VZCZCXRO4022
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHFR #3198/01 2080913
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 270913Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9174
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0830
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 5919
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 003198 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS RS ZL XT FR
SUBJECT: DAS KRAMER'S JULY 20 MTG WITH ELYSEE RUSSIA ADVISOR 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT FOR REASO 
NS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a July 20 meeting, Damien Loras, the 
Presidency's diplomatic advisor for the Americas, Russia, 
Central Asia, and non-EU Europe, including the Balkans, told 
DAS Kramer that France would recognize Kosovo's independence 
at the conclusion of renewed negotiations.  Loras stated that 
a credible process was necessary in order to garner more EU 
unity.  Kramer explained U.S. concerns about Russian actions 
on Abkhazia and defense issues, suggesting that quiet high 
level diplomacy was imperative.  Loras agreed and expressed 
the GOF hope that a resolution to the current CFE crisis 
could be found before Russian suspension took effect.  Both 
interlocutors suggested that a proposed G-7 meeting at the 
Political Director level could effectively demonstrate to the 
Russians that their actions were not without consequences. 
END SUMMARY 
 
KOSOVO 
------ 
 
¶2. (C) Loras noted that, despite current failure to obtain a 
UNSCR on Kosovo, the process had been vital to showing EU 
partners that the Quint had made a serious effort to engage 
Russia.  More EU unity had been the result.  Loras commented 
that although France did not expect much from new 
negotiations between the parties, the process itself was 
again key to obtaining more EU support for the UDI that would 
follow.  "We (the GOF) are committed to recognizing Kosovo's 
independence after negotiations," Loras stated. 
 
¶3. (C) Sarkozy had a positive conversation with Putin about a 
UNSCR a week before the resolution went into blue, Loras told 
us.  Putin seemed to agree that as long as the proposed UNSCR 
did not implicitly recognize Kosovar independence, there was 
no need for Russia to insist that the resolution exclude the 
possibility.  Despite this conversation, FM Lavrov and 
others, however, had refused to compromise.  Indeed, Russia's 
intentions had become clearer as negotiations over the UNSCR 
continued.  Loras wondered whether a single-sentence 
resolution on 1244 might have been preferable -- a Russian 
veto could have therefore implicitly ended the mission. 
 
¶4. (C) Loras and Kramer agreed that the U.S., together with 
the Quint, needed to make the Kosovars understand that 
patience would bring its rewards.  For its part, Loras said, 
Serbia needed to be convinced that its future in the 
Euro-Atlantic community would ultimately be affected by the 
way it conducts itself.  Kramer noted that the Kosovo process 
should be finalized before a new Russian president was 
elected; otherwise we risked putting the new President in a 
difficult position as well as beginning the relationship on a 
very sour note. 
 
RUSSIA AND ABKHAZIA 
------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) The U.S. believes Russia's threat to recognize 
Abkhazia's independence is credible, Kramer explained. 
Increased Russian rhetoric, moreover, had put Moscow's 
credibility on the line and made it more difficult for the 
Russians to withdraw their threat.  Loras agreed with 
Kramer's assertion that quiet, high-level diplomacy was 
needed now in order to discourage Russia from following a 
dangerous path.  Kramer suggested raising several issues 
related to Russia's possible unilateral recognition of 
Abkhazia: the success of the Sochi Olympics; the stability of 
the North Caucasus; and the credibility of Russia's future 
role in the Abkhaz peace process. 
 
 
RUSSIA AND DEFENSE ISSUES 
------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Kramer explained that the U.S. would continue to move 
forward with Poland and the Czech Republic on missile defense 
installations, while simultaneously pursuing with the 
Russians ideas on the Gabala radar site in Azerbaijan and the 
Armavir site in southern Russia; these were not mutually 
exclusive options.  Russian DFM Kislyak would be in 
Washington the end of the month for discussions on this 
issue.  Kramer told Loras that Russia did not share the U.S. 
threat assessment of Iran and could not accept that Russia 
was only an incidental player in our efforts to confront a 
potential Iranian threat.  Loras agreed with Kramer's 
 
PARIS 00003198  002 OF 002 
 
 
analysis of Russia's psyche, but noted that the Russians had 
been constructive on Iran issues, particularly at the G8 and 
the UNSC.  He suggested that Russia's analysis of the Iranian 
threat was not yet clear. 
 
¶7. (C) France hoped that some progress could be made on CFE 
before the Russian suspension went into effect in December, 
Loras told Kramer.  The Russians, he said, had proposed that 
some movement towards the adoption of the adapted CFE Treaty 
could stop the impending suspension.  Loras questioned 
whether some of the Baltic states could sign, but not ratify 
the treaty, as a sign of constructive engagement to Russia. 
Kramer insisted that any movement from the U.S. and Europe 
had to come in concert with a Russian step in the right 
direction.  We planned to discuss CFE with Kislyak as well, 
and we hoped to have a better sense of any Russian 
flexibility on CFE and its willingness to fulfill its 
Istanbul commitments.  (COMMENT: It was clear that Loras was 
looking to appease Russia in some way, but he avoided 
questioning the substance of the Istanbul commitments and the 
need for Russia to implement them.  He stressed, instead, the 
need for creative solutions.) 
 
RUSSIA AND THE UK 
----------------- 
 
¶8. (C) The GOF had publicly supported the UK on its recent 
diplomatic row with Russia, Loras said, but was disappointed 
that the British did not appear to have a strategy. 
Fortunately, he said, the Russian response thus far had been 
proportional.  Both agreed, however, that the deeper issue 
was more serious and called into question whether it was 
possible to have common values with Putin's administration. 
 
A G-7 MEETING ? 
--------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Loras expressed his support for a proposed G-7 meeting 
at the Political Director level that would exclude Russia. 
Kramer agreed that Russia had to understand that there were 
consequences to its actions and that such a meeting would 
send an appropriate signal.  Loras surmised that the other 
G-7 would attend if invited. 
 
¶10. (U) This cable has been cleared with DAS Kramer. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
 
STAPLETON