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OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHFR #3213/01 2110953
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O 300953Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9203
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1318
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 003213 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2017 
TAGS: MOPS MASS PBTS KPKO PREL PREF EUN CT CD FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH VIEWS ON EU FORCE IN EASTERN CHAD 
 
REF: STATE 103146 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d 
). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  MFA DAS-equivalent Helene Le Gal on July 
26 said that France sought the deployment in eastern Chad of 
an EU peacekeeping force (2,000-2,500 troops) early in 
November.  Prior to that, France would seek a UN Security 
Council Resolution authorizing the EU to undertake the 
mission; the UNSCR was indispensable for the EU to establish 
the operation in conformity with EU legal requirements.  The 
purpose of the EU mission would be to provide security to the 
refugee and IDP camps in eastern Chad, but not to provide 
border security.  The UN, the French conceive, would agree to 
provide police/gendarme capability in parallel to the EU 
mission and agree to assume formal control of the overall 
operation one year after its deployment.  Le Gal said that, 
for the moment, France did not contemplate a direct U.S. role 
in this project, but she said that any USG political 
statements in support would be welcome, and that at some 
later stage the U.S. could play a role in prodding potential 
European troop contributors.  Le Gal said that a small part 
of the EU force could also deploy in the C.A.R.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Helene Le Gal, MFA DAS-equivalent for East and 
Central Africa, met with us on July 26 to discuss reftel 
demarche, and offered clear responses to its main points. 
 
OVERALL GAME PLAN 
 
¶3.  (C)  Le Gal said that France was working towards an early 
November deployment of an EU peacekeeping mission in eastern 
Chad, whose function would be to provide security for refugee 
and IDP camps; it would not be charged with securing the 
Chad-Sudan border.  The force would be composed of 
2,000-2,500 troops, with France providing the majority of the 
forces.  However, France and its EU partners would need a UN 
Security Council Resolution authorizing the EU to deploy the 
mission.  She said that the UNSCR did not need to be specific 
and could consist of a general authorization.  The resolution 
could also contain a provision stating that the UN would 
mount a civilian police mission in eastern Chad in 
conjunction with the EU mission.  As a third component, the 
UNSCR would also stipulate that the UN would assume control 
of the EU mission within one year after its deployment.  The 
EU mission itself would have an initial six-month mandate, 
with an option to extend it for six more months, after which 
the UN would assume control. 
 
¶4.  (C)  The UNSCR would allow the EU to create and structure 
the operation, in accordance with EU practices and 
procedures.  Le Gal noted that the decisions taken at the 
July 23 meeting were only preparatory; an "action commune" 
decision was required, and this could only happen with the 
UNSCR in place.  She noted Germany's reluctance to endorse 
the plan, and the fact that it had taken high-level 
engagement to prevent Germany from trying to block the 
mission at the July 23 EU session. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Le Gal said that France hoped the EU decision could 
take place circa September 10, which would require adoption 
of a Security Council resolution beforehand.  EU approval 
would authorize funding for such preliminary activities as 
fact-finding, military planning, development of a CONOPS, and 
other steps necessary before deployment could begin.  French 
military planners were already at work on a provisional 
CONOPS, which should ensure accelerated EU action. 
 
FORCES 
 
¶6.  (C)  MILITARY:  Le Gal said that the French would provide 
at least half of the 2,000-2,500 personnel and was therefore 
seeking roughly 1,000 troops from other EU members.  She 
believed Poland, Spain, and Sweden had committed about 150 
troops each, and Romania was considering participation. 
Non-EU states such as NATO-members Turkey and Norway were 
also possible contributors, although she said that EU members 
had to constitute the first deployment force.  The UK and 
Germany refused to contribute and Denmark (which had opted 
out of ESDP) could not participate.  Portugal had so far been 
mute, but Le Gal said that Lisbon, as the current EU 
president, would feel compelled to make at least a token 
troop contribution. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Le Gal said that French forces already deployed in 
Chad as part of Operation Epervier would not participate in 
the new mission.  Operation Epervier, she said, was primarily 
aerial in nature and did not include ground specialists, so 
France would need to deploy infantry troops for the EU 
 
PARIS 00003213  002 OF 003 
 
 
mission.  Operations Epervier, however, would provide 
logistical and transportation support, especially when the 
new operation's forces began arriving in Chad. 
 
¶8.  (C)  The Rules of Engagement for the new mission would be 
standard EU ROE ("comparable to but perhaps a bit less robust 
than NATO's," Le Gal noted), similar to the ROE that applied 
to the EU mission deployed in the DRC.  The UNSC 
authorization would not determine the mandate, CONOPS, or ROE 
of the EU mission, but it would specify the UN's own role, 
which Le Gal said would be primarily civilian in nature, 
specifically the CIVPOL component. 
 
¶9.  (C)  CIVPOL:  The part of the mission to be under UN 
control would involve 1,000 UN civpol, Le Gal anticipated. 
These would include the absorption under UN command and the 
UN salary structure of 800 Chadian gendarmes, some of whom 
were currently part of UNHCR efforts to provide refugee camp 
security.  Le Gal said that francophone African countries had 
to be the primary source of personnel; Jordanian civpol, for 
example, were not viable candidates.  France would contribute 
a few civpol, who would likely play a liaison role with Chad. 
 
CHAD'S VIEWS 
 
¶10.  (C)  Le Gal said that Deby remained unconvinced and was 
wary of the French plan, especially with respect to what he 
believed could result in a large-scale UN presence in eastern 
Chad.  Deby feared that the EU and UN operation could become 
a launching pad for a possible "invasion" of Darfur from 
Chad, thus embroiling Chad in a subsequent conflict with 
Sudan not of Chad's own making.  Le Gal stressed the need to 
convince him that the EU operation, followed by the UN 
mission, would be good for Chad, and to emphasize that 
neither mission would be huge in scale.  She added that the 
EU operation would not address political reconciliation in 
Chad, commenting that the EU already had an established 
process led by EU Commissioner Louis Michel. 
 
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 
 
¶11.  (C)  Le Gal said that the French plan included the 
deployment of a small contingent of EU forces into 
northeastern C.A.R.  In contrast to Chad President Deby, 
C.A.R. President Bozize actively wanted an EU or UN 
deployment.  Le Gal said that EU Foreign Policy Chief Solana 
had phoned C.A.R. President Bozize on July 25 and received an 
enthusiastic response.  Le Gal said that FOMUC forces, where 
were deployed in and around Bangui on a specific mandate, 
would not be involved in the EU operation, though there was a 
good case for placing FOMUC liaison officers within the EU 
operation.  French forces presently in C.A.R., specifically 
in Birao, could be rehatted for the new EU mission, she 
remarked, although the matter had not yet been settled. 
 
AFRICAN UNION 
 
¶12.  (C)  Le Gal said that France was not seeking an active 
AU role in the new mission in Chad -- the AU's approval, in 
the form of a Peace and Security Council declaration, would 
suffice, along the lines the AU had granted to the EU for its 
operation in the DRC.  She noted that FM Kouchner was 
currently in Addis Ababa and would discuss the matter with AU 
Chairman Konare.  The EU would likely offer the AU a liaison 
officer slot at the mission's headquarters.  When the EU 
dispatched forces to the DRC, it had made a similar offer, 
but the AU had declined.  Le Gal said that France was 
reluctant to seek involvement with Africa's subregional 
groupings, especially CEN-SAD, which Libya dominated. 
 
HUMANITARIAN/RECONSTRUCTION 
 
¶13.  (C)  Le Gal noted that appeals would be made to the 
usual UN agencies for humanitarian support for refugees and 
IDPs in eastern Chad.  She acknowledged that there was 
competition with Darfur for donor resources, with Chad's 
needs less well addressed.  Le Gal indicated that it was 
premature to consider longer term reconstruction issues. 
 
U.S. ROLE 
 
¶14.  (C)  At several points we asked whether France wanted or 
expected the U.S. to play an active role in this project. 
Underscoring that the Chadian operation would be an EU 
mission, Le Gal saw no need for direct U.S. involvement. 
However, she invited the U.S. to renew the discussion early 
in September, particularly with an eye to U.S. help in 
encouraging participation by Europeans and other potential 
troop contributors and in terms of focusing the UN.  France 
was grateful for U.S. humanitarian assistance in Chad and 
 
PARIS 00003213  003 OF 003 
 
 
would welcome public statements in support of the EU's 
operation. 
 
DARFUR 
 
¶15.  (C)  Le Gal believed the EU force would have a salutary 
impact on Darfur.  The border area in Chad would no longer be 
a No-Man's Land, and the refugee camps and IDP population 
would prove less fertile ground for militia recruitment. 
Darfur rebel factions would draw the message, she hoped, that 
they needed to participate in a political process. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶16.  (C)  Le Gal provided succinct and incisive responses to 
the issues raised reftel and, at least in general terms, 
presented a coherent vision of what the French want to 
accomplish.  However, rapid agreement among partners and 
equally rapid action in the UNSC and in Brussels will be 
necessary for the French to keep to their timetable, 
complicated by the inevitable worldwide summer slowdown -- Le 
Gal herself leaves shortly for three weeks of holiday.  She 
nonetheless expressed firm French commitment to this plan and 
is likely to remain a candid interlocutor during its 
development and implementation.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
 
PEKALA