VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSJ #1317/01 1911920
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 101920Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8470
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 4070
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM J1 MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEHOND/DIR ONDCP WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM  PRIORITY
RUEABND/DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN HQ WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SAN JOSE 001317 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA FOR JASON MACK 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2017 
TAGS: PINR PREL PTER SNAR XK
SUBJECT: COSTA RICA FOILS COLOMBIAN CARTEL ASSASSINATION 
PLAN 
 
 
Classified By: CDA DHENIFIN For Reason 1.4 (d) 
 
 
 
¶1. (S) SUMMARY. In late June, the GOCR foiled a plan by 
traffickers linked to the Colombian Norte del Valle cartel to 
assassinate Minister of Public Security Fernando Berrocal, 
apparently in retaliation for the recent (and notable) 
counternarcotics successes of the Arias administration. 
Elements of the national intelligence service  (DIS), the 
Drug Control Police (PCD), the Judicial Police (OIJ), the 
Special Immigration Police, and the regular police (Fuerza 
Publica)  combined forces to break up the plot.  Despite GOCR 
public statements suggesting that other cabinet-level 
officials were also at risk, Berrocal  was the real target, 
with some lower-level police officials also in the cross 
hairs.  A down payment of USD 50,000 had been paid to the hit 
men, who were to receive an additional USD 100,000 upon 
success.  Five Colombian citizens --the supposed hitmen -- 
were deported to Bogota on June 30, but released shortly 
after arriving in Colombia since they had technically broken 
no law in either country.   We hope this near-miss will be a 
wake-up call to re-energize GOCR efforts to build a more 
effective domestic security as part of a coordinated national 
domestic security strategy.   END SUMMARY. 
 
GOCR ACTION 
============ 
¶2. (U) Since the start of the Arias administration in May 
2006, over 45.5 metric tons of narcotics have been seized in 
unilateral GOCR or joint US-Costa Rican actions in Costa 
Rican territory.  This underscores the success of the Arias 
administration,s anti-drug efforts, its commitment to combat 
drug trafficking, but also the magnitude of the problem. 
Additionally, large amounts of currency (over one million USD 
since 2005), marijuana, and Ecstasy pills have been seized. 
According to Vice-Minister of Public Security Rafael 
Gutierrez, 52 Colombian citizens have been arrested in the 
past year for those and other crimes. 
 
TRAFFICKER REACTION 
==================== 
¶3.  (S)  The GOCR,s efforts , in particular the seizure of 
two Central Valley caches totaling over 4 mts, apparently had 
a significant enough impact on a Choco-based operation linked 
to the Norte de Valle cartel to prompt a reaction.  A 
five-member hit team was dispatched to Costa Rica, with plans 
to also send a larger surveillance team.   Minister Berrocal 
was the only confirmed cabinet-level target, although the 
media mentioned Minister of the Presidency (and the 
president,s brother Rodrigo Arias as a target.  (Of note, 
Attorney General Franciso Dall,anese erroneously inisisted 
to the media that he, too, had been targeted.)  The hitmen 
were also reportedly gunning for key vice ministerial-level 
figures, according to Public Security Minister Berrocal. 
 
GOCR RESPONSE 
============== 
¶4. (S)  Tipped off by intelligence information, key elements 
of the national intelligence service (DIS), the drug control 
police (PCD), the judicial police (OIJ), the immigration 
police, and the regular police (Fuerza Publica) broke up the 
plot.   A US-vetted DIS unit played the leading role.  Three 
Colombians were arrested on June 28 in Alajuela, with two 
more in Esparza on June 29.  Of the initial three arrestees, 
who had been in the country for up to one year, two had 
married local prostitutes in an attempt to legalize their 
immigration status (a common practice in Costa Rica). Their 
marriages were not yet recorded, however, affording them no 
special immigration status.  The third subject had applied 
for political asylum, which was denied.  The other two 
arrestees had been in the country for just a few weeks. 
 
¶5.  (C) The five Colombians were held on public security and 
immigration charges, then deported on June 30, in careful 
coordination with the GOC.  Because the deportations were 
based primarily on intelligence and not law enforcement 
information, and because there were no charges or warrants 
against the five in Colombia, they were released on July 1. 
On July 2, Berrocal issued a statement which respected the 
GOC decision and added that &on-going investigations 
continued8 in both countries.  Vice Minister Gutierrez added 
that the GOCR could not charge the Colombians "because we 
 
only had indications that they were going to do something." 
Privately, GOCR authorities are satisfied that the detentions 
and deportations have stopped the assassination plot, despite 
the quick release in Colombia. 
 
WHY BERROCAL? 
=============== 
¶6.  (C) In addition to the GOCR,s counter-drug cooperation 
and successes (which continue this week against two go-fast 
boats off Costa Rica,s Pacific Coast), we assess that 
Berrocal was targeted for three reasons.  First, the 
traffickers probably considered any Costa Rican official to 
be a relatively soft target, certainly by Colombian 
standards.  Second, Berrocal was the logical choice, given 
his ministerial portfolio and his public role touting Costa 
Rica,s CN successes.  Third, the traffickers needed to send 
a message to the GOCR, their presumably compromised network 
in Costa Rica, and their customers and suppliers in the 
region that they remained in business, despite the recent 
setbacks.  A successful attack against Berrocal would have 
had a serious (and negative) impact on GOCR CN efforts, in 
our view.  Now that this plot has been broken up and made 
public (and Berrocal,s personal security appropriately 
improved), we expect the traffickers to turn their attention 
back to business as usual, at least for now. 
 
COMMENT 
========= 
¶7. (S)  The Good News:   Judging by the GOCR,s cartel 
"enemies," Costa Rica,s CN efforts are making a difference. 
Indeed, from our point of view, the GOCR continues to offer a 
lot of counter-drug bang for just a few bucks.   Furthermore, 
in his press comments, Berrocal clearly described the threat 
to Costa Rica from international trafficking, in sharp 
contrast to some of his comments after taking office last 
year suggesting that local crime, and not the "US-fueled" 
flow of drugs, was a more serious issue in Costa Rica.  The 
increased seizures demonstrate not only better law 
enforcement efforts but increased cooperation between 
intelligence units and the police.  The Bad News:  We can,t 
remember such a bold cabinet-level assassination plot by 
narcos in the past in Costa Rica.  The drug game may be 
changing here, and not for the better.   We hope this 
near-miss will be a wake-up call to the GOCR to re-energize 
efforts to build a better-trained, better-equipped and more 
effective domestic security apparatus, within the framework 
of  coordinated national domestic security strategy. 
HENIFIN