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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 003470 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
MANILA FOR D/KAYE LEE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2017 
TAGS: PREL KNNP JA DPRK
SUBJECT: PDAS STEPHENS JULY 23 MEETINGS WITH JAPANESE 
OFFICIALS ON THE NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY MECHANISM 
 
Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer. Reasons 1.4 (b)/(d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  MOFA officials took a very cautious line 
on the Six-Party Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism 
Working Group during meetings with Principal Deputy Assistant 
Secretary Stephens on July 23.  They were also cautious in 
 
SIPDIS 
reacting to initial U.S. ideas for core principles for 
regional security, emphasizing that such principles should 
focus heavily on denuclearization and peace on the Korean 
Peninsula.  They emphasized that too rapid movement on this 
track runs the risk of taking the focus off denuclearization 
and affording the DPRK an opportunity to slow down the 
Six-Party process.  PDAS Stephens said the mechanism could in 
fact reinforce denuclearization.  She noted that while the 
United States envisioned this issue remaining within the 
Six-Party process as we focus on full implementation of the 
September 2005 Agreement, the Northeast Asia Peace and 
Security Mechanism might eventually become a separate forum, 
growing out of success in the Six-Party Talks.  PDAS Stephens 
also reassured MOFA officials that the U.S. would consult 
closely with Japan on the four-party Korean Peninsula peace 
regime process.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs Kathleen Stephens had separate meetings 
July 23 with MOFA North American Affairs Director General 
Shinichi Nishimiya, Deputy Director-General for Asian and 
Oceanian Affairs Junichi Ihara, Director-General for Asian 
and Oceanian Affairs Kenichiro Sasae, Deputy Director-General 
of Foreign Policy Yasumasa Nagamine, and Deputy Vice Minister 
Chikao Kawai.  Explaining that she was embarking on a series 
of bilateral consultations to prepare for the August meeting 
of the NEAPSM Working Group and the September Six-Party 
Ministerial, she outlined initial U.S. thinking on the NEAPSM 
and the separate (though people sometimes blurred the two) 
issue of the Korean Peninsula peace regime process. 
 
¶3.  (C)  PDAS Stephens said we envisioned a general 
discussion on regional peace and security at the Six-Party 
Foreign Ministers meeting and a ministerial tasking to the 
Working Group to develop a charter, or core principles, for 
the NEAPSM.  Deputy Ministers might subsequently meet to 
finalize and endorse the set of core principles.  Stephens 
outlined initial U.S. thinking on what these core principles 
might cover, emphasizing that our thinking was still in its 
early stages.  DDG Nagamine agreed that because the six 
parties might not be able to agree on NEAPSM principles by 
September, it was more realistic for the ministers to task 
that effort to the Working Group.  He stressed that even 
these basic principles would require close U.S.-Japan 
consultations.  Nagamine also expressed concern over using 
the word charter ("We don't like the word."), saying it 
suggested something legally binding and requiring legislative 
action.  He made clear Japan would not support anything 
legally binding.  PDAS Stephens said we were not attached to 
any particular word. 
 
¶4.  (C)  DDG Nagamine questioned the involvement of Deputies, 
asking if we envisioned Deputies launching a new forum or 
grouping.  PDAS Stephens clarified that we envision a 
possible Vice Ministers meeting as a one-off event to boost 
the Working Group's efforts at an appropriate time to agree 
to a set of principles.  DDG Nagamine cautioned that a Vice 
Ministerial should not be held only for the NEAPSM Working 
Group; if Vice Ministers were to meet, it should be for 
Six-Party working groups across the board. 
 
¶5.  (C)  PDAS Stephens told DDG Nagamine that in regard to 
talks on a Korean Peninsula peace regime as envisioned by the 
September 2005 Joint Statement, the directly related parties 
were the two Koreas playing the central roles, plus China and 
the U.S.  She emphasized that the Korean peace talks would 
only get underway after the denuclearization process was in 
disablement phase.  PDAS Stephens added that the U.S. would 
 
TOKYO 00003470  002 OF 003 
 
 
closely consult with Japan as those talks unfolded.  DDG 
Nagamine emphasized that peace on the Korean Peninsula was a 
vital concern for Japan and the image that Japan was involved 
in the process was politically important.  DDG Nagamine 
suggested that Korean peace talks should "report" to the 
NEAPSM Working Group, an idea to which, he said, Russia was 
sympathetic. 
 
¶6.  (C)  In a separate meeting, Deputy Vice Foreign Minister 
for Foreign Policy Chikao Kawai emphasized that 
the Japanese government believed the Six-Party Working Groups 
should focus first on 1) confidence-building among the 
parties; and 2) issues surrounding the Korean Peninsula.  The 
agenda could expand over time, but the parties needed to keep 
their attention on the immediate task at hand -- the 
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.  Furthermore, any 
discussion of Northeast Asia peace and security should be 
within the overall Six-Party framework; creating a new 
framework outside the Six-Party process was vulnerable to 
DPRK manipulation. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Kawai agreed that China's taking on a constructive 
role in the Six-Party process was a positive step, but such a 
"by-product" ought not to displace the DPRK nuclear issue 
among the Six-Party priorities.  He acknowledged that, while 
premature, the parties needed to think about the future. 
Responding to PDAS Stephens's comment about looking to 
examples of confidence-building measures (CBMs) from other 
multilateral fora, Kawai opined that neither ARF nor OSCE 
presented a viable model for a Northeast Asian security 
framework due to the former's questionable effectiveness and 
the latter's relatively simple framework (i.e., East versus 
West blocs).  In the Six-Party process, the DPRK, China, and 
Russia all had different regimes and separate interests that 
ran counter to the relatively consolidated stance of the 
U.S., Japan and the ROK.  From Japan's perspective, 
addressing the DPRK's missile program and the abduction issue 
remained important factors in engaging with the DPRK. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Director-General Nishimiya said MOFA's "gut 
reaction" to the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism 
(NEAPSM) was that it was premature, and he advised against 
introducing "new, untested ideas" at this point in the 
Six-Party process.  Establishing a set of guiding principles 
for the mechanism would also be quite difficult, he 
predicted.  Even nomenclature was problematic, he asserted, 
since there was no clear agreement on the geographic 
boundaries of Northeast Asia.  DG Nishimiya recommended that 
U.S.-Japan discussions focus on specifics, to avoid us 
"talking past one another."  Citing initial confusion in the 
Japanese press over the proposed security mechanism and a 
separate four-party Korean peace process, Nishimiya stressed 
the need to carefully manage public perceptions. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Denuclearization was the immediate task at hand, 
stated Director-General Sasae, a point later reinforced by 
DVM Kawai.  Sasae doubted the effectiveness of the NEAPSM 
process, contending that it would turn into just another 
"academic" forum.  DDG Ihara cautioned that the NEAPSM would 
send the wrong signal to the DPRK and ran the risk of being 
used by the North Koreans to drive a wedge between allies, or 
to slow down the denuclearization process.  Six-Party 
participants needed to be careful about whether 
denuclearization was a "driver" or "follower," observed DDG 
Nagamine, adding that only if denuclearization moved forward 
would confidence grow in the Six-Party process. 
 
¶10.  (C)  Discussions on alliances could also be problematic, 
DDG Nagamine said.  Although Japan and the U.S. agree that 
our alliance is key to peace in the region, that view was not 
universally held by all Six-Party participants.  First North 
America Division Director Mori seconded this line, saying we 
should be extremely cautious about bringing alliances into 
the Working Group discussions.  North Korea might try to use 
 
TOKYO 00003470  003 OF 003 
 
 
seemingly unobjectionable things, such as UN principles, for 
its own purposes, cautioned DDG Nagamine.  Statements about 
peaceful settlement of disputes, especially territorial, was 
another area where there might be unwanted connotation 
applied to specific issues, continued DDG Nagamine.  On the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), where Japan had doubts about 
the DPRK's resolve, there might be difficulty in reaching a 
common definition among the six parties of what constituted 
the NPT regime.  North Korea, Nagamine noted, had already 
called for nuclear inspections in the ROK.  Should we, he 
asked rhetorically, be prepared to accept a North Korean 
demand for denuclearization in areas surrounding the Korean 
Peninsula? 
 
¶11.  (C)  DDG Nagamine said Japan wanted to be constructive 
and was "not being negative for the sake of being negative." 
He agreed that Northeast Asia lacked the kind of multilateral 
security institutions that existed in Europe, but argued that 
the Six-Party process was not a good "fit" for addressing 
issues such as China's expanding military capabilities, the 
China-Taiwan issue, or the U.S.-Japan security alliance.  He 
advocated concentrating on confidence building mechanisms and 
then identifying principles that would assist that focus.  DG 
Nishimiya said that while China may have warmed to the idea 
of a ministerial meeting, it did not want to put sensitive 
issues on the table.  The views of South Korea also needed to 
be addressed with care, he said, at least until after South 
Korea's presidential election in December. 
 
¶12.  (C)  PDAS Stephens responded that the U.S. was not 
proposing to create a separate process outside the Six-Party 
Talks and that we agreed the NEAPSM should not detract from 
denuclearization, but rather reinforce it.  She explained 
that if Six-Party talks achieved success on denuclearization 
and normalization of relations among the parties, then there 
was a hope, or a vision, that the Six-Party process could 
develop into a multilateral forum to address other regional 
security issues.  She made clear that the U.S. did not have a 
roadmap at this point.  But, in Washington's calculus, she 
observed, discussing a framework for the long-term security 
interests of the region was not only possible, but desirable. 
 
 
¶13.  (U)  PDAS Stephens has cleared this cable. 
SCHIEFFER