VZCZCXRO7086
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHPS #0593/01 2121547
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 311547Z JUL 07
FM USOFFICE PRISTINA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7579
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0962
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1237
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000593 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR DRL, INL, EUR/SCE 
NSC FOR BRAUN 
USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI 
EUR/ACE FOR DMAYHEW 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL EAID PREF PHUM SOCI KV UNMIK
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: SIGNS OF HARDLINE SERB CONSOLIDATION IN 
RUN-UP TO FINAL STATUS 
 
REF: A. PRISTINA 464 
     ¶B. PRISTINA 520 
     ¶C. PRISTINA 521 
 
Classified By: CHIEF OF MISSION TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Recent disturbing moves by Serb hardliners 
linked with the Belgrade's Coordinating Center for Kosovo 
(CCK) and the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) provide evidence 
that Belgrade is working to sow fear and mistrust between 
Kosovo Serbs and their Albanian and international 
interlocutors.  Kosovo Serbs, particularly those in enclaves 
south of the Ibar river, have been pressured not to 
participate in events linked to the international community 
or the Kosovo government.  Meanwhile, hardline Bishop 
Artemije and others in the SOC and GOS have recently made 
their own unhelpful moves, such as demanding the flying of a 
Serbian flag over the recently reconstructed Monastery in 
Zociste and persisting in their attempts to disrupt the work 
of the Reconstruction Implementation Commission (RIC). 
Although we have seen considerable unhappiness with this line 
from Kosovo Serbs in the enclaves, we have no reason to 
expect these hardliners to change their strategy.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
CCK PRESSURE ON THE SOUTH: VRBOVAC... 
 
¶2.  (C) In an apparent effort to consolidate its hold not 
only in the north of Kosovo but within Serb enclave areas in 
the south, we have seen increasing evidence of attempts by 
Belgrade's Coordinating Center for Kosovo (CCK) to sow fear 
and mistrust between local Serb communities and their 
Albanian and international interlocutors.  On July 6, we 
received a report from USKFOR in Vrbovac (Vitina/Viti 
municipality) describing a complaint by a local Serbian 
Orthodox priest about the activities of Vrbovac CCK activist 
Dejan Moskic.  Moskic had made outrageous statements to local 
Serb villagers, saying that the routine dismantling of a 
USKFOR forward operating base was in fact a sign that 
American troops would soon depart the area, to be replaced by 
Russian troops who would "look for traitors" among the local 
population.  Moskic also encouraged local Serbs to wear "Tsar 
Lazar Guard" t-shirts during the Vidovdan holiday June 28. 
(Note: June 28 is the much-commemorated date of the 1389 
Battle of Kosovo, in which Tsar Lazar was defeated by Ottomon 
forces. End Note.) 
 
...SILOVO... 
 
¶3.  (C) At the widely-covered inauguration of a UK-funded 
sewage system in the Serb village of Silovo (Gjilan/Gnjilane 
municipality) July 17, Kosovo media noted the boycott of the 
event by the beneficiaries themselves, who were pressured not 
to attend by former local CCK leader and local IDP activist 
Milorad Todorovic.  UK Liaison Office DPO Ruari O'Connell 
told poloff that Todorovic attempted to block the 
participation of PM Ceku and any other Albanian PISG 
representatives from the event, but that the UK office went 
ahead anyway because the local Serbs did not oppose the 
project.  Some local Serbs did appear, bravely asserting to 
broadcaster RTK that they wished "both our governments could 
cooperate."  For his part, Ceku used his speech at the event 
as an opportunity to highlight Belgrade's "manipulation" of 
local Serbs. 
 
...AND BRESTOVIK 
 
¶4.  (SBU) In the Serb village of Brestovik (Peje/Pec 
Municipality), village leader Miodrag Dasic told the press 
July 17 that the village is suffering a water shortage, 
directly blaming the CCK and accusing it of blacklisting 
Serbs who work with Kosovo institutions or the international 
community and therefore prohibiting constructive cooperation 
between the village and the municipality on these problems. 
Saying that he had received no help from the CCK, he asked 
 
PRISTINA 00000593  002 OF 003 
 
 
the press "now that we are afraid to cooperate with anyone, 
to whom can we turn?" 
LITTLE TRACTION IN BABUSH 
 
¶5.  (C)  Serb returnees to the Ferizaj/Urosevac-area village 
of Srpski Babush (ref B) have also expressed their 
displeasure with CCK and the Serbian government.  In a July 
12 interview with Kosovo Serb KiM radio, village leader 
Novitsa Jovanovic expressed his frustration about the 
complete lack of support from the Serbian government, and 
told us July 18 that the village had yet to receive any help 
from Serbia or the CCK, adding that KFOR MNTF-E U.S. BG 
Earhart "will always be a welcome guest in our village" 
because of his attention to returnees' needs after their 
arrival in late June.  During a July 21 CODEL visit to the 
village, Jovanovic continued to praise USKFOR, UNDP, 
Ferizaj/Urosevac municipality, and others for helping the 
village, but never mentioned the Serbian government. 
 
MITROVICA: PRESSURE ON SERBS WHO COOPERATE WITH USOP 
 
¶6.  (C)  On July 9, Dajana Gosmanac, Kosovo Serb American 
Corner Coordinator in north Mitrovica, reported to PAO that 
she is under increasing pressure from local politicians, whom 
she would not identify, because of her work with USOP.  She 
said she is told that she is "collaborating with the enemy," 
and that her daughter, who traveled to the U.S. last year on 
a USG-funded fellowship, now feels ashamed of having done so. 
 Gosmanac, who has worked extensively with USOP in the past, 
including participation in training seminars in Pristina and 
Croatia, feared that politics was creeping into her everyday 
work, which she sees as purely cultural. 
 
PROVOCATIONS IN ZOCISTE, PRIZREN 
 
¶7.  (C)  On July 13, nearly 2,000 Serbs attended a 
celebration of the reconstruction of the Zociste monastery 
(Rahovec/Orahovac municipality), during which a Serbian flag 
was flown from the belfry.  Local Albanians, including the 
local KLA War Veterans Association, were offended by the 
flag's continued presence in the days following the event and 
by press interviews given by hardline Bishop Artemije to both 
Kosovo- and Serbia-based media outlets in which he asserted 
it was appropriate that the flag fly over Serbian territory, 
adding that KFOR could take it down if it were so inclined. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Moderate SOC leader Father Sava of Decani Monastery 
(protect) told USOP that Artemije issued the original 
instruction to fly the flag and has insisted that it remain 
there regardless of the consequences, which Sava and his 
patron, Bishop Teodosije, fear could stir conflict in Serb 
communities near Orahovac.  Upping the stakes, on July 26, 
monks at the Holy Archangels Monastery outside Prizren also 
raised a Serbian flag above their monastery.  On July 29, 
Holy Archangels monk Father Benedict gave an interview to the 
Kosovo daily "Express," in which he said that the monastery 
was Serbian territory and that Serbian flags would fly over 
all SOC monasteries and churches in Kosovo.  (Note: UNMIK and 
KFOR are monitoring the situation closely and believe that 
while it is not critical now, the continued presence of flags 
above SOC sites could exacerbate extremist feelings among a 
population fed up this summer with high temperatures, chronic 
water shortages and delays in the decision on Kosovo's final 
status.  End Note). 
 
ARTEMIJE STILL WORKING AGAINST CHURCH RECONSTRUCTION... 
 
¶8.  (C)  According to Father Sava, Artemije has also refused 
to bless churches reconstructed by the Reconstruction 
Implementation Commission (RIC), and has not allowed nuns at 
the Gracanica monastery to paint icons for a reconstructed 
church in Pristina.  Artemije refers to holy sites rebuilt by 
the RIC as "Teodosije's churches," considering them an 
abomination.  During a July 21 meeting with CODEL Bean, 
Artemije referred to "150 churches" destroyed since 1999, yet 
 
PRISTINA 00000593  003 OF 003 
 
 
refused to mention the RIC and its good work, much to the 
dismay of Teodosije.  Sava told us that "it is incredible how 
much they (SOC hard-liners and the Serbian government) are 
hysterically against reconstruction and anything constructive 
in Kosovo." 
 
...HAND IN HAND WITH BELGRADE 
 
¶9.  (C)  Although hardline Serbian Ministry of Culture 
representative Gordana Markovic has been replaced as the 
official Serbian government delegate to the RIC (ref C), she 
has continued her attempts to disrupt church reconstruction. 
RIC chairwoman Emma Carmichael told poloff July 20 that she 
has been compelled to intervene in order to prevent Markovic 
from attending RIC meetings.  Markovic forced herself into 
the June RIC meeting, declaring that "Samardzic has 
authorized me to be here," after which Carmichael asked her 
to leave the building.  Markovic reappeared for the July 17 
meeting but was again stopped (this time at the front of the 
building).  Carmichael expressed relief that Serbian 
President Boris Tadic's DS party controls the Ministry of 
Culture, which in turn appoints Serbia's representative to 
the RIC, thus insulating it from DSS-linked hardliners in the 
Ministry for Kosovo. 
 
LOCAL SERBS DESPAIR, BUT CANNOT EVADE THE MACHINATIONS 
 
¶10.  (C) Recent conversations with moderate Kosovo Serb 
politicians Oliver Ivanovic and Lipljan major Momir Cankovic 
provide some insight on how ordinary Serbs view these 
machinations.  Neither believed that Belgrade provides 
largesse for Kosovo Serbs out of any real concern for their 
welfare, but rather uses the threat of removing salaries, 
pensions and other payments to maintain control in 
Serb-majority areas.  Cankovic expressed the common fear 
among local Serbs that the Belgrade-provided public sector 
salaries of Kosovo Serbs will be cut off once status is 
resolved, a factor many Serbs are considering now in deciding 
whether to stay or leave Kosovo in the event of an 
independence declaration by Kosovar Albanians. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶12.  (C)  While the evidence remains anecdotal, there appears 
to be an emerging pattern both within the Belgrade-run CCK 
and other institutions associated with it, like the Serb 
Orthodox church, to enforce an increasingly strict policy of 
separation between local Serb communities and both Albanian 
and international interlocutors.  In some cases, this has 
extended even further into acts that are both provocative and 
dangerous.  We have not yet seen a Serb community refuse our 
aid or cut off ties completely, but it has happened to other 
international donors and it is clear to our colleagues at 
USKFOR that CCK interference is in several instances 
hampering their efforts to ensure close ties to Serb areas in 
their AOR.  We can expect such a pattern to intensify as 
negotiations on Kosovo's status draw to a close and we move 
closer to independence for Kosovo, though we are using every 
methodology at hand to keep the lines of communication open 
and clear.  End comment. 
KAIDANOW