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RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 003202 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2017 
TAGS: MOPS MARR PREL PGOV EU XH ZL FR
SUBJECT: DAS KRAMER'S JULY 20 PARIS QUAD MEETING 
 
 
Classified By: POL M/C JOSIAH ROSENBLATT FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: DAS Kramer met with his "Quad" (UK, France, 
Germany) counterparts on July 20 in Paris.  (Their last 
meeting had been in London, April 2007.)  Discussions 
included support for reform in Ukraine and key areas for 
further policy engagement there.  Ukraine, all agreed, was 
generally moving in a good direction.  Kramer outlined a 
proposed expansion of U.S. sanctions against Belarus to put 
pressure on the regime to release all political prisoners, 
but added we did not expect the EU to follow suit due to the 
political sensitivity of the issue and the recent revocation 
of GSP.  The Germans questioned whether Minsk was prepared to 
take a step forward at a time when Lukashenko thought he had 
already made positive steps that deserved to be rewarded. 
Kramer insisted that the Quad should note that the release of 
all political prisoners was the line in the sand.  All 
participants agreed on the need for more transparency from 
Moldova on their Transnistria discussions with Moscow. 
 
¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: France provided a summary of FM 
Kouchner's recent visit to Belgrade and Pristina.  FM 
Kouchner had asked the parties to engage constructively 
during upcoming negotiations.  France noted that EU 
discussions on the subject would be difficult, adding that it 
was a priority to convince the Spanish and the Swedes that a 
UDI might be necessary in the face of Russia's desire to 
maintain the status quo.  Kramer told the Quad that the U.S. 
was concerned about possible Russian recognition of 
Abkhazia's independence.  It was important to engage the 
Russians now with quiet, high-level diplomacy:  they had to 
understand the implications of their actions.  A longer 
discussion on Russia ensued, with Quad participants 
pessimistic about a change in Russian attitudes over the next 
two years.  EU and U.S. unity, everyone agreed, was vital in 
dealing with Russia. END SUMMARY 
 
¶3. (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
---- 
DAS David Kramer 
Poloff John Espinoza 
 
UK 
-- 
Anthony Smith 
Nicole Willey 
 
GERMANY 
------- 
Hans-Deiter Lucas 
Christina Beinhoff 
 
FRANCE 
------ 
Jacques Faure 
Aurelia Bouchez 
 
------- 
UKRAINE 
------- 
 
¶4. (C) The Quad shared similar views on the current political 
situation in Ukraine, and underlined seven key areas for 
continued policy engagement, noting a need to support Ukraine 
generally while staying out of internal political 
disagreements. Policy areas included: (1) urging quick 
formation of a new government; (2) energy security, including 
reform of the sector; (3) respect for human rights; (4) WTO 
accession; (5) raising NATO awareness; (6) elevating EU 
awareness and reform in line with EU standards; and (7) 
constitutional reform. 
 
¶5. (C) Overall, the Quad agreed that Ukraine was moving in a 
positive direction, albeit with fits and starts, and seemed 
to have (more or less) internal political consensus on the 
need to move towards the EU.  Awareness of EU institutions 
was lacking in public circles, Faure told the others, blaming 
a lack of activity by the local EU office.  Others agreed but 
warned that an aggressive campaign could backfire or lead to 
unrealistic expectations.  Expectations of Ukraine's 
political class about the EU and access to EU markets was 
finally becoming more realistic.  The EU had to be careful 
with its approach.  NATO membership, everyone agreed, was 
more controversial, therefore more visible.  Ukraine was not 
ready for membership, but the Quad noted that the Alliance 
should continue engagement. 
 
 
PARIS 00003202  002 OF 004 
 
 
¶6. (C) France's Bouchez expressed concern that Russia may see 
Western involvement in Ukraine as antagonizing.  Issues such 
as the Black Sea Initiative and NATO membership could put 
Russia, which always sees itself competing with the West in a 
zero-sum game, on the offensive.  She suggested that the EU 
in particular should be careful not to get into areas where 
Russia might put pressure on Ukraine to "choose" between 
partners.  Kramer and Smith both agreed that Russia made 
everything a zero-sum competition, while insisting that -- on 
serious issues -- this should only guide strategy, and not 
decisions. 
 
MOLDOVA 
------- 
 
¶7. (C) Quad participants all agreed on the need for further 
transparency on Moldovan discussions with Moscow on 
Transnistria.  Moldovan President Voronin continues to assure 
Quad countries that no decisions will be made outside of the 
5-plus-2 format, but his interest in basing his legacy on 
solving the Transnistria problem is a concern.  Bouchez said 
that the EU needed to work harder with Moldova on reforms; it 
was unclear if political will was the impediment, or lack of 
capacity to absorb concrete reforms.  Perhaps EU tools did 
not fit the Moldovan model.  Lucas insisted that the U.S. and 
EU should continue to deplore a lack of transparency, without 
being too concerned: Voronin would not take a unilateral 
step.  Kramer surmised that without Russian interest in a 
solution to the Transnistria issue, any forward movement was 
unlikely.  He was dubious that the 5-plus-2 format would 
resume any time soon. 
 
BELARUS 
------- 
 
¶8. (C) Kramer outlined USG intentions to impose additional 
U.S. sanctions against Belarus, including significantly 
expanding the visa ban list and likely freezing assets 
ofstate-owned companies that we believe are principal funders 
of Lukashenko's regime.  The goal, Kramer explained, was to 
increase pressure on Minsk for the release of six remaining 
political prisoners (three had been released).  Kramer added 
that the U.S. was prepared to withdraw the sanctions 
proposal, and ease current sanctions, if Minsk responded 
positively prior to implementation of the additional measures 
(most likely within the next two months).  These latest moves 
by the U.S. were not irreversible, but we felt forced to take 
them after telling the Belarussian regime we would do so in 
April unless they changed their behavior.  Change in 
behavior, Kramer emphasized, was what we sought, and 
tightening the noose was the best way to try to do that. 
Kramer made clear, however, that the U.S. understood EU 
sentiment on the issue, and would not push the EU to adopt 
similar sanctions in light of the recent decision to revoke 
GSP.  He also stressed the importance of maintaining a firm 
position unless Lukashenko did the right thing. 
 
¶9. (C) Lucas noted that Belarus had recently demonstrated 
some positive movement, including an agreement for opening an 
EU Commissioner's office, allowing the Belarus Helsinki 
Commission to remain open, and allowing foreign officials 
more latitude in traveling outside of the capital.  While 
Lucas did not defend Lukashenko, he wondered if the regime 
would be open to making more concessions at a time when it 
believed it should be rewarded.  Kramer interjected that 
recently there had been steps in the wrong direction, such as 
moves against youth activisits and others.  France's Bouchez 
noted that the U.S. and EU needed to discuss the transition 
from isolation to engagement, while recognizing that the 
process would be in stages.  She affirmed Kramer's 
observation that there was no appetite in the EU for harsher 
sanctions, and that any such move could damage EU unity. 
Kramer reassured the others that the U.S. was not looking for 
regime change but rather regime behavior change. 
 
¶10. (C) The quad agreed that the developing economic 
situation in Belarus could significantly affect its political 
future.  The economy appeared to be worsening in the face of 
higher energy prices.  Subsidies for military pensioners and 
students would soon be reduced -- a move that clearly 
signaled financial trouble for the government.  Lucas 
highlighted Russia's role as the only possible creditor for 
Belarus, thereby solidifying its position with Lukashenko. 
He added that as the international community sought change 
from Minsk, we had to keep the door open to dialogue and 
avoid driving the regime into the arms of Russia.  The Quad 
endorsed Lucas' comments to keep the door open -- Kramer said 
it was open, though not much -- but there was also a 
unanimous view that the fear of Russia's relationship with 
 
PARIS 00003202  003 OF 004 
 
 
Lukashenko would not affect Western demands for a respect of 
basic human rights.  Kramer added that there still appeared 
to be friction between Moscow and Minsk, underlining the fact 
that Moscow's choice for CIS SYG had not been supported by 
Lukashenko.  Our problems with Lukashenko, Kramer noted, were 
not driven by his relationship with Moscow but by his 
behavior internally. 
 
¶11. (C) Quad members all insisted that U.S. and EU engagement 
with mid-level officials would continue, as well as attempts 
to assist in the development of civil society and political 
parties (the opposition).  The EU plans further discussions 
on energy with Belarus, but on a technical level.  Kramer 
added that a small Department of Energy team may visit 
Belarus in August. 
 
KOSOVO 
------ 
 
¶12. (C) Faure reviewed FM Kouchner's visit to Belgrade and 
Pristina, noting that the Minister was warmly greeted in both 
cities.  Kouchner's message to both Belgrade and Pristina was 
that the Ahtisaarhi plan remained a good basis from which to 
work, and that the additional 4-6 month period for 
negotiations was a positive development that Serbia and 
Kosovo should use constructively.  PM Kostunica, as expected, 
did not welcome anything that hinted at Kosovar independence. 
 President Tadic and FM Jeremic were less guarded, though not 
particularly helpful on a positive way forward.  Faure also 
stressed that Kouchner had, for the first time, made a 
linkage between Kosovo and EU membership -- Serbia could not 
hope to join the EU as long as Kosovo's status was undecided 
and ethnic conflict still existed.  Pristina insisted that 
independence was the key issue and not negotiable.  KFOR, 
Faure reported, characterized the situation as calm but 
perceived impatience.  It was currently a mild concern, but 
they were preparing for any eventual possibility. 
 
¶13. (C) Herve Boisguiallaume, the French MFA's Kosovo expert, 
gave a quick rundown of Quint discussions and noted that the 
Quint would be announcing its failure to obtain a UNSCR at 
the UN due to Russian threats of a veto.  Quint Balkans 
directors would be meeting in Vienna on July 25 to discuss 
modalities of future negotiations.  EU discussions would 
begin on July 23; these would be difficult, Bouchez told us. 
Convincing the Swedes and the Spanish was the priority. 
Kramer noted that it would be better to solve the Kosovo 
issue before a new Russian president was elected; otherwise 
we risked putting the new President in a very difficult 
position, and there was no guarantee that dealing with Russia 
on this issue would get any easier with a new leader. 
 
KOSOVO: THE ABKHAZIA LINKAGE 
---------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) Kramer emphasized the need to dissuade the Russians 
from associating the Kosovo case with that of Abkhazia.  He 
proposed that Quad governments make several points to the 
Russians: (1) the stability and security of the South 
Caucasus could not be walled off from the North Caucasus, (2) 
no one had questioned the territorial integrity of Russia in 
1994 when Chechnya rebelled, and (3) the success of the Sochi 
Olympics could be in jeopardy if Russia mvoed forward with 
recognition of Abkhazia. 
 
¶15. (C) Bouchez and Lucas expressed concern over the Sochi 
Olympics proposal, and focused instead on a need to continue 
with confidence-building measures and obtain a successful 
renewal of UNOMIG in October.  Kramer noted that the 
Georgians had been restrained in their behavior, and should 
be given appropriate support.  The U.S. was looking for a way 
to show the Russians that recognition of Abkhazia would be 
extremely serious.  Putting pressure on Russia by discussing 
the 2014 Olympic games might convey the right message.  The 
U.S., however, remained open to other ideas.  Lucas also 
questioned the utility of a NATO visit to Tbilisi in the 
current timeframe -- wondering if it would only serve to 
further irritate Russia. 
 
RUSSIA 
------ 
 
¶16. (C) During an in-depth discussion of Russia's current 
motivations and attitudes, all Quad members shared one key 
assessment: Russia was not likely to change its attitude in 
the next two years and this was not good.  The trends in 
Russia and with Russian policy were not encouraging, but Quad 
members agreed this didn't mean they could ignore or simply 
confront Russia; they needed to engage on key issues as well. 
 
PARIS 00003202  004 OF 004 
 
 
Lucas underlined the need for patience and further 
engagement, noting that the EU had to do a better job of 
agreeing on common language and staking out "redlines."  He 
added that a positive agenda was key in order to show Russia 
that we recognized where common ground existed.  Lucas 
insisted that Russia was trying to play the role of a great 
power and it needed to be managed carefully. 
 
¶17. (C) France highlighted the need to avoid both complacency 
and open confrontation.  Faure mentioned five areas for 
further EU (and in some cases, U.S.) engagement: (1) early 
warning system for urgent crises; (2) dialogue on 
investments; (3) agreement on overflight fees for Siberia; 
(4) framework for WTO/Russia dialogue; and (5) completion of 
EU/Russia post-PCA agreement.  There was general agreement on 
these elements. Quad members unanimously emphasized the need 
for U.S./EU unity on the tougher issues. 
 
¶18. (C) Kramer agreed in general with EU members, and said 
that we would try to find common ground with Russia on 
missile defense and other strategic issues (Iran and North 
Korea), but he also noted the need to push back when 
appropriate.  He stressed the importance of EU-U.S. unity if 
we wanted to have opportunities to influence Russia.  Russia 
tended to present on many issues a mirror image of the U.S. 
and the West, a tendency that exacerbated problems.  It was 
important that they understood the need to think through 
their policies instead of just taking a contrary position, he 
said. 
 
¶19. (C) Meeting participants all expressed solidarity with 
the UK on its current diplomatic row with Moscow (Russian 
refusal to extradite Lugovoi), pointing out that the  matter 
went to the core of our common values. 
 
¶20. (U) This cable has been cleared by DAS Kramer. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
 
STAPLETON