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FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
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INFO RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH 8843
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 001412 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR ZEYA 
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP (WALKER, JACHIM, SRAMESH), INL, DRL, PRM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2017 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV KDEM ECPS SOCI SCUL SA
SUBJECT: GROWING PAINS: IMPROVEMENTS IN SAUDI MEDIA 
LIBERALIZATION 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Michael Gfoeller for 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C)  In the past five years, there have been significant 
and positive changes in the Saudi media thanks to King 
Abudullah, gains by moderates in the SAG, and subsequent 
ministry restructuring.  There are more moderate commentary 
in the press, more reporting done on previously taboo 
subjects, more inroads for women, and modifications to the 
previuosly ultra-conservative media.  The SAG has also used 
the press as a marketing tool for its reform initiatives and 
has improved its communication with the Saudi press.  The 
SAG, however, still retains direct and indirect controls over 
the media.  The trend for liberalization will likely continue 
as new technology and regional media will further limit the 
SAG,s control of news and information.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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A NEW SEASON PREMIERES IN SAUDI ARABIA 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  In the past few years, there have been significant 
and positive changes in the Saudi media, which were partly a 
result of two tragedies:  the 9/11 attacks, which riveted 
international attention on Saudi Arabia, the home of Osama 
bin Laden and a breeding ground for terrorism; and the Mecca 
fire in 2002 when 15 school girls died after members of the 
Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice 
(CPVPV) known as mutawa,een (religious police) prevented the 
unveiled girls from escaping their burning school.  The 
subsequent harsh criticism of this needless tragedy both 
weakened the institution of and public support for the CPVPV, 
a source of power and influence for Saudi religious 
conservatives, and gave moderates an opportunity to make 
major structural changes in the government. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Realizing it had to counter domestic extremism and 
improve its global image, accordingly, the SAG made changes, 
starting in 2003, by turning the Ministry of Information into 
the Ministry of Culture and Information (MOCI),  placing all 
cultural programs previously scattered throughout the 
government, often in the vice-like grip of religious 
conservatives, under one umbrella.  The groundwork was laid 
for Dr. Iyad bin Amen Madani, who was named MOCI Minister in 
February 2005, to make dramatic changes in Saudi cultural 
policy, which in turn impacted positively the Saudi media. 
For example, moderate voices are now heard in Saudi literary 
clubs (one of the few government-sanctioned outlets to 
promote intellectual debate); book fairs are open to mixed 
gender audiences and display previously-banned books; 
cultural activities are co-sponsored with foreign embassies; 
and Saudi culture has been promoted abroad with cultural 
tours in Russia, China and the EU. 
 
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HOME IMPROVEMENT:  SAUDI MEDIA EXPANDS ITS REPORTING 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  Saudi media have quickly followed suit, routinely 
publishing articles on previously unreported topics and 
commentaries critical of certain government entities, notably 
the once untouchable CPVPV.  Journalist can do more 
investigative journalism on issues that were once banned from 
open public discussion, such as domestic abuse, women,s 
rights, prostitution, homosexuality, drug and alcohol abuse, 
poverty, and crime.  A recent example is the reporting on the 
deaths of three Saudi citizens, allegedly at the hands of the 
mutaw,een, that has resulted in substantial and harsh 
criticism of the CPVPV. 
 
¶5.  (C)  SAG-controlled media have also become more moderate. 
 In 2004, the 24-hour, SAG-controlled news channel 
Al-Ikhbariyya was launched to improve the image of Saudi 
Arabia, complete with women broadcasters (in hijab but 
wearing makeup).  The SAG-controlled Holy Qu,ran radio, 
broadcast throughout the region and Africa, changed its 
format from continuous, ultra-conservative sermons to more 
moderate sermons, news bulletins, and informative and 
educational programming.  "Oprah-style" call-in shows are 
proliferating on TV and radio throughout the region featuring 
religious sheikhs who cite the Holy Qu'ran in order to 
provide family counseling on once-taboo topics.  For example, 
 
RIYADH 00001412  002 OF 003 
 
 
they have reprimanded a husband for taking a second wife and 
ignoring his first wife while she was in the hospital for a 
kidney transplant, chastised men for practicing the 
"pre-Islamic tradition" of not eating with their family, and 
asserted that women can sit in the front seat of a car with 
their husbands. 
 
¶6.  (C)  However, not all media have embraced change.  Saudi 
Channel I remains ultra-conservative, made up of primarily 
religious programming.  Also, MOCI Minister Madani has not 
had much luck with the Saudi Press Agency (SPA), which simply 
continues to parrot government statements, much to his 
chagrin. 
 
-------------------------------- 
LAW AND ORDER IN THE SAUDI MEDIA 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  Nonetheless, the SAG frequently uses the Saudi media 
as a tool to promote its reform programs, influence 
discussion, and test the waters among its very conservative 
population.  For example, the Shura Council will debate a new 
proposal that is reported in the press, generating commentary 
and debate.  Should the debate become confrontational or 
ignite severe pushback from religious conservatives, the 
Minister of Interior will make a negative public comment, 
which is dutifully widely reported in the press, thus 
effectively shelving the proposal.  Consequently, press 
coverage and discussion on the issue disappears.  This 
pattern has been frequently repeated, such as with a proposal 
for Saudi women to drive, changing the Saudi weekend to 
Friday/Saturday, or allowing classes to be taught in English. 
 
¶8.  (C)  However, Saudi journalists stress that they no 
longer must wait for the MOCI to "bless" a story before 
running it.  They also frequently emphasize that the SAG has 
taken proactive measures to improve cooperation with the 
media.  For example, Saudi government officials are 
conducting more press conferences and interacting with the 
media.  Many of the ministries, such as the Ministry of 
Health and the CPVPV, now have media spokesmen.  Coverage of 
debate within the SAG has also increased.  The once-closed 
debate in the Shura Council was first opened to print media, 
then a weekly TV summary.  The MOCI has announced that a 
C-SPAN-type channel will soon be devoted to the Council, 
providing Saudis full access to these discussions. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Lastly, foreign journalists are now more accepted in 
the Kingdom, obtaining visas and credentials more rapidly. 
Reuters and Agence France Press now have offices in the 
Kingdom, as do Russian and Chinese media outlets.  There are 
also plans for a BBC Arabic Channel in the Kingdom. 
 
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BIG BROTHER:  SAG STILL HAS THE UPPER HAND 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶10.  (C)  For worse or better, the SAG still oversees the 
Saudi media, directly controlling TV and radio channels and 
the SPA.  The government indirectly controls the 
"independent" print media through its press law, which 
mandates that a newspaper,s Board of Directors must submit 
nominations for editor-in-chief to the MOCI for final 
approval.  Also, each newspaper in the Kingdom is backed, if 
not owned, by a member of the Royal Family. 
 
¶11.  (C)  Saudi Radio also recently introduced a weekly 
program called "open majlis" in which Saudi citizens can 
freely air their grievances and complaints without 
censorship.  Reportedly, the program irritated several 
cabinet ministers who complained to MOCI Minister Madani 
about the frankness of the commentary and the sheer number of 
grievances.  However, these ministers stopped complaining 
once they were told that King Abdullah sponsored this 
program.  In a May 19, 2007, interview with Al-Hayat 
newspaper, the host of "open majlis" pointed out the 
usefulness of his program by contrasting its openness with 
the Saudi media which had failed to report on 20 percent of 
these complaints and grievances because they cross the SAG's 
red line. 
 
¶12.  (C)  Government control aside, newspaper editors also 
practice self-censorship based on what they assume the MOCI 
will allow.  Editors-in-chief often attend briefings at the 
MOCI to hear the SAG's view on current events and issues, and 
take their cues.  Interior Minister Prince Naif has also made 
 
RIYADH 00001412  003 OF 003 
 
 
a public point of meeting with editors.  Journalists know 
there are red lines that they dare not cross.  The Grand 
Mufti is beyond reproach.  The King and Royal Family are 
beyond criticism, as most recently and currently evidenced by 
reports in the international press on Prince Bandar,s 
questionable financial dealings.  Once Bandar issued a 
statement to the SPA, all reporting and commentary in the 
Kingdom stopped, even positive commentary defending the 
Prince.  Journalists who fail to heed unwritten rules are 
still routinely called in for questioning, according to Okaz 
Deputy Editor-in-Chief Khaled al-Firm, or simply fired. 
 
¶13.  (C)  Perhaps the most famous incident of the firing of a 
prominent editor for going over the red line, was the 
dismissal of Jamal Khashoggi, then editor-in-chief of 
Al-Watan, on May 27, 2003.  Allegedly, the SAG had Khashoggi 
fired because Khashoggi had criticized thirteenth and 
fourteenth century Hanbali jurist and favorite of Wahhabis, 
Ibn Tamiyya.  Khashoggi had blamed Ibn Tamiyya's fatwa, that 
said it was permissible to kill Muslims if they stood in the 
way of killing infidels, for encouraging extremism and 
terrorism.  At that time, Khashoggi was reacting to the 2003 
bombings of three Western compounds in Riyadh.  By the time 
of his firing Khashoggi had made many powerful enemies 
through his comments, notably the CPVPV, religious leaders, 
and conservatives.  However, in April 2007, Al-Watan, owned 
by then Asir Provinicial Governor Prince Khaled Al-Faisal and 
operated by Prince Bandar bin Khaled Al-Faisal, re-hired 
Khashoggi.  Upon his return, Khashoggi said that he felt 
encouraged by the changes in Saudi media, but that he knows 
his limits.  Khashoggi said that Saudi media is more open 
compared to 2003, that the environment is healthy now, and 
that most things that were once controversial are now being 
debated by every Saudi paper.  (NOTE:  No sooner had one 
branch of the Al-Faisal family fired Khashoggi than another 
branch, Prince Turki Al-Faisal, then Saudi Ambassador to the 
UK and later Saudi Ambassador to the U.S., hired Khashoggi as 
an advisor.  END NOTE). 
 
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WOMEN JOURNALISTS: THEY MIGHT JUST MAKE IT AFTER ALL 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶14.  (C)  Women are making gradual gains in the media and 
increasingly allowed to work at newspaper bureaus 
(specifically in Riyadh), though in separate, secluded 
offices.  Aforementioned Al-Ikhbariyya was the first Saudi TV 
network to feature women anchors, and Saudi Channel II 
Director Mohammed Barayan insisted that the women,s advisor 
be moved to an office on the same floor as the male 
executives. 
 
¶15.  (C)  Training for women (and men) in journalism remains 
limited.  There is only one journalism school in the Kingdom 
offering undergraduate courses to men only; women can, 
however, earn a master,s degree in journalism.  Several 
Saudi female journalists, highly educated and fluent in 
English, complain they are forced to report only on cultural, 
family, and religious issues.  Many of these women seek 
opportunities abroad in London or Dubai. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶16.  (C)  When compared to independent press in the West, 
Saudi Arabia still has a long way to go.  However, 
organizational changes in the ministries and opening up to 
more moderate views in the media indicate that liberalization 
is happening and likely to continue.  Cable TV packages 
offering pan-Arab news channels, such as Al-Jazira and 
Al-Arabiya, are already available to anyone who can afford a 
satellite dish, and the internet and inevitable new 
technologies will only increase access and speed to news and 
discussion.  Saudi bloggers, such as those on the site Sahat, 
are a popular means around the red-line restricted media. 
They are already adding a new element to political 
discussion, with outspoken voices boldly attacking the Royal 
Family, the religious establishment, and liberal voices. 
Saudi Arabia, like the rest of the world, is discovering the 
joys and sorrows of the Information Age.  END COMMENT. 
FRAKER