VZCZCXRO7708
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHAB #0804/01 2130747
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 010747Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3322
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0111
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1607
RUEPGDA/USEUCOM JIC VAIHINGEN GE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABIDJAN 000804 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
ADDIS ABABA FOR US REP TO AU 
PRETORIA FOR EXTERNAL POL AFFAIRS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2022 
TAGS: PGOV PREL IV
SUBJECT: SORO, FORCES NOUVELLES STAY TIGHTLIPPED ON AUTHORS 
OF ATTACK 
 
REF: A. ABIDJAN 764 
 
     ¶B. ABIDJAN 755 
     ¶C. ABIDJAN 732 
     ¶D. ABIDJAN 719 
 
Classified By: EconChief EMassinga, Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary.  Emboff traveled to Forces Nouvelles 
stronghold Bouake to meet with key aides to Prime Minister 
Soro concerning the investigation into who attacked Soro on 
June 29 (reftel D, C).  Soro aide Cisse Sindou said the PM 
will not comment on who the authors of the attack were until 
an international investigation is conducted, and his top 
lieutenants on the civilian and military side appeared to 
fall in line behind this directive.  Several interlocutors 
outside of the Soro camp expressed unease that the peace 
process is stalled, largely due to mistrust between Soro and 
Gbagbo stemming from the attack, despite the pomp and 
circumstance surrounding the July 30 "Flame of Peace" 
ceremony.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Emboff traveled July 25-26 to Bouake, stronghold of 
the Forces Nouvelles and de facto seat of Prime Minister Soro 
since the June 29 attack on his life (reftel C, D), to meet 
with senior aides to the PM concerning the investigation into 
who was behind the attempt.  Senior Forces Nouvelles 
ministers and key advisors to the Prime Minister had become 
increasingly unavailable and unwilling to talk in Abidjan. 
The preparations for the July 30 "Flame of Peace" ceremony 
added to the general unavailability of key Soro aides. 
 
--------- 
The Scene 
--------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  Emboff took a UN Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (ONUCI) 
flight.  In Abidjan, the presidential Fokker 100 that had 
transported Soro when he and his entourage were attacked was 
in plain view, parked in front of the ONUCI hanger.  The 
damage to the plane was easy to see and one large hole with 
burn marks around it and another, smaller hole without such 
marks were both covered with plastic sheeting.  There was 
no/no additional damage, either from rocket or from automatic 
weapon fire visible from the outside. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Security at the Bouake airport is heavily 
reinforced.  For Emboff's ONUCI flight, a platoon of armed 
ONUCI troops held strategic positions around the airfield and 
in a guard tower overlooking the ONUCI terminal.  The brush 
had been recently pushed at least 100 meters back from the 
runway, taxiways and terminal by ONUCI equipment still in 
place. 
 
------- 
Forces Nouvelles Carefully Addresses Rumors, Exhibits Tight 
Message Discipline 
------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Emboff was greeted by Forces Nouvelles Deputy 
Director of Cabinet Cisse Sindou at the group's civilian HQ. 
According to Sindou (an 18-year resident of the U.S. whose 
wife and children still reside in the NYC area), he has been 
active in the FNs since its inception and has taken on the 
role of chief interlocutor between the PM's office and the 
various governmental arms of the redeployment of civil 
administration and the FNs.  Sindou told Emboff that the FNs 
and Soro were continuing to work diligently to put into place 
a durable peace process through deployment of administration, 
despite the unfortunate June 29 attack.  Sindou said that 
neither the FNs nor the PM would dignify rumors concerning 
the authors of the attack, preferring to see a proper 
international investigation, whatever the length of time 
needed. 
 
¶6.  (S)  Emboff asked about a specific report in the press 
(which has also been the subject of several sensitive 
reports) that indicates the Burkina intelligence service had 
helped determine that elements close to the Presidency had 
conspired with I.B. Coulibaly to assassinate the PM.  Sindou 
demurred at commentary, saying vaguely that others at a 
higher level would have to comment.  Emboff asked about the 
150 Burkinabe troops pledged by President Compaore for ONUCI 
(Note: top aides to senior ONUCI officials had been dismayed 
at the potential for such a deployment, fearing the "signal 
of mistrust it would give."  End Note).  Upbeat, Sindou said 
the troop deployment would occur as soon as the Burkina 
 
ABIDJAN 00000804  002 OF 003 
 
 
legislature ratified the plan. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Emboff had been scheduled to meet with FNs military 
Chief of Staff Bakayoko.  Pleading extreme scheduling 
conflicts and the demands to work around the clock with PM 
Soro and his top aides de camp on the "Flame of Peace" 
ceremony preparations, Bakoyoko said he could not find the 
time to meet.  Zone Commander "Big" called Emboff personally 
later in the day, apologizing for his superior's 
unavailability, but promising profusely to meet once the 
ceremony had passed.  (Comment:  The interaction of the FNs 
top leadership with Emboff during the Bouake trip appeared 
closely choreographed.  Both Bakayoko and ComZone Big were 
well aware of the visit, but the former allowed he would have 
little to say since the designated spokesman Sindou had 
already met with Emboff.  Emboff called Minister Sidiki 
Konate (FNs #3) and the PMs spokesman Alain Lobognon, both of 
whom were in Bouake (along with #2 Dacoury Tabley); both 
declined to meet, despite being frequent interlocutors in 
Abidjan before the June 29.  End Comment.) 
 
------ 
The Mayor of Bouake Weighs In 
------ 
 
¶8.  (C)  The Mayor of Bouake, Fanny Ibrahima, met with Emboff 
for dinner on July 25. Ibrahima was at the center of a 
beehive of activity, taking friendly calls from the 
newly-installed (but not yet resident) prefect and having 
just come from an evening countdown meeting for the "Flame of 
Peace" ceremony presided over by Soro and attended by top 
aides.  Clearly unwilling to discuss sensitive topics at 
Emboff's hotel, he and Emboff met at the Mayor's house for 
breakfast the following morning.  Ibrahima chose not to 
comment on the rumors mentioned in para 6, but pointedly did 
not/not contradict them.  Offering insights into the Forces 
Nouvelles' inner workings, Ibrahima was dismissive of Konate, 
saying he'd embarrassed himself in the immediate aftermath of 
the June 29 attack, and implying strongly that Sindou has 
effectively taken his place.  Responding to questions 
concerning Tabley's near disappearance from the public scene, 
Ibrahima confirmed the War Victims and Solidarity Minister 
has been sidelined, partially over his reported unhappiness 
at Soro's decision to take the Prime Ministership, partially 
over a personal dispute with Soro involving the affections of 
a woman in Ouagadougou. 
 
------ 
Contacts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ONUCI Express 
Misgivings 
------ 
 
¶9.  (C)  Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Ambassador Tanoh 
Boutchoue, Director of the Office of International 
Organizations and UN Affairs, asked to meet with Emboff the 
evening of his return from Bouake, citing the urgent need to 
exchange several routine pending demarches.  Meeting at 
Emboff's home, Boutchoue made it clear he strongly suspects 
the Presidential camp in the Soro attack, specifically 
hard-liner William Atteby (a close ally of First Lady Simone 
Gbagbo and who was quoted saying "the attempted assassination 
pales in comparison to the war crimes of Soro and his 
confederates").  Boutchoue was plainly worried that a 
Presidential hand in the attack would deal a fatal blow to 
the peace process, and sought to enlist the aid of the U.S. 
in preventing that.  (Note: it was unclear if Boutchoue was 
freelancing or acting under orders from FM Bakayoko.  Both 
Boutchoue and Bakayoko are members of the opposition PDCI. 
End Note). 
 
¶10.  (C)  ONUCI's DDR head Jean Luc Stalon called Emboff on 
the evening of the 26th to express his own disappointment 
with the pace of the peace process.  Speaking frankly, he 
said the pace of DDR and other key processes had slowed to a 
crawl, mostly due to mistrust ONUCI sees between the Soro and 
Gbagbo camps subsequent to the attack on Soro.  While still 
in Bouake, Emboff spoke to ONUCI's Acting Sector East 
Commander Col. Adams from the Ghana Battalion.  Puzzled over 
the odd combination of amateurishness and cunning in the Soro 
attack, Col. Adams  remarked at the inability of the 
assailants to hit the aircraft with small arms fire, despite 
it being no more than 80 meters away as it made a slow, 
vulnerable turn towards the ONUCI hangar.  Adams noted the 
long-standing discord within the FNs military wing, which had 
been roiled by the March 4 Ouaga Accord, and pointed to the 
July 10 attack on ComZone Zakaria's Bouake residence as 
 
ABIDJAN 00000804  003 OF 003 
 
 
evidence such tensions persist.  Turning to the alternate 
theory of President's camp involvement in the attack, Adams 
said that "informed opinion" in Bouake before the attack had 
either Gbagbo or Soro moving to eliminate the other within 
short order, so the June 29 attack came as no surprise. 
 
 
¶11.  (C)  Comment.  The organization of both the Forces 
Nouvelles' engagement with Emboff and Soro's equally tight 
control over all of his lieutenants during the preparation 
for the "Flame of Peace" ceremony tends to indicate they are 
very cautious with their public and even private messages 
related to the ultra-sensitive topic of who tried to kill 
their leader.  That same organization, in addition to the 
fact Soro has remained in Bouake for essentially the past 
month, tends to undercut the theory that the attack was an 
inside job, although Soro could merely be attempting to keep 
his enemies where he can see them.  No one in his circle has 
pointed a public or private finger in the direction of the 
President.  However, they seem to be taking prudent steps, 
such as bringing in a company of Compaore's paratroopers 
(though this is not yet a certainty), while at the same time 
pushing forward with the element of the peace process they 
care most deeply about, identification (the arms destruction 
in the "Flame of Peace" was symbolic, according to Soro's 
team, and does not signify a renewed focus or even a new 
breakthrough on the thorny questions hindering DDR progress). 
 Going forward, it remains to be seen if the suspicions 
within the Soro camp that the Presidency had a role to play 
in the June 29 plot will poison the atmosphere to the point 
that the peace process will grind to a halt.  End Comment. 
HOOKS