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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 UNVIE VIENNA 000435 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR IO/T, IO/UNP, ISN, NEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2017 
TAGS: PREL IAEAK EUN IS EG LE
SUBJECT: ISRAEL/LEBANON UPDATE ON THREAT RESOLUTION, WEOG 
 
REF: UNVIE 421 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000435  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for 1.5 reasons b, d 
 
 ------- 
Summary 
      -------------- 
 
¶1.  (C) Israel Ambassador Michaeli told Ambassador Schulte 
that he hopes the EU can head off an Israel-specific agenda 
item at the September General Conference (GC), but he was not 
optimistic.  Despite divisions within the Arab group, 
Michaeli thought that a Israeli threat resolution would 
likely be added to the GC agenda.  Israel was &reluctant8 
about a U.S. suggestion that the Director General revive the 
Forum on a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (MENWFZ), 
but did not want to close the door either, as long as it were 
based on the agreed 2004 agenda.  Michaeli also raised 
concerns about the Secretariat,s annual report to the GC on 
the Middle East, which he thought should take the Iran 
situation into account.  The Ambassador, as WEOG Chair (and 
based on the previous chairs efforts) offered to invite 
Israel to join the group.  Michaeli welcomed the offer. 
 
¶2. (C)  Summary Continued: Lebanese Charge Kabalan reported 
that the Arab Group had found the EU proposals unsatisfactory 
and was moving ahead with a request for an Israeli Nuclear 
Threat Agenda item.  He reported that most Arab Group members 
wanted to "ring the bell" on Israel but were open to 
compromise.  The Lebanese hoped a creative solution could be 
reached before the General Conference and was open to the 
idea of reviving the Middle East Forum on a NWFZ. Lebanon is 
likely to be the President for the General Conference.  End 
Summary. 
 
---------------------- 
Israeli Nuclear Threat 
---------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Israeli Ambassador Michaeli briefed the Ambassador 
July 10 on the status of EU negotiations with the Arab group 
regarding a possible General Conference Agenda Item on the 
Israeli nuclear threat (reftel).  IAEA Israeli Ambassador 
Israel Michaeli recounted his latest discussions with 
Portuguese Ambassador Durante, who is negotiating on behalf 
of the EU to deflect a potential Arab group-sponsored General 
Conference agenda item on the &Israeli Nuclear Threat8 
(reftel).  According to Durante, the Arab group is still 
insisting on a second agenda item, in addition to the Middle 
East Safeguards resolution.  Duarte reportedly asked Michaeli 
if another agenda item on the Middle East that does not 
single out Israel in the title would be acceptable.  (Note: 
In earlier discussions with the EU, Israel had rejected 
dropping the word &threat8 as insufficient because the 
agenda item would still single out Israel.  End note). 
Michaeli told Durante that he would not be in a position to 
support such a proposal without instructions, but that the 
Portuguese could go ahead and float it with the Arab group. 
Michaeli expressed skepticism about a second Middle East 
agenda item because Israel could still be singled out in the 
text of a resolution.  He noted that last year's GC 
resolution on Middle East safeguards, which Israel and the 
U.S. voted against, included a factual reference to Israel as 
the only Middle East country that has not signed the NPT.  In 
any case, the Arab group is rumored to have rejected this 
latest proposal.  Michaeli urged Durante to not renounce the 
threat of a procedural move by the EU, the Arab group's main 
concern, to scuttle a resolution as happened in last year's 
GC.  He noted the mere threat of a procedural motion had been 
enough to prevent Arab group action in the CTBTO.  Durante 
took this point under advisement. 
 
¶4.  (C) The Arab group appears to be split on the &Israeli 
Nuclear Threat8 issue.  Michaeli reported that the Maghreb 
countries would just as soon give it up while Egypt would 
like to defer the agenda item until next year. 
Interestingly, before leaving on vacation, the Omani Arab 
group chair will hand off negotiations on this issue to 
Morocco and Algeria, who are more inclined to compromise. 
However, Iran is pushing Syria forward and Egypt has a 
strategic connection to Syria.  Thus Michaeli saw no reason 
for optimism, but he did note a willingness among the Arab 
group to do things &differently8 in last year's UNGA First 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000435  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
Committee and the NPT Review Conference.  He had no new 
information on timing but expected the Arab group was just 
waiting for the conclusion of the July 9 Board of Governors 
meeting before submitting the agenda item (Note: so that it 
would not be raised in the Board session). 
 
¶5.  (C) The Ambassador related that he had expressed U.S. 
concerns to the EU and advocated a single resolution and 
single agenda item adopted by consensus. He reminded them 
that last year's GC had clearly voted the &Israeli Nuclear 
Threat8 item off the agenda.  He advised the EU that 
changing the title to drop the word &threat8 was not 
helpful and that Iran was much more deserving of a country 
specific resolution.  Michaeli stipulated that no the Prime 
Minister himself would determine Israel's position on a 
specific proposal. 
 
----------------------- 
Arab Group Moving Ahead 
----------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) In a July 11 meeting with the Ambassador, Lebanese 
Charge Bilal Kabalan said the Arab group had resubmitted the 
second agenda item on Israel, including the word "threat." 
According to the Secretariat, however, the Omani Arab Group 
Chair subsequently asked, for a second time, for the item to 
be held.  The Secretariat noted the more than usual Arab 
Group hesitation on this second agenda item, but nonetheless 
fully expected that it would be re-submitted very soon.  The 
Lebanese reported that Arab group members had been 
dissatisfied with EU proposals because they received nothing 
in return.  Not mentioning Israel by name was a non-starter 
for Lebanon.  The Arab group wanted to "ring the bell" on 
Israel, but most were open to compromise.  He said four 
(unnamed) countries were leading the debate in the Arab 
group, two hardliners and two "liberals."  Last year Syria 
and Sudan had led the charge, and part of the problem was 
that there had been no good alternative proposal, he said. 
Arab group members had misperceived compromise Presidential 
Statement language (actually drafted by South Africa) as a 
U.S.-Israeli initiative.  Kabalan appealed for "creative" and 
constructive solutions but noted that most Arab group 
Ambassadors were not outside-the-box thinkers.   Lebanon did 
not want to legitimize the Israeli nuclear program nor draw 
any links between this issue and that of Iran. 
 
¶7. (C) Kabalan hoped that an understanding could be reached 
before the September General Conference (Note: The next GC 
President is likely to be from Lebanon.  The Lebanese 
government will nominate Mouin Hamzi, head of the National 
Council on Scientific Research. End Note ).  He recommended 
demarching capitals, particularly Cairo.  He also noted that 
there would be several new Ambassadors in Vienna, including 
from Syria, Egypt and Lebanon. 
 
¶8. (C) The Ambassador agreed that early action was needed to 
prevent a debacle in the General Conference.  If need be, 
however, we were ready to repeat last year's vote.  The 
Ambassador advised that the U.S. preferred a single agenda 
item and one resolution.  He warned against politicizing the 
GC by singling out Israel, and noted that this could lead to 
pressure for an Iran resolution.  Several constructive 
solutions were possible, including a single resolution that 
advances the forum for a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ), 
but he feared that not everyone was interested in a 
constructive outcome. 
 
--------------- 
Forum on MENWFZ 
--------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) The Ambassador asked Michaeli about reviving the 
Middle East Forum on a NWFZ, on which Egypt and Israel came 
close to agreement in 2004.  Michaeli said that his 
government would not be &very happy8 about a Forum but they 
did not want to close the door either.  He noted that 
tensions had increased in the Middle East since 2004, 
especially on Iran.  However, if such a Forum were based on 
&known elements,8 meaning the agreed 2004 agenda, Israel 
could countenance it.  Speaking on a personal basis, Michaeli 
did not see many points of leverage with the Egyptians, 
except U.S. pressure to agree to a Forum.  The fact that 
there would soon be a new Egyptian Ambassador to IAEA, and 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000435  003 OF 004 
 
 
that Egypt seemed inclined to take a different approach on 
Iran in other fora were hopeful signs.  For example, he noted 
that the Arab group had agreed to include text on compliance 
in the NPT conference, which they had not done in the GC. 
 
¶10. (C) The Ambassador also raised reviving the Middle East 
Forum with the Lebanese. Kabalan was well-disposed and said 
he had also raised the idea with the Arab group last March. 
Even the Iranian Ambassador was (unofficially) open to a 
Forum, according to Kabalan.  The Syrians and others believed 
that the Israelis would not agree. 
 
----------------------------- 
DG,s Middle East Report to GC 
----------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) Michaeli also related his discussions with EXPO 
Director Vilmos Cserveny regarding the DG,s annual report to 
the General Conference on Middle East Safeguards.  Israel had 
harshly criticized last year,s report because it did not 
adequately reflect rising tensions in the region due to 
Iran's nuclear program, or discuss the latter,s impact on 
safeguards.  At a minimum, the report should refer to UNSCR 
and BOG resolution language on this subject (references which 
Israel did not support).  The Secretariat was unwilling to 
reflect Israel's position that a NWFZ is linked to the ME 
peace process.  Michaeli nonetheless believed that the report 
could &do a lot8 and offered to share Israel's recommended 
language with the U.S. (Note: He seemed to be angling for 
U.S. support on this issue.) 
 
---- 
WEOG 
---- 
 
¶12.  (C) The Ambassador noted that previous WEOG Chair, UK 
Ambassador Macgregor, had asked members for opinions about 
inviting Israel to be a member.  The Ambassador told Michaeli 
that, since there were no complete objections, he was 
inclined to proceed with the invitation at some point during 
U.S. chairmanship during the next six months.  Michaeli 
welcomed US efforts.  He said had held a series of 
consultations.  In addition to the U.S., Germany had 
expressed support and the UK promised to do so.  The 
Australians expected New Zealand to be problematic (though 
not formally object) as they had been in the UNGA First 
Committee.  Norway has problems with Israel's nuclear policy; 
Ireland and Italy have sometimes raised issues; and many of 
the Mediterranean countries are closer to the Arabs, he 
surmised.  However, in all other UN organizations, no WEOG 
delegation has formally objected to Israel's WEOG membership, 
including in UNGA, Geneva, OPCW, etc.  It should be even 
easier in the IAEA, he argued, since WEOG does not have an 
electoral function in terms of nominating Board members. 
(Note: Under the IAEA statute, Western Europe and North 
America are represented separately on the Board of 
Governors.)  He acknowledged concerns expressed by some 
delegations over WEOG deliberations on the General Conference 
Middle East agenda item(s) but offered to sit out those 
deliberations. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Outgoing WEOG Chair, UK Ambassador Macgregor sent 
the following letter to WEOG members on this issue on June 29: 
 
Dear Colleagues: 
 
I am grateful to members of WEOG for their cooperation during 
the six months when I have been Chair.  We have had a number 
of useful briefings and exchanges. 
 
The main piece of outstanding business is the request of 
Israel to become a member of the group.  I have mentioned 
this twice during my Presidency, and asked group members to 
let me know whether they support or oppose this idea. 
 
I thought I would let you know that no-one has expressed 
complete opposition, and two have expressed support.  Others 
have raised the question of how one would tackle Middle East 
questions in the group e.g. in connection with the General 
Conference, if Israel was a member. 
 
So this is simply to record that no decision has been taken 
on this point and the matter therefore remains to be pursued 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000435  004 OF 004 
 
 
under Greg's Chairmanship of WEOG, as appropriate. 
 
Many thanks again for your help and support. 
 
Yours, 
 
John Macgregor 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶14.  (C) We will continue to work with our EU and Middle East 
colleagues in Vienna to underscore that we think an 
Israeli-specific agenda item at the CG is inappropriate 
absent a similar Iran agenda item.  Furthermore, the Board 
has already linked the Iran issue in its February 2006 
resolution, to a MENWFZ.  Per reftel, demarches in capitals 
and a high-level approach to Egypt could help move this issue 
in the right direction.  Since the UK has prepared the ground 
for inviting Israel to join WEOG, it is incumbent on us to 
follow-through during our chairmanship.  We are, however, 
still considering whether to make the invitation before or 
after the General Conference. 
 
 
SCHULTE