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C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 002972 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2017 
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP JA NK
SUBJECT: JAPANESE ANGST ABOUT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ON NORTH 
KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer.  Reason: 1.4 (b) (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:   Most Japanese media, academic and 
political sources cite A/S Hill,s June 21-22 Pyongyang visit 
as a first step toward denuclearizing the DPRK.  Some 
observers, however, remain skeptical about the DPRK's 
intention to shut down its nuclear facilities, and there is 
widespread worry over A/S Hill's bilateral contact with the 
DPRK.  Although several sources tell Embassy Tokyo they view 
A/S Hill's Pyongyang visit as intentionally downplaying the 
abduction issue and leaving Japan out of Six-Party 
negotiations, this notion has been rebutted by Prime Minister 
Abe and mitigated by A/S Hill's continuing "celebrity8 
status in Japan.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Overall media coverage of A/S Hill's Pyongyang visit 
was positive, but analysts believe that it is unlikely the 
DPRK will dismantle its nuclear facility without making 
unreasonable demands in future negotiations.  A Mainichi 
editorial said that while it appeared A/S Hill took some 
preliminary steps toward dismantling North Korea,s nuclear 
program, "actions are more important than words.8  Foreign 
Minister Aso reflected that skepticism in a June 22 press 
conference, observing that A/S Hill,s visit to North Korea 
would ¬ immediately settle things.8  Prime Minister Abe 
offered a similarly guarded public statement on June 25, 
saying Japan &must carefully monitor whether North Korea 
will actually carry out that action.8 
 
¶3.  (C)  Other editorials expressed concern with what they 
claimed to be an attempt to exclude the abduction issue from 
the Six-Party process.  Asahi observed that Japan has little 
direct contact with Pyongyang, forcing Tokyo to &stake its 
only chance for achieving success on the abduction issue on 
progress in the bilateral dialogue between the U.S. and North 
Korea.8  Mainichi reporter Koichi Yonemura took a different 
tack, telling us it was widely recognized in Japan that to 
mix the nuclear and abduction issues was &illogical and 
inconsistent.8 
 
¶4.  (C)  DPRK expert Hajime Izumi of Shizuoka University told 
Embassy Tokyo that A/S Hill,s visit to Pyongyang, because it 
took place before the shutdown of the nuclear facilities, 
called into question the legitimacy of Six-Party discussions 
and gave the international community an &excuse to criticize 
the visit.8  Meanwhile, Masaharu Nakagawa, Deputy Chairman 
of DPJ Abduction Issue Strategy, warned that if the U.S. 
continued its bilateral dialogue with North Korea, the 
Six-Party Talks might become a faade. 
 
¶5.  (C) On June 24, Prime Minister Abe publicly dismissed 
reports that Japan had been kept in the dark about A/S 
Hill,s mission and stressed that Japan and the U.S. have an 
&unshakable alliance.8  Tadasu Yano, Policy Secretary to 
LDP Councilor Ichita Yamamoto, told us that the LDP was 
generally satisfied with A/S Hill,s visit to Pyongyang. 
Finally, media contacts have observed that concern over A/S 
Hill's Pyongyang visit has also been mitigated by his 
continuing &celebrity8 status in Japan. 
SCHIEFFER