VZCZCXRO8425
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTC #1386 2011540
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 201540Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9870
INFO RUEHAT/AMCONSUL AMSTERDAM 3350
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEAHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 001386 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/UBI 
HOMELAND SECURITY FOR OIA - DGORDNER 
DOE FOR MEGAPORTS PROGRAM - WKILMARTIN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EWWT KHLS KRAD PTER NL
 
SUBJECT: ROTTERDAM PORT RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING SYSTEM IN PLACE 
 
¶1.  Summary: The port of Rotterdam recently completed the 
installation of 40 new radiation portal monitors (RPMs) at all 
container terminals.  Dutch Customs, which operates the monitoring 
program, demonstrated the new system July 10 for officials from the 
U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Megaports Initiative.  DOE 
officials noted that Rotterdam officials have been actively sharing 
information with the U.S. to improve the capability for detecting 
illicit nuclear material. End Summary. 
 
¶2.  With the completed installation of all 40 RPMs, Rotterdam now 
scans 100% of the containers that enter and exit the port by train 
or truck for nuclear and radiological materials.  The 40 RPM gates 
are manufactured by SAIC and are similar units to those installed at 
US borders and ports. As container trucks enter or exit the port 
(trains are only scanned upon entry into the port) they pass through 
inconspicuous booms on both sides of the road that passively scan 
and record the containers identification number and the radiation 
level of the container. A central command post monitors the RPM 
gates and sends trucks to a secondary inspection station if the scan 
indicates higher than normal radiation levels.  For the vast 
majority of container trucks and trains, there is no noticeable 
delay as a result of the scan. Dutch Customs indicted that the 
secondary alarm rate was less than 2% of scanned containers. 
 
¶3.  On June 10, 2007, DOE Representatives William Kilmartin, 
Megaports Program Manager, National Nuclear Security Administration 
and David Kostorowski, Program Manager, Pacific Northwest National 
Laboratory and Embassy Global Officer met with Sylvia Niesing, Dutch 
Customs, Team Leader, Nuclear Detection, Port of Rotterdam.  Ms. 
Niesing was accompanied by a group of technicians and customs 
inspectors that shared technical information with DOE 
representatives. 
 
¶4.  Rotterdam has been a leader in implementing strong security 
measures.  Rotterdam is Europe's largest container processing port. 
It was the first foreign port to sign onto the U.S. Container 
Security Initiative (CSI) Program, in September 2002, and was an 
early partner for DOE's Megaports/Second Line of Defense Initiative. 
 DOE first installed 5 RPMs in Rotterdam as a pilot project in 2004. 
 The Dutch subsequently decided to expand the monitoring program to 
cover additional container terminals.  Instead of having DOE pay for 
the expanded program, the Dutch government purchased 40 RPMs, at a 
cost of 30 million euros, by contracting with Siemans AG in 2005. 
It is the first port of its size to have completed implementation of 
a program for radiation monitoring that covers the whole container 
port.  DOE officials noted that the Dutch installation has enhanced 
features that they would like to consider incorporating into future 
U.S. international deployments.  For example, there is a large 
monitoring screen in the command post that relays real time video 
and data from all 40 RPMs.  Redundancy is built into the system so 
that any one command post can assume control of all 40 RPMs in case 
of a malfunction. 
 
¶5.  DOE officials stated that Rotterdam's early adoption of the 
Megaports Initiative and CSI has helped persuade other ports to work 
with the U.S. on cargo security measures.  As Europe's largest port, 
and one of the largest in the world, Rotterdam's decisions influence 
other ports.  In the last 3 years, Dutch Customs officials, at the 
request of DOE, have hosted visits from over 15 different countries 
to review the operation of their radiation portal monitors. DOE 
officials stated that these visits convinced many more ports to 
adopt radiological monitoring programs. 
 
¶6.  Rotterdam scans all containers that enter or exit the port by 
truck and scan all containers that enter by train; it does not scan 
containers that are transferred from one ship to another, or from 
inland barges to ships within the port.  These transhipments account 
for 10% of the total container traffic in Rotterdam.  Due to 
operational impacts there is no plan to scan transhipments at 
Rotterdam.  DOE officials noted that scanning transshipped 
containers continue to be a challenge at international ports. 
 
¶7.  Dutch Customs officials indicated they are "cautiously" 
discussing an ambitious plan to x-ray all containers, in addition to 
scanning them for radiation.  Ms. Niesing noted that Shanghai's port 
already x-rays all of its container traffic, but no decision has 
been made yet on whether to adopt such a program in Rotterdam. 
Dutch Customs and DOE officials agreed to continue their on-going 
cooperation on data sharing and training, which each side agreed has 
been beneficial.