VZCZCXRO2244
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHC #3146/01 2061641
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 251630Z JUL 07
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 3224
INFO DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 103146 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
PARIS FOR GD'ELIA 
RKANEDA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2017 
TAGS: MOPS MASS PBTS KPKO PREL PREF EUN CT CD FR
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE: WORKING WITH THE FRENCH IN EASTERN CHAD 
 
REF: A. (A)USEU BRUSS 2302 
 
     ¶B. (B)PARIS 2913 
     ¶C. (C)PARIS 2837 
     ¶D. (D)NDJAMENA 530 
     ¶E. (E)NDJAMENA 504 
     ¶F. (F)USEU TODAY REPORTS 
 
Classified By: AF A/S Jendayi E. Frazer for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (U) Department requests Embassy Paris to convey to French 
government officials the USG support for Foreign Minister 
Kouchner's plan to deploy a European Security and Defense 
Policy 
(ESDP) bridging mission in Eastern Chad and to explore what 
types of assistance the French might need and desire from the 
U.S. 
 
OBJECTIVES 
---------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Department requests that Embassy pursue the 
following 
objectives: 
 
--Inform the French government that the USG is supportive of 
the 
French proposal for an international humanitarian peace 
support 
operation in eastern Chad. 
 
--Solicit more information about the mission itself and about 
how the mission will interplay with other initiatives in 
Chad, 
including ongoing humanitarian operations. 
 
--Query contacts about the type of support the U.S. could 
provide 
to advance the French proposal.  We look forward to working 
with 
France and the EU on civilian aspects; encourage France to 
direct 
any requests for non-EU military, logistics or training 
support 
through NATO, where the U.S. and other Allies could consider 
potential contributions; 
 
--Express Department's willingness to participate in further 
discussions about the mission in either Washington or Paris. 
 
REPORTING DEADLINE 
------------------ 
 
¶3.  (U) Embassy should report results of efforts by cable by 
August 1. 
 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Over 400,000 individuals are now displaced in 
eastern 
Chad (235,000 Darfur refugees and over 170,000 internally 
displaced persons).  Insecurity continues to hamper the 
ability 
of the UN and non-governmental organization (NGO) partners to 
deliver humanitarian assistance, prevents IDPs from returning 
home, 
and negatively impacts the lives of Chadians who are trying 
to 
remain in their homes.  Armed groups operate throughout the 
area 
and can misuse refugee and IDP camps with impunity.  The 
inability 
of the Government of Chad (GOC) to provide basic law and 
order 
in the region and effectively suppress (through negotiation 
or 
force of arms) cross-border threats to the regime suggests a 
need 
for external actors to step in to effect peace and security. 
The 
GOC continues to oppose a robust UN peacekeeping force in 
eastern 
 
STATE 00103146  002 OF 004 
 
 
Chad as suggested in 2006, but seems open to the French 
initiative, 
without committing to an eventual UN force to which the ESDP 
mission would bridge. 
 
¶5. (SBU) To address the situation, in June, French Foreign 
Minister Bernard Kouchner proposed an initiative to address 
security 
concerns in eastern Chad.  The initiative has two goals: 
first, to 
improve security in and around refugee/internally displaced 
person 
(IDP) sites and in areas from which many of the IDPs 
originated by 
deploying an interim force in eastern Chad; and second, to 
launch a 
civil reconstruction effort in the areas whence the IDPs fled 
in 
order to promote return, recovery, and reconciliation.  The 
security 
force would not have a mandate to secure or manage the 
Sudan-Chad 
border. 
 
¶6. (C) According to a non-paper circulated by the French in 
June, 
the "civilian" (police/gendarme/stability police) component 
of the 
security force would include 800 Chadian gendarmes and 230 
international police/gendarmes, mostly from Francophone 
countries. 
The French had envisioned that the police force would be 
blue-hatted 
and would be commanded by an international police officer. 
The 
non-paper is silent about the composition of the military 
force, 
but reports from Brussels suggest that the military force 
would be 
comprised of 2,000-3,000 EU troops as part of an ESDP 
deployment, 
protecting a 900 km by 200-400 km zone in eastern Chad.  The 
French 
do not want to provide more than half the total troops, and 
are 
apparently concerned about force generation.  Sweden is 
reportedly 
considering offering troops, perhaps as part of the Nordic 
Battlegroup that would follow an initial deployment by the 
French. 
 
¶7. (C) The mission was briefed to the USG as a temporary 
mission 
(from October 2007 to May 2008 approximately) that would be 
followed 
by a UN military force in eastern Chad, a force that the USG 
still 
considers a priority.  Since the original briefing, there are 
reports 
that this mission may end in one year or with the deployment 
of the 
hybrid UN-African Union force. 
 
¶8. (U) The Secretary expressed her support for such a mission 
when 
she met with President Sarkozy and FM Kouchner in Paris in 
June. 
The Department is exploring ways in which we can be helpful. 
Some 
ideas include: 
 
--Utilizing our positive relationship with the AU and UNSC to 
obtain 
buy-in for the initiative and to support a UNSC authorization 
for 
the bridging force. 
 
--Encouraging Germany and other EU members to support the 
French 
initiative and contribute troops, without diminishing the 
priority 
of other ongoing missions' needs, particularly in 
Afghanistan. 
 
--Encouraging DPKO to broaden its thinking when formulating 
options 
for a possible follow-on force. 
 
--Committing USG funding for the follow-on UN force. Congress 
 
STATE 00103146  003 OF 004 
 
 
granted 
83 million dollars for a UN force in Chad through the fiscal 
year 2007 
supplemental appropriation.  This funding may only be used 
for assessed 
contributions to UN peacekeeping operations. 
 
--Should funding permit, providing training through the 
Center of 
Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU) for 
international 
gendarme peacekeepers to deploy as part of the bridging force. 
 
--Training and equipping of African military forces for this 
mission, 
if funding is available.  This or similar requests for 
security, 
training or logistics assistance from the United States for 
the 
proposed ESDP should be directed through NATO. 
 
¶9. (U) The Department requests that Embassy Paris ascertain 
the 
following information about the plan: 
 
--The size of the military component of the force and the 
expected 
role and contribution of each EU member nation.  Have any 
countries 
committed to sending troops? Will the ESDP include enabling 
forces? 
How will the force be supplied?  How will the EU deploy such 
a force? 
What type of units will it include?  What will be their Rules 
of 
Engagement (ROE)? 
 
--The role of the United Nations.  Will France still pursue a 
robust 
UN peacekeeping force to follow the France-EU force?  If so, 
has there 
been any progress in obtaining Chadian buy-in for the 
follow-on force? 
The UN peacekeeping mission will also include a presence in 
the 
Central African Republic (CAR).  Will the EU consider a 
bridging 
presence in the CAR? Would current initiatives, such as the 
Central 
African Multinational Force (FOMUC) or the French presence in 
CAR, 
be expanded?  We believe a UN peacekeeping deployment in CAR 
could help 
address spillover from Darfur and provide a useful base for 
launching 
UN peacekeeping in Darfur and Chad. 
 
--The participation and role of the African Union and the 
militaries 
and police forces of its members states in the mission. 
 
--Will the force include a political component or address 
domestic 
Chadian issues such as political reconciliation?  What do 
French experts 
see as the root causes of the instability in Eastern Chad, 
and how will 
the proposed security and reconstruction mission address 
those drivers 
of instability? 
 
--What level of Chadian participation is expected? 
 
¶10. (SBU) The USG is also interested in partnering with 
France and with 
the EU on the civilian aspects of this initiative.  We intend 
to 
increase our emergency humanitarian non-food assistance to 
IDPs with 
supplemental budgets provided to USAID's Office of Foreign 
Disaster 
Assistance (OFDA), as well as to State's Bureau of 
Population, Refugees, 
and Migration (PRM).  We would be interested in hearing more 
about 
France and EU reconstruction efforts and how we can best 
coordinate our 
extensive humanitarian efforts in the region with their 
efforts. 
 
STATE 00103146  004 OF 004 
 
 
 
 
POINT OF CONTACT 
---------------- 
 
¶11.  (U) Please contact Madeeha Ashraf at (202) 647-1637 or 
via e-mail 
for any necessary further background information or 
argumentation to 
meet our objectives. 
RICE