VZCZCXYZ0004
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #4546 1872035
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 062024Z JUL 07
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 0000

S E C R E T STATE 094546 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2017 
TAGS: PARM PREL KNNP MNUC KH KS UK
SUBJECT: POTENTIAL DPRK PURCHASE OF CURRENCY PRODUCTION 
EQUIPMENT AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY 
 
REF: A. STATE 071148 
     ¶B. STATE 071889 
     ¶C. BERLIN 000963 
     ¶D. STATE 061051 
     ¶E. BERLIN 000484 
     ¶F. EDDY/MOON EMAILS FEBRUARY 27 2007 
     ¶G. BERLIN 000354 
     ¶H. BERLIN 000318 
     ¶I. STATE 018308 
     ¶J. 2006 BERLIN 002224 
     ¶K. 2006 STATE 118598 
     ¶L. 2006 BERLIN 1876 
     ¶M. RUGGIERO/CONWAY EMAIL JUNE 21 2006 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY ISN PDAS PATRICIA A. MCNERNEY, 
REASONS: 1.4 B/D. 
 
¶1. (S) Action Request: Washington requests Post to draw from 
paras 7-12, as appropriate, in stressing to UK officials the 
U.S. warning that the DPRK may seek currency production 
equipment and technology from British companies for the 
production of U.S. counterfeit currency.  Request that para 
12 information  be delivered verbatim. SBU paras 7-11 may be 
handed over as a non-paper. Washington requests post to reply 
within 10 business days. End action request. 
 
¶2. (C) Objectives: 
 
-- Inform British officials of the U.S. concern that the DPRK 
may seek to purchase currency production equipment, 
technology, or related supplies from British companies that 
it could use to counterfeit U.S. currency. 
 
-- Explain the DPRK's current and past production and 
dissemination of counterfeit U.S. currency. 
 
-- Obtain assurance from British officials that they will 
remain vigilant and use their influence and legal 
authorities, if applicable, to prevent the sale or supply  of 
currency production equipment, technology, or related 
supplies to North Korea. 
 
End objectives. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
US-German Meetings on the Drent Goebel Issue 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (S) Background: The United States is concerned that North 
Korea is seeking to procure equipment and technology suitable 
for the production of counterfeit U.S. currency.  North Korea 
has approached Drent Goebel of Germany to purchase an 
intaglio press - capable of counterfeiting U.S. currency. The 
U.S. has repeatedly warned both Germany and Drent Goebel (in 
Germany) that North Korea could use this equipment to produce 
counterfeit U.S. currency (see refs). 
 
4.(S) ISN PDAS McNerney led a meeting with Treasury and 
Secret Service representatives on April 26 to receive an 
 
SIPDIS 
update on DPRK counterfeit U.S. currency activities and 
discuss the pending sale the Drent Goebel printing press to 
the DPRK.  The Secret Service reiterated that the press is 
capable of counterfeiting U.S. currency and recent 
investigations indicate that the DPRK continues to produce 
and distribute counterfeit U.S. currency.  They noted that 
amounts of higher denomination counterfeit U.S. currency have 
become more prevalent in the United States than abroad. 
 
5.(S) On Friday May 4, PDAS McNerney and Secret Service 
Deputy Assistant Director Michael Merritt met with the German 
DCM Johannes Haindl to reiterate Washington's continued 
concerns that Drent Goebel may go ahead with the sale of 
currency production equipment including an intaglio web-press 
to North Korea. She handed over a non-paper (ref B). Haindl 
reiterated previous statements by Senior German officials 
that they are well aware of North Korea's long record of 
counterfeiting and that the German Government could 
ultimately block the export of the printing press on foreign 
policy/national security grounds in the event Drent Goebel 
tried to go forward with the deal.  Haindl pledged that 
Germany would deny the shipment if the company moved forward 
with the sale, and encouraged the USG to share any specific 
information it has in other channels, and promised to pass 
USG concerns to appropriate ministries in Berlin. 
 
6.(S) On May 11, Global Affairs Counselor and Global Affairs 
Officer delivered a demarche to Michael Findeisen, the German 
Finance Ministry's Director of the Money Laundering and 
Terrorist Finance Division(ref B). Findeisen stated there is 
no/no likelihood of Drent Goebel beginning production at this 
point of the offset/intaglio press North Korea has sought. 
He noted North Korea has not even paid the initial deposit 
that would be necessary before the firm would start 
production.  Findeisen agreed with the importance of 
continued vigilance against the possibility that the DPRK 
might try to obtain the printing press through duplicitous 
methods.  He noted a legal agreement exists between the 
German Government and Drent Goebel that the company will 
inform the German Ministries of Economy and Foreign Affairs 
if North Korea approaches it again to resume the order for 
the printing press and also said the German Government has 
the legal authority, using a provision of the Foreign Trade 
and Payments Act, to prevent D 
rent Goebel from exporting the printing press to North Korea. 
 
 
--------------------------------------- 
THE DPRK COUNTERFEIT US CURRENCY THREAT 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Over the past several years, the U.S. Secret Service 
has implemented an aggressive campaign to stop the 
counterfeiting of U.S. currency by the DPRK through 
disruptions in the supply of materials and equipment used to 
produce counterfeit US currency. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The June 2006 Interpol "Orange Alert" describes the 
involvement of the government of the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea in the production and distribution of 
highly deceptive counterfeit US currency.  The notice says 
that these counterfeit banknotes, described by some as the 
"Supernotes" or "Superdollars" are distributed by DPRK 
officials.  These counterfeit banknotes are produced in the 
same manner as U.S. currency, utilizing similar processes and 
materials as U.S. currency. 
 
¶9. (SBU) In addition, the US Department of Justice indicted 
Sean Garland, an Irish citizen, for conspiracy and 
counterfeit acts committed outside the United States and for 
dealing in counterfeit obligations and securities.  This 
criminal indictment states that, "Quantities of the Supernote 
were manufactured in and under the auspices of the government 
of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Individuals, 
including North Korean nationals acting as ostensible 
government officials, engaged in the worldwide 
transportation, delivery, and sale of quantities of 
Supernotes." 
 
------------------------------------ 
LAW ENFORCEMENT WARNINGS TO INDUSTRY 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (SBU) The Secret Service requested Interpol assistance in 
disseminating information regarding the illicit activities of 
the DPRK. Interpol responded by issuing an "Orange Alert" in 
2005 and 2006 cautioning Interpol member countries about 
"Supernotes" and recommending the restriction of the sale and 
shipment of banknote production equipment and supplies to the 
DPRK. Interpol also hosted a meeting in Lyon, France in 
January 2005, for the leading companies within the banknote 
industry - including Drent Goebel.  At this meeting the 
Secret Service presented evidence of currency counterfeiting 
 
SIPDIS 
activities attributable to the DPRK. 
 
-------------------------- 
MEETINGS WITH DRENT GOEBEL 
-------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Since late 2005, the U.S. Secret Service and U.S. 
Embassy in Berlin have met several times with Drent Goebel 
executives and German government officials to discuss Drent 
Goebel's scheduled sale of an offset/intaglio web-press. 
During meetings with Drent Goebel officials, the U.S. Secret 
Service presented evidence of the DPRK's involvement in the 
production and distribution of "Supernotes" and provided them 
with a copy of the latest Interpol "Orange Alert".  The US 
subsequently requested Drent Goebel cancel the pending sale. 
Requests, however, have thus far been met with assurances by 
Drent Goebel that the press could be modified to prevent 
misuse by the DPRK.  The U.S. Secret Service has concluded 
the proposed modifications to the press would be insufficient 
to prevent the production of counterfeit currency by the 
DPRK. 
 
¶12. (S//Rel UK) Begin points for the UK 
 
-- In light of our commitment to share as much information 
with your government as possible on illicit DPRK activities, 
we would like to raise concerns about North Korea's continued 
efforts to acquire technology from Drent Goebel (a German 
firm with headquarters in Netherlands) that is suitable for 
the production of counterfeit U.S. currency. 
 
-- We believe that North Korea's Central Bank continued to 
seek currency production equipment from the German firm Drent 
Goebel in late December 2006.  We understand that the North 
Korean Central Bank sought currency paper manufacturing 
equipment and may also remain interested in purchasing a high 
security printing press from Drent Goebel.  Both sets of 
equipment are suitable for the production of counterfeit U.S. 
currency, possibly including Supernotes. 
 
-- We believe this equipment would be a custom made device 
and Drent Goebel would need to contact suppliers in at least 
the UK and Germany.  Thus, we are concerned that this 
transaction may involve other German companies and possibly 
British companies. 
 
-- We urge the UK to take all necessary actions, according to 
your national legal authorities, to prevent the sale or 
transfer of any equipment or technology that may be suitable 
for the counterfeiting of U.S. currency from being exported 
or transshipped from or through your territories to North 
Korea by companies or individuals under your legal 
jurisdiction. 
 
-- We look forward to working with you on this and other 
related security matters and  are prepared to provide 
additional assistance as appropriate. 
 
End points for UK. 
 
¶13.  Washington point of contact for follow-up information is 
Michelle New, ISN/CPI, (202) 647-0186, 
NewML@state.sgov.gov. 
 
¶14. (U) Please slug all responses for ISN, EAP, EUR,INL and 
Treasury/TFI.  Please include SIPDIS in any response. 
Washington appreciates Post's assistance. 
RICE