 
should be read in conjunction with "Scenesetter for Visit to 
UAE by U/S Burns and U/S Levey" (septel).  End Comment. 
 
SISON